It is common for Protestant apologists to appeal to the metaphor of being "clothed" by God as evidence for the Reformation understanding of imputation. Notwithstanding, when read in context, such clothing language is representative of an outward sign of an inward reality; indeed, in Psa 104:1, Yahweh Himself is said to be "clothed" with righteousness--if a Protestant were to be consistent, they would have to argue that Yahweh is reputed to be righteous, merely, and not intrinsically so! Such shows the blasphemous nature of the doctrine. For a recent refutation of imputation, see my articles:
For discussions of “clothing imagery” in the Bible, see:
In this post, I wish to add to the preexisting body of material on my blog by addressing how this concept also works, not just for the righteous, but also the unrighteous. In Psa 109:29, we read the following:
My accusers shall be clothed in shame, wrapped in their disgrace as a robe. (1985 JPS Tanakh)
In this text, the psalmist speaks of the eschatological judgment of his enemies, and how they will be clothed with “shame” and “disgrace.” Of course, their shame and disgrace is not a mere legal sign and they are not merely reputed to be such via imputation; they are deemed such due to their actions (i.e., they are intrinsically shameful and disgraceful due to their sinful actions). Again, we see how clothing imagery refutes, not supports, the contention of some Protestant apologists that being clothed in righteousness is “proof” of their understanding of imputation.
Furthermore, this verse and the concept of the righteous and unrighteous being clothed in garments reflecting their actions reminded me of a New Testament passage serves as definitive biblical proof that the Reformed understanding is simply false:
For as by one man's disobedience many were made (καθίστημι) sinners, so by the obedience of one shall many be made (καθίστημι) righteous (δικαιος). (Rom 5:19)
The verb “to be made” in this verse is καθιστημι, which means “to constitute.” It does not have the meaning of merely legally declaring something to be “x” without it actually being “x.” Compare the following usages of the verb in the New Testament:
Who then is a faithful and wise servant, whom his lord hath made (καθιστημι) ruler over this household, to give them meat in due season? . . . Verily I say unto you, That he shall made (καθιστημι) ruler over all his goods. (Matt 24:45, 47)
And delivered [Joseph of Egypt] out of all his afflictions, and gave him favour and wisdom in the sight of Pharaoh king of Egypt; and he made him (καθιστημι) governor over Egypt and all his house . . .But he that did his neighbour wrong trust him away, saying, Who made (καθιστημι) thee a ruler and a judge over us? . . .This Moses whom they refused, saying, Who made (καθιστημι) thee a ruler and a judge? The same did God send to be a ruler and a deliverer by the hand of the angel which appeared to him in the bush (Acts 7:10, 27, 35)
For every high priest taken from among men is ordained (καθιστημι) for men in things pertaining to God, that he may offer both gifts and sacrifices for sins. (Heb 5:1)
For the law maketh (καθιστημι) men high priests which have infirmity; but the word of the oath, which was since the law, maketh the Son, who is consecrated for evermore. (Heb 7:28)
Furthermore, no one doubts that one is more than just “declared” to be a sinner; one is actually a sinner and is sinful intrinsically; it would break the parallel between “being a sinner” and “being righteous” in Rom 5:19 to introduce into it such a distinction that Reformed theology reads into this verse (that the former is a real, ontological category, but the latter is only a legal category). Therefore, those who are said to be righteous (δικαιος) are not simply placed into a legal category and labelled “righteous”; they are actually righteous.
Commenting on the use of words in the δικαι-word group, Joseph Fitzmyer wrote the following, often appealing to Rom 5:19 itself, showing that Paul did not teach justification was declarative merely and that such terms are also transformative:
The action whereby the God of uprightness “justifies” the sinner has been the subject of no little debate. Does the verb dikaioun mean “to declare upright” or “to make upright”? One might expect that dikaioun, being a verb belonging to the -oō class, would have a causative or factitive meaning, “to make someone dikaios” (as dēloun, “make clear”; douloun, “enslave”; nekroun, “mortify”; anakainoun, “renew”). But in the LXX, dikaioun seems normally to have a declarative, forensic meaning (Schrenk, TDNT 2.212–14; cf. D. R. Hillers, JBL 86 [1967]: 320–34; cf. N. M. Watson, “Some Observations on the Use of dikaioô in the Septuagint,” JBL 79 [1960]: 255–66). At times the declarative seems to be, indeed, the sense in Paul’s letters (e.g., 2:13; 3:4, 20; 8:33); but many instances are ambiguous, and the effective sense seems to be supported by 5:19, “through the obedience of one many will be made upright (dikaioi katastathēsontai).”
Again, if Käsemann’s emphasis on “God’s uprightness” as “power” is correct, this sense of dikaioun acquires an added nuance, and the OT idea of God’s word as effective would support it (Isa 55:10–11). The debate about the declarative or effective sense of dikaioun has been acute ever since the Reformation. Yet it is to be recalled that even Melanchthon admitted that “Scripture speaks both ways” (Apology 4.72). Compare too the modern debate about its meaning between (Presbyterian) B. M. Metzger (TToday 2 [1945–46]: 562) and (Baptist) E. J. Goodspeed (JBL 73 [1954]: 86–91).
From patristic times on, the effective sense of dikaioun, “make upright, just, righteous” has been used (dikaion poiēsai: John Chrysostom, In ep. ad Romanos 8.2 [PG 60.456]; In ep. II ad Corinthios 11.3 [PG 61.478]; Augustine, De Spiritu et littera 26.45 [CSEL 60.199]: iusti facti; 32.56 [CSEL 60.215]: iusti efficimur; Sermo 131.9: iustos facit; 292.6: iustum facere [PL 38.733, 1324]). From such statements, McGrath concludes that “righteousness, effected in justification, is regarded by Augustine as inherent rather than imputed, to use the vocabulary of the sixteenth century” (Iustitia Dei, 1.31). He also maintains that this sense of dikaioun persisted throughout the early and late medieval period (ibid., 184).
In modern times this sense of dikaioun is often called “transformationist.” It would mean that the sinful human being is not only “declared upright,” as dikaiousthai may mean in some instances in Romans, but is “made upright” (as in 5:19). For the sinner’s condition has changed: dikaiousthai is the opposite of hamartanein and hysterountai tēs doxēs tou theou, falling short of the glory of God (3:23). Through justification the condition of doxa is restored to the sinner. “God’s judgment has creative power. Declaring the sinner upright has not only a forensic effect, but as forensic also an ‘effective’ meaning” (Kertelge, “Rechtfertigung,” 123). Through faith in Christ Jesus the sinner experiences the manifestation of God’s uprightness and “becomes” in the concrete “the uprightness of God” (2 Cor 5:21). As a result, the sinner is dikaios and stands before God as “upright, acquitted.” (Joseph A. Fitzmyer, Romans: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary [AB 33; New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008], 118-19)