In my lengthy article, An Examination and Critique of the Theological Presuppositions Underlying Reformed Theology, I discuss, among many other things, the contingent nature of promises and prophecies in the Bible, and how such is incompatible (theological pun intended for those who “get” it) with Calvinism.
In a recent book, John Peckham, under the section entitled “Are Divine Unfulfilled Desires Compatible with Determinism?,” discusses how God having unfulfilled desires in the Bible proves to be rather fatal to Calvinism and divine determinism:
In John Calvin’s view, at least, God does indeed causally determine the mental actions of humans. He writes that the “internal affections of men are not less ruled by the hand of God than their external actions are preceded by his eternal decree,” and therefore, “God performs not by the hands of men the things which He has decreed, without first working in their hearts the very will which precedes the act they are to perform” (45).
Given this kind of determinism, nothing could prevent God from instilling in every mind any value, virtue, or characteristic that he desires, unless there is something intrinsic to any such value, virtue, or characteristic such that God cannot determine it to obtain. Any value that intrinsically cannot be determined to obtain in creaturely minds would thereby intrinsically require indeterminism (46).
Further, if the divine actualization of two values is compatible in some way, then to claim that God desires both values is to claim that he (counterfactually) desires that the actualization of the two values were not incompatible.
However, if the incompatibility of the two values is subject to God’s will, then God could simply will that the two values be compatible. If, however, the incompatibility of the two values is intrinsic to reality and thus to God’s own nature, then for God to desire the compatibility of the two values would be to desire something that is contrary to his own nature. It seems, then, that the God of compatibilism cannot consistently have either unfulfilled actual or unfulfilled counterfactual desires. This is because there appears to be nothing that God could desire without self-contradiction that he could not causally determine to be the case.
Consider again Piper’s claim that God’s glory somehow prevents God from fulfilling his desire to save everyone. If God causally determines the fact that God’s glory (somehow) requires that he causally determine some to be damned, then God could determine that this be otherwise. If, conversely, God’s glory is intrinsically such that it demands that some be deterministically damned, then for God to (even counterfactually) desire that none be damned would require that God desire something that contradicts his own nature and glory.
Thus, given determinism, if God has unfulfilled desires, God either wills against his own will in a self-contradictory way or possesses desires that conflict with his own nature, amounting to another kind of self-contradiction. Therefore, if determinism is true, God would not have any fulfilled desires (even counterfactual ones). This conclusion puts determinism in profound tension with the many biblical portrayals of God’s unfulfilled desires. To coherently claim that God has unfulfilled desires requires that there is some operative actor beyond God’s own will and nature (47). However, any such factor would by definition be a theologically indeterministic factor (48).
This line of thought has major ramifications for the problem of evil. If theological determinism entails that God causally determines every occurrence (even the mental events of creatures), then God must have casually determined every occurrence of evil. On this view, even though “God could have created a world in which all persons freely did only the good at all times,” God causally determines every instance of evil, purportedly because God wants to manifest his glory, or because God wants to achieve some other purportedly greater value (49). Even if one sets aside the conclusion reached above—that, if determinism is true, God could save everyone and make everyone fully recognize his glory—one wonders how deterministically damning people could bring God glory in the first place (50) Further, of God needs intervening evil events or his glory or for any other “greater value,” then God either needs evil by nature or needs it to accomplish his will. Yet this conclusion would undercut a basic tenet of divine sovereignty (51). If, alternatively, such evil events are not necessary for some greater value, then (in determinism) all evils are willed by God for their own sake. (
Notes for the Above
(45) Calvin, “Defence of the Secret Providence of God,” 2.23 (emphasis original). Calvin affirms that “the sentiments of Augustine on these momentous points are to be fully received and maintained. ‘When God (says he) willeth that to be done which cannot be effected, in the course of the things of this world, without the wills of men, He at the same time inclines their hearts to will do to it, and also Himself does it, not only by aiding their hearts to desire to do it, but also by decreeing it, that they cannot but do it’” (2.23-24).
(46) This is just what many free will defenders affirm; God desires some values that he cannot causally determine because something about such values is incompatible with being determined by God.
(47) Recall that Pipe explicitly rejected this: “There is nothing beyond God’s own will and nature which stops him from saving people.” Piper, “How Does a Sovereign God Love?” 10.
(48) On indeterminism, divine unfulfilled desires are coherent because nothing intrinsic to God’s nature or caused by his will prevents the possibility that humans possess libertarian free will and always loves flawlessly.
(49) Walls, “Why No Classical Theist,” 82. John F. Feinberg, an advocate of compatibilism, expresses serious misgivings about such divine glory defences, noting, “A theology that says evil in our world is justified because God uses it to bring himself glory” may evoke the reaction that God “is morally repugnant.” Feinberg, Many Faces of Evil, 187.
(50) Some claim that God must display his wrath. However, divine wrath is not itself an essential attribute of God but is the appropriate display of love against evil. Absent evil, wrath would not be and would thus require no expression. See Peckham, Love of God.
(51) Walls notes that if God “must display justice by punishing evil in order fully to manifest his glory,” then “God needs evil or depends on it fully to manifest his glory. This *consequence undermines not only God’s goodness, but his sovereignty as well.” Walls, “Why No Classical Theist,” 75.
Elsewhere
(Ibid., p. 41 n. 58), substantiating his claim that “God consistently refrains
from causally determining humans to will as he desires,” we read the following
insightful note:
Notably, even in OT narratives such as those
of Balaam and Jonah, we find evidence that God is not causally determining
human wills. For instance, if God was determining Balaam’s will, it does not
seem to make sense that Balaam angered God by trying to curse Israel after God
told him not to (e.g., Num. 22:12, 22) or that Balaam later provided Balak with
a successful plan to lead Israel into corruption (Num. 31:16; cf. Rev. 2:14).
Similarly, if God controlled Jonah’s will, he could have made Jonah go directly
to Nineveh in the first place. Both cases include strong divine interventions,
but the wills of the prophets themselves do not seem to have been determined by
God.