C. W. Wandell's Report of Trolling the Strangites with a Fake Revelation

  

C. W. Wandell wrote a revelation purporting to come from the Lord through J. J. Strang, to see what effect it would have upon the strangites. He sent it to Jehiel Savage, who took the article, went on to the stand, read it to the people and bore testimony that he knew it was from the Lord.

 

Brother Wandell seeing it was having an evil effect upon the followers of Strang, came out and acknowledged that he was the author of the article, that the Lord had nothing to do with it, and that Strang never saw it.

 

Brother Wandell found it unprofitable and dangerous business to use the name of the Lord falsely, that it was wrong and produced evil among the children of men; as was the case with William E. McLellan who undertook to imitate one of the Revelations of Jesus Christ and failed in the attempt, and although this article of brother Wandell’s showed that Savage and the followers of Strang, who had forsaken the truth, were more ready to receive fables than truth and bear testimony that they were of the Lord; yet no man should use this means to produce such an effect. (Brigham Young, March 6, 1846, in Manuscript History of Brigham Young, 1846-1847, comp. Elden J. Watson [Salt Lake City: Elden J. Watson, 1971], 68)

 

Description of New Altar for Sealing by Brigham Young, January 6, 1846

  

This afternoon, the new altar was used for the first time, and four individuals and their wives were sealed. The altar is about two and one half feet high and two and one half feet long about one foot wide, rising from a platform about 8 or 9 inches inch and extending out on all sides about a foot, forming a convenient place to kneel upon. The top of the altar and the platform for kneeling upon are covered with cushions of scarlet damask cloth; the sides of the upright part or body of the altar are covered with white linen. (Brigham Young, January 6, 1846, in Manuscript History of Brigham Young, 1846-1847, comp. Elden J. Watson [Salt Lake City: Elden J. Watson, 1971], 8)

 

David L. Mathewson on the Exegetical significance of the passive voice

  

The passive voice indicates indirect causality and external agency, where the subject functions as the medium or affect participant. . . . One of the important ways that the passive voice functions is to maintain “topic continuity.” That is, the passive voice is used to keep the focus on the grammatical subject and to background the agent in a prepositional phrase, if expressed, as the external cause (the lack of expressed agent would seem to further background the agent). In Mark 1:9, ἦλθεν Ἰησοῦς ἀπὸ Ναζαρὲτ τῆς Γαλιλαίας καὶ ἐβαπτίσθη εἰς τὸν Ἰορδάνην ὑπὸ Ἰωάννου (Jesus came from Nazareth of Galilee and was baptized in the Jordan by John), the passive voice ἐβαπτίσθη keeps the focus on Jesus, who was the grammatical subject of the previous verse, rather than on the one baptizing him (John). In this way continuity of topic is maintained in the discourse. (David L. Mathewson, Voice and Mood: A Linguistic Approach [Essentials of Biblical Greek Grammar; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, 2021], 62, 63)

 

Brian C. Passantino on Brigham Young's deep-seated hatred for Lucy Mack Smith's Memoirs

  

Historians have grappled over Brigham Young’s deep-seated hatred for Lucy Mack Smith’s book and have sought to find answers for why its existence angered him so much. In one instance, Brigham ranted against a section in the book that seemed to laud William Smith, Joseph’s younger brother, as a virtuous and saintly man. Young scoffed at the notion and recounted a time when he heard William speak ill of Joseph and wish death upon him (Joseph). William had also left the Church following the death of Joseph and set himself up as the true successor to his brother . Another possible reason for Young’s dislike of the book stems from its alternative history of the Church that places the Smith family at the center of the saga and deemphasizes the authority of the Twelve Apostles, and the importance of temple ordinances, and plural marriage. It appeared that the history would align nicely with the claims of the Reorganized Church, spearheaded by Joseph Smith III, and could thwart Young’s prophetic claims. Because Young was literally written out of Lucy’s history (except for noting his conversion) and the doctrines promulgated by the Church in Utah were minimized, the book could not continue its current course of publication without severe modifications.

