Lutheran Doctrine of “Communication
of Properties”
While, in this way, the acts and
qualities of either nature may be attributed to the one theanthropic person,
the acts and qualities of one nature may not be attributed to the other nature.
It would be erroneous to say that divine nature suffered or that human nature raised
the dead; as it would be erroneous to say that the human body thinks or that
the human soul walks. The man or “person” whose is the body and whose is the
soul both thinks and walks, but the natures by whose instrumentality he performs
these acts do not both of them think and walk. One things, and the other walks.
Properties belong to a nature and
are confined to it. Hence properties are always homogeneous. A material nature or substance can have only
material properties. It cannot be marked partly by material and partly by
immaterial properties. Natures, on the other hand, belong to a person and may
be heterogenous. A nature must be composed wholly of material or wholly of
immaterial properties; but a person may be composed partly of a material and
partly of an immaterial nature. Hence two or even three kinds of natures may be
ascribed to a person, but only one kind of properties may be attributed to a
nature.
By overlooking the difference
between person and nature, the later Lutherans have partially revived the ancient
error of Eutyches of confounding or mixing the natures of Christ’s person.
They distinguish three kinds of communication idiomatum or communication of
properties; namely, genius idiomaticum—the attribution of the properties of
either nature to the person, genus apotelesmaticum—the attribution of the
mediatorial acts to either nature, and genus majestaticum. The last of these is
of such an exalted species as to amount to a communication of the properties of
one nature to the other. It is founded upon those texts in which, according to
Hases’s definition of this genus, the Scriptures speak of “the human nature as
exalted by divine attributes: quibus natura humana attributis divinis effertur”
(Hutterus, 238). The texts in which this is supposed to be done are “the Son of
Man is in heaven” (John 3:13); “the Son of Man has authority to execute
judgment” (5:27); “all power is given unto me . . . I am with you always”
(Matt. 28:18, 20); “concerning the flesh, Christ is God over all, blessed for
ever” (Rom. 9;5); “at the time of Jesus, every knee shall bow” (Phil. 2:10). In
these passages, the titles “Son of Man,” “Jesus,” and “Christ,” according to the
advocate of the genus majestaticum, denote, not the theanthropic person, but
the human nature; and this human nature is exalted by divine attributes of
omnipresence—being upon the earth and in heaven simultaneously, of sovereignty—being
the judgment of mankind; of omnipotence—having all power in heaven and earth;
of absolute deity—being God over all. . . . . The principal motif for the Lutheran
tenet of the ubiquity of Christ’s humanity is to explain the presence of the
entire Christ. The God-man promises to be with his disciples upon earth, “always,
even unto the ned of the world” (Matt. 28:20). The Reformed explanation is by
the conjunction and union of the limited and local humanity with the illocal
and omnipresent divinity. “Presence by way of conjunction is in some sort
presence,” says Hooker (5.55). The divine nature of Christ is present with his
human nature wherever the latter may be, though his human nature is not, as the
Lutheran contends, present with his divine nature whenever the latter may be. But
this continual presence of the deity with the humanity is equivalent to the
presence of the humanity with the deity. The humanity is in effect ubiquitous,
because of its personal connection with an omnipresent nature and not because
it is in itself so immense as to be ubiquitous. Christ’s deity never is present
anywhere in isolation and separation from his humanity, but always as united
with and modified by his humanity. But in order to this union and modification,
it is not necessary that his humanity should be locally present wherever his
deity is. Distance in space is no bar to the personal union between the Logos
and his human-nature. Suppose, for illustration, the presence of the divine
nature of Christ in the soul of a believer while partaking of the sacrament in
London. This divine nature is at the same moment conjoined with and present to
and modified by the human nature of Christ which is in heaven and not in London.
This conjunction between both is equivalent to the presence of both. The whole
Christ is present in this London believer’s soul, because, though the human
nature is in heaven and not in London, it is yet personally united with the
divine nature which is both in heaven and in London. There is no separation
between the two natures; so that whatever influence or effect the divine nature
exerts in the believer’s soul as he receives the sacrament is a divine human
influence—an influence proceeding from the union of the divine with the human
in Jesus Christ. (William G. T. Shedd, Dogmatic Theology: Complete and
Unabridged, Volumes 1-3 [Reformed Retrieval, 2021], 575-76, 577, emphasis
added)