Monday, August 15, 2022

John Laing on Libertarian Free will being a Component of the Image of God in Humans

  

Libertarianism is a Component of the Image of God in Humans

 

Some proponents of libertarian freedom point to the image of God as undergirding their position, though they rarely offer an argument explaining how it does so. Evangelical Christians of all persuasions agree that humans are made in the image of God, and through the image was adversely affected by the fall, it was not lost (Gen 9:6; Jas 3:9). In the creation narrative, we are told God created humanity—male and female—in his image and likeness (Gen 1:26-27). It does not explicitly define the imago Dei, and theologians have long debated the relationship of the Hebrew terms for “image” and “likeness” (tselem and demuth). But most now agree that the image includes multiple aspects, even if some see one as primary, and that these aspects each reflect something of God within the created order. For ease of discussion, the aspects may be defined as three: dominion, resemblance, and relationality.

 

The most popular view of the image in the history of the church is dominion. God’s charges to Adam to rule over the other creatures and to tend the garden both indicate that the image includes service as God’s representative on earth (Gen 1:26, 28; see also Ps 8:5-8). To bear the image is to participate in the royal function of judicial discernment, decision-making, and provision. In the medieval period, it was common to conceive of the image in terms of humanity’s resemblance to God and uniqueness or difference from brute animals. This approach has led to a number of proposals for the mage that include spiritual, creative, moral, rational, aesthetic, loving, and free. It should be clear that image can include all these traits, as they are not mutually exclusive. In more recent years, evangelical theologians have placed more emphasis upon relationality in their understanding of the imago Dei. This is due in part to a resurgence of interest in trinitarian theology as it developed in the East, where the three divine persons are constituted in their perichoretic relations (i.e., they are who they are in virtue of the inter-trinitarian relations), and in part to its exegetical basis in the Genesis account. God is a community of being, relational in his very nature, and has created humanity for relationship with him, and each other. This relational component to the image can be seen in several features of the text, to include the more personal deliberative introductory statement to the creation of humanity (i.e., “Let us make man . . .” versus “Let there be . . .”); the gender distinction associated with the statement that humans are made in God’s image (Gen 1:27); the command to increase through sexual relations (v. 28; cf. Gen 9:1, 7); and the claim “It is not good for man to be alone” (2:18) (the image as relationality may also be seen in the development of the idea later in Genesis, where image appears to be tie to familial and human-divine relations. Adam has a son who is after his own image and likeness [Gen 5:3], and it is this son [Seth] who perpetuates the close relationship between God and humanity).

 

The important point here is that each of these cases, libertarian freedom is needed. For humans to fulfill their function as divine vice-regency, they must have the ability to evaluate, adjudicate, and decide between competing obligations, needs, and limitations. Similarly, for humans to reflect God’s nature in the many and varied proposed ways they resemble God, they must have the ability to choose. For example, to display their aesthetic sense, humans must have the ability to choose their medium to express their immediate and deeply personal feelings (e.g., Jubal in Gen 4:21). Likewise, rational and moral thought seem predicated on the ability not only to weight the relative strength of ideas and arguments but also to chose that which seems best, and to be either right or wrong, base don one’s choice. If one only has one option, then he does not really have the potential to be right or wrong, and seems unable to truly deliberate. More important, if humans are to act with purpose, they must have the ability to reflect on the larger consequences of their actions (past, present, and future), to assess if those actions have had or will have the intended effect(s), and to evaluate the meaning and significance of those actions within the context of the broader community and human history, all with a view to making a positive contribution beyond their own personal well-being. This requires, at a minimum, freedom of choice. Last, for humans to mirror divine relationality, they must have the ability to choose to enter into personal relations with others, dissolve those relations that are unhealthy, and engage in those activities necessary for healthy relationships and refrain from those that detract from them. . . . It should be clear that the image of God in humans includes and is based in freedom. (John Laing, “Determinism and Human Freedom,” in Calvinism: A Biblical and Theological Critique, ed. David L. Allen and Steve M. Lemke [Nashville, Tenn.: B&H Academic, 2022], 412-13, 414)

 

While Latter-day Saints do believe that "image" and "likeness" refers to physical likeness (and there is solid exegetical and linguistic grounds for this), one should refrain from having an "either-or" approach and embrace a "both-and." "Image" and "likeness" refers primarily to physical resemblance, but as a result of man being in the image and likeness of God, we share in his libertarian free will.