Writing in
the late 18th century, one critic of Trinitarian orthodoxy noted the
following rather cogent problem of various Trinity theories:
The Realist holds three Spirits, each God,
and equal in every perfection, but avoids tritheism, as he apprehends, by
saying the three are inseparably joined in one substance or essence . . . the
sabellian and nominal Trinitarian hold Father, Son, and Spirit, to be one
infinite mind . . . the words of our Saviour, my Father is greater than I—greater than l. Here, then, the system
of the Realist is embarrassed. If he asserts, that the three persons are
equally self-existent, and independent; by his own confession he runs into
Tritheism: if he asserts, that the Father alone is from none, he makes the Son and Spirit to be inferior to him, notwithstanding a specifick saments of essence;
which is something like semi-arianism. To obviate fairly one of these
consequences, requires uncommon dexterity: for by maintaining the perfect
co-equality of the three persons, each as God, where is the talked of pre-eminence of the Father? where is the
unity? If the realist thinks he saves both by asserting the self-existence and independence of the Father, exclusively; by the very assertion he
destroys the co-equality; or this
paradox follows, self-existence and independence are no divine perfections;
and there is no inequality between
him who hath, independently, all perfection of himself, and them who, independently,
have of themselves none: for it is to be remembered, that the Realist lays it down as an established
principle to preserve the unity, that the Son and Spirit derive their nature,
and all their powers from the Father. When these difficulties press hard, the
derivation of the Son, especially, is said to be an eternal, immutable, and
necessary emanation; as light from
the Sun; a tree from its root; or a river from its foundation. In this sense,
it is doubted, whether according to the analogy of language, God can, with any
propriety, be called the Father of Jesus Christ; as the term, Father, excludes
necessity, and implies freedom of will. Could any man, with any propriety, call
his arm, his son? These difficulties
are pointed out, as an argument for the exercise of charity. In a word, the one
God of the Realist is a compound of three Spirits, one underived, and two
derived; one a self-existent God, and the other two deriving their deity from
him. It is a natural question for a humble enquirer to put in this place, doth
the scripture explicitly give us, any where, this idea of one God? The nominal Trinitarian, Sabellian, Arian,
and Scina, apprehend that it doth not. The Nominal
adopts a system which appears to him less perplexed and encumbered with
difficulties.—As being next in order, let us consider his sytem. As he
expresses his ideas in the very same terms with the realist, it becomes
necessary to have an explanation of those terms.—Pray Sir, when you say, God is
three persons, do you mean that he is three spirits, or one Spirit? One Spirit.—Then
how do you make it out, that he his three
persons, or conscious agents, with distinct understanding and will?—That is
not my idea of person.—No? Then, you depart from the idea of the scriptures,
which speak of the sacred three, in
the same terms, that men commonly speak of three persons properly so called.
Sir, “the sacred writings were not addressed to the literi, to philosophers,
and scholars, but to the common people, and consequently, they used words in
their plain popular significations.” But you are, by your scheme, forced to use
the word person in a sense contrary to its plain signification. The Father is a
spirit according to the context, John iv. 23, 24. The Holy Spirit, by his very
name, is a distinct Spirit from the Father; and the Son, as being begotten
before all ages, and having a body
prepared him, Heb. x. 5. and coming forth from the Father into the world, John xvi. 28. appears to have been
a distinct spirit from both. But, according to you, the Father, Son, and
Spirit, each God, are but one Spirit, with one numerical consciousness and
will, which seems irreconcileable according to the plain meaning of words with
what we read in John xiv. 16, 17, 26. John xv. 16. Ephes. ii. 18. Ephes. vi. 4,
5, 6, &c. &c. Let us consider a particular instance. The Holy Ghost descended in a bodily shape,
like a dove upon him (Christ) and a
voice came from heaven, which said, thou art my beloved Son, in thee I am well
pleased. Luke iii. 22. According to the principles of the nominal
Trinitarian, here is one infinite Spirit descending on itself when united with
man, and saying to itself in this state; thou art my beloved Son, in thee I am
well pleased: or perhaps, more accurately thus, one distinction in the infinite
mind, descending upon another distinction in the same mind incarnate, when the
mind itself not incarnate, saith to it, thou art my beloved Son, & c.—The Nominals
have been, for the most part, embarrassed about giving a definition of the word
person. I they use I in a sense denoting different relations or characters,
as when one and the same man may be said to be three persons because he
sustains the characters of Father, Son, and Brother; or when George the third
may be said to be king of England, king of Scotland, and king of Ireland; when
they apply it to that sense of the trinity, they are Sabellians, and, in
effect, destroy the real personality of the Son (excepting as man) and of the
Spirit. (David James, A Short View of the
Tenets of Tritheists, Sabellians, Trinitarians, Arians, and Socinians [2d
ed.; London: J. Johnson, 1780], 66, 69 45-49, italics and spelling in original)
In a footnote on pp. 67-68, James reproduces
an answer to a possible “counter” that Jesus and the Holy Spirit are eternally “necessary
emanations from the father, as rays of light are emanations from the sun”:
“The doctor (Randolph) indeed
thinks to solve all difficulties by supposing the Son to be an eternal and necessary Emanation from the Father, he would do well however to
consider whether eternal Emantion is
not a contradiction in terms. In my apprehension, he who always was, would no
more have been emaned from the Father
than the Father from him. If both
co-existed eternally, then neither would emane;
because that which never wanted existence, could never receive its existence
from any thing whatsoever: And what, I beseech you, is to emane, but to proceed or come forth into existence from some
extrinsic course? To emane is
therefore but another name for beginning to
exit: but how could that begin to exist, which in every point of infinitely
past duration, which absolutely without
beginning, was just what it now is? Suppose a tree and its branches to have
existed necessarily together from eternity; under that supposition the branches
certainly never issued from the tree. To suppose them to have issued, would be
to suppose, either that there was some point in infinite duration when the
branches had no existence, which contradicts their notion of eternity, or that they issued when they
were already in existence, which is the grossest of absurdities.” Mr Temples
Letters to Dr. Randolph, preface, p. 7.