In the following excerpt from On Grace and Free Choice, Bernard of Clairvaux argued that, even after the Fall, man's (genuine) free-will was not extinguished, but remains albeit, in a weakened state:
although man cannot
sin, nevertheless he has not lost free choice
Free choice, consequently, still remains,
even after man’s sin, tinged with sorrow but intact. And the fact that he can
in no way extricate himself either from sin or sorrow signifies, not the
destruction of free choice, but the privation of the other two freedoms. For it
does not belong to free choice, in itself, nor did it ever belong to it, to
possess either power or wisdom, but only to will; nor can it make a creature
wise or able, but only willing. He cannot therefore be considered as having
lost free choice, if he has ceased to be wise or able, but only if he has
ceased to be willing. For where there is no will, neither is there freedom. I
am not saying that once a person ceases to will the good, but once he ceases
simply to will—where it is not merely a question of the good ceasing in the
will, but of the will itself ceasing in its entirety—must free choice also be
said unquestionably to vanish. If he finds himself unable simply to will the
good, this is a sign that he lacks free counsel, not free choice. And if he
finds himself powerless, not indeed to will the good, but to accomplish that
good which he already wills, let him recognise that it is not free choice that
is wanting to him, but free pleasure. Hence, if free choice so follows the will
everywhere that unless the will ceases to function free choice will continue to
operate, then the will remains present equally in evil and in good; and free
choice likewise in evil and in good. And, as the will, even in a state of
sorrow, does not cease for all that to be the will, but is called, and is in
fact, a sorrowful will, (as it is also called, and is, a happy will), so
neither can any adversity or necessity either destroy, or, in what concerns its
own nature, in any way diminish, freedom of choice.
25. But though it always carries on unimpaired, it
cannot of itself rise from evil to good as easily as it could of itself fall
from good to evil. And what wonder is it if it is unable to rise of itself from
its fallen condition, when in its standing it was quite powerless to advance on
its own to something better? In a word, while to some extent it still enjoyed
those other two freedoms, it could not ascend from these lower degrees to the
higher, that is, from a state of being able not to sin and being able not to be
disturbed to that of not being able to sin and not being able to be disturbed.
Now, if with the help, even in some small measure, of those freedoms, it was
yet unable to raise itself from the good to the better, how much less chance
does it stand, now that it is deprived of them, of raising itself up by its own
power from evil to that former level which was good.
26. And this is where Christ comes in. In him, man
possesses the necessary “power of God and the wisdom of God,” who, inasmuch as
he is wisdom, pours back into man true wisdom, and so restores to him his free
counsel; and, inasmuch as he is power, renews his full power, and so restores
to him his free pleasure. As a result, being by the former perfectly good, he
may now no longer know sin; and being, by the latter, completely happy, may no
longer feel its sting. Such perfection, nevertheless, must be awaited in the
next life, when both these freedoms, at present lost, will be fully restored to
free choice, not as it is given to any just man here on earth however perfect,
and not as it was given even to the first human beings to enjoy them in
paradise, but as the angels possess them now in heaven. Meanwhile, in “this
body of death” and in “the present evil age,” we must be content simply with
not giving way to sin from any concupiscence, and this we may do through our
freedom of counsel; and with fearing no adversity for the sake of
righteousness, and this we may do through our freedom of pleasure. In this
sinful flesh, however, and in this evil of the day, it is no small wisdom not
to consent to sin, though one cannot be rid of it altogether; and it is no
inconsiderable power, manfully to despise adversity for the sake of truth,
though one cannot yet, in happiness, avoid feeling it at times.
27. Here below, we must learn from our freedom of
counsel not to abuse free choice, in order that one day we may be able fully to
enjoy freedom of pleasure. Thus we are repairing the image of God in us, and
the way is being paved, by grace, for the retrieving of that former honor which
we forfeited by sin. Happy then will be the man who shall deserve to hear said
of him: “Who is he, and we shall praise him? For he has done wonderful things
in his life: who had the power to transgress, and did not transgress; to do
evil and did not do it.” (Bernard of Clairvaux, On Grace and Free Choice [trans. Daniel
O'Donovan; Athens, Ohio: Cistercian Publications Inc., 2008], 81-83)
One should compare some of Bernard’s
comments above with canon 23 of Session 6 (1546) of the Council of Trent:
833 [DS 1573] Can.
23. If anyone shall say that a man once justified can sin no more, nor lose
grace, and that therefore he who falls and sins was never truly justified; or,
on the contrary, that throughout his whole life he can avoid all sins even
venial sins, except by a special privilege of God, as the Church holds in
regard to the Blessed Virgin: let him be anathema [cf. n. 805, 810].
One thing is clear: Bernard of Clairvaux, one
of the leading theologians of his time, was not a proto-Calvinist in the above excerpt,
or even the entirety of, On Grace and Free Choice.
Further Reading
An Examination and Critique of the Theological Presuppositions Underlying Reformed Theology