The logical problem of Christology is easily stated: The properties of any thing must possess to be “God” appear to be incompatible with the properties possessed by humans. The most basic law of logic, the law of noncontradiction, see to be violated by the assertion that a human was also God. The law of noncontradiction asserts that no thing can be characterized simultaneously by a property ad its complement the same respects (or the claim that the thing both has and does not have the property in question). For example, it is not possible or a thing to be simultaneously both red and noncolored, both taller and shorter than Socrates. Now let us list some of the traditional properties of God and humans:
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God
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Humans
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1 Living forever.
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1’ Living for a finite time
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2 Being omnipotent
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2’ Being nonomnipoent
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3 Being omniscient
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3’ Being nonomniscient
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4 Being omnipresent
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4’ Being spatially limited
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5 Being incorporeal
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5’ Being corporeal
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6 Being immutable
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6’ Being subject to change
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7 Being impassable
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7’ Experiencing suffering
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Now for some definitions. An accidental property of X is a property that X has contingently, if it has it. That is, X could fail to have the property and still be X. For example, there is a man John Adams who has the property of having lost of all the hair on his head. However, even if Adams did not have this property, he would still be John Adams. As essential property of X that X cannot fail and to have and still be X. For example, a square essentially has the property of having four sides; if it includes all those properties which are essential to ay member of the king X. For example, all geometrical figures have the property of having at least one point. If a thing did not have at least one point, it could not be a member of the king “geometrical figure.” To belong to the natural king “human being” it seems that one would at least have to have the properties of being a mammal, having chromosomes and hair on one’s body, being morally free and responsible when mature, etc.
The logical problem consists of the assertion that Jesus was both very God and very man, entailing that Jesus had both the properties 1 through 7 as God and also properties 1’ and 7’ as a human—that is, the Christ had both a set of properties and also the complements of those properties. If properties 1 through 7 are essential properties of the person who is God or otherwise essential to the divine nature; and if properties 1’ through 7’ are essential to being human or are included in human nature then nothing can simultaneously be both God and man—at least not if the law of noncontradiction is to be maintained. Consider the following:
(A) God is essentially omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent and uncreated;
(B) Jesus Christ was and is fully God;
(C) Jesus Christ was and is fully human;
(D) Necessarily, no human is omnipotent or omnipresent or uncreated.
Given the foregoing premises, there is an inconsistency in asserting that teach of these premises is true. The affirmation of any three of these premises entails the denial of the fourth--at least if premises (B) and (C) are understood as identity statements. Do not the affirmation (A), (B), and (D) entail Docetism or the assertion that Christ is not human? Do not (A) and (D) entail Arianism in the sense that Christ is not fully God? Do not the affirmation of (B), (C) and (D) entail that God is not omnipotent or omnipresent and thus not really God? Do not (A), (B) and (C) entail that humans are omnipotent and omnipresent--a claim so obviously absurd that no one has seriously promoted it?
The logical problem is, of course, compounded if we add to the divine properties those attributed to God in the absolutist tradition including timelessness, immutability, impassibility and simplicity. It is at least logically possible that a human be very powerful or very knowledgeable, but how can one coherently speak of a human not within any temporal interval or having no extension or parts? It is no wonder that John Hick regards the doctrine that Jesus was "very God and very man" as "devoid of meaning as to say that a circle is also a square" (The Myth of God Incarnate [London: SCM Press, 1977], 178). Similarly, Don Cupitt has described the doctrine that Jesus was God as "simply the making of a contradictory assertion" (Michael D. Goulder ed., Incarnation and Myth: the Debate Continued [London: SCM Press, 1979], 132). Certainly the Christian would hope for more than a central belief that either cannot be given any meaning or that, when carefully spelled out, can be shown to be positively incoherent. (Blake T. Ostler, Exploring Mormon Thought, volume 1: The Attributes of God [Salt Lake City: Greg Kofford Books, 2001], 419-21)