 

Brigham Young was keenly aware of his place and importance in the Latter-day Saint movement. From the beginning, he controlled the Church’s official histories and worried about competing accounts of events. Many of his worries were justified due to the explosion of schismatic groups that began cropping up almost immediately after Joseph Smith’s death. Young desired for the Saints to know that he had been chosen as God’s rightful heir to Smith’s prophetic enterprise. One major way that he could assure that was to remind the Saints of his loyalty and faith since the earliest days of the Church. This was accomplished by means of one of Joseph Smith’s revelations that he received on Young’s behalf. (Brian C. Passantino, “Orson Pratt and the Expansion of the Doctrine and Covenants” [MA Thesis; Utah State University, 2020], 47-48)

 

Thomas B. Falls on the Worldplay in Justin Martyr's First Apology 4

Commenting on the wordplay in First Apology 4, Thomas B. Falls notes that:

 

Justin here indulges in paronomasia to play upon the words Christós, Christianoi (Christ, Christians) and chrestós, chrestótatoi (excellent, most excellent). Cf. Theophilus of Antioch, Ad Autolycum 1.1; Lactantius, Inst. div. 4.7. (Thomas B. Falls, in Justin Martyr, The First Apology, The Second Apology, Dialogue with Trypho, Exhortation to the Greeks, Discourse to the Greeks, The Monarchy or The Rule of God [The Fathers of the Church 6; Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1948])

 

Falls renders the relevant passage thusly:

 

Nothing good or evil is included in the mere use of a name, apart from the actions which are associated with that name. We, if you judge from the name we are accused of, are most excellent persons. (Ibid, 36)

 

Hilarious Caricature of Latter-day Saint Soteriology from 1898

  

The degree of the Mormon's reward and his glory in eternity, depends in no respect upon his moral qualities, or his manner of life, or his deeds, whether good or bad, or the way in which he has served God or man; but solely upon his sensuality. There is absolutely nothing whatever in the Mormon doctrines of future rewards and punishments to stir one noble impulse, or awaken one pure and holy aspiration, or prompt to a single deed of charity or benevolence. On the contrary, there is the most powerful consideration that can influence a human soul, that of a man's eternal destiny, to sink him to the lowest depths of bestiality. if he have a great many wives and a great many children, he will have a very great glory, and become the peer of the eternal God. (A. C. Osborn, The Mormon Doctrine of God and Heaven: An Address Delivered Before the Baptist Ministers' Conference of South Carolina, November, 1898 [Nashville: Sunday School Board Southern Baptist Convention, 1899], 46-47)

 

William Hasker on Free-Will and the Foreknowledge Problem

  

People will often say that God does not determine our actions, but he nevertheless knows in advance exactly what we will do. But there is a strong argument which seems to show that divine foreknowledge is just as inconsistent with free will as is predestination. Suppose, for instance, that I am going to have a cheese omelet for breakfast tomorrow. We can then construct the following argument:

 

1. It is now true that I will have a cheese omelet for breakfast tomorrow. (Assumption)

 

2. It is impossible that God should at any time believe anything false or fail to believe anything which is true. (Assumption: divine omniscience)

 

3. Therefore God has always believed that I will have a cheese omelet for breakfast tomorrow. (Inference from 1 and 2)

 

4. If God has always believed a certain thing, it is not in my power to bring it about that God has not always believed that thing. (Assumption: the inalterability of the past)

 

5. Therefore it is not in my power to bring it about that God has not always believed that I will have a cheese omelet for breakfast tomorrow. (Inference from 3 and 4)

 

6. It is not possible for it to be true both that God has always believed that I will do not in fact have one. (Inference from 2)

 

7. Therefore it is not in my power to refrain from having a cheese omelet for breakfast tomorrow. (Inference from 5 and 6) So I do not have a free will with respect to the decision whether or not to eat an omelet.

 

The argument can also be summarized briefly as follows I cannot now change what God has always believed about what I will do, nor is it possible for me to act in a way that would contradict God’s belief about me. So I have no free-will—in this case, or in any other.

 

Can this argument be refuted? It is often pointed out that one cannot reasonably assume that God’s knowing (or believing) what I will do causes me to act accordingly. But the argument makes no such assumption. The argument does indeed simply that God’s belief is a sufficient condition of my acting accordingly; this is just to say that it is impossible for God to believe in one way and for me to act in another. (William Hasker, Metaphysics: Constructing a World View [Contours of Christian Philosophy; Downers Grover, Ill.: IVP Academic, 1983], 51-52)