Twice
[Matthew] links “divorce” with “adultery: (1) the divorcing husband makes his
divorced wife commit adultery and (2) the man marries a divorced woman commits
adultery in regard to the first case, we must remember that Jesus proscribes
all divorce. Hence the divorced wife, should she enter another marriage, would
be committing adultery because the former marriage is still valid; and her divorcing
husband, who is allowing her subsequent union, would then be her panderer (Betz
1995:249; see Philo, Special Laws 3.31). The husband who allows his divorced
wife to remarry makes his wife shameless and so brings shame upon himself.
After all, she is still his wife, and one of his prime duties as a male is to
guard her sexual exclusivity. In the second case, where a man marries a divorced
woman, according to Hanson’s study, this marriage is most likely one of social climbing
and seeking advantage, rather than passion or romance. Malina and climbing and
seeking advantage, rather than passion or romance. Malina and Rohrbaugh provide
the culturally appropriate appreciation of “adultery,” which results in this
second case: marriage to a divorced woman brings dishonor to her previous husband,
to whom she is still married in Jesus’ eyes; the new husband is thus committing
adultery with another man’s wife (1992:53). Males, then, are either failing in
their honorable duty to preserve the sexual exclusiveness of their own wives or
acting aggressively in illicit sexual conquests of the wives of other men.
In
Hanson’s analysis of Herod’s affairs, marriage and divorce were strategies to
gain honor. Then might we not presume that the husband marrying a divorced
woman is himself recently divorced? Why divorced? Most likely because a more advantageous
marriage became available. Thus the man marrying a divorced woman is likely to
be acting aggressively, shedding one wife for a more profitable one. HE would
gain honor both by his ability to have more females, especially those of other
men, and by the more favorable alliances that result from the new marriage.
Therefore, if the husband stands to gain honor both by marriage and by divorce,
who loses honor? Who is shamed by the divorce? Three people are shamed: (1)
surely the wife who has been rejected, (2) but also the wife’s family,
especially her father and other male relatives, and (3) the wife’s husband, if
he is losing his wife to another man.
The
exception clause (“except in the case of uncleanness,” 5:32) should also be
viewed in light of honor and shame. As we have seen, “adultery” means “shame”
to the aggrieved husband. In both Greek and Judean traditions, the aggrieved husband
must put away the guilty wife if he is to avoid being the victim of “shame”
himself (m. Soṭah 5.1); apropos of Greek practice, Hauck remarked, “If
the wounded husband is not himself to fall victim to atimia (i.e., ‘shame’)
he must put away the guilty wife” (1967:732-33). In the early Christian tradition,
a husband’s control over a household is not only a qualification for bishops
and deacons (1 Tim. 3:4, 12) but a general prerequisite for an honorable male
(Verner 1983:132-34). The issue, then, involves honor and shame, inasmuch as
marriage and divorce were common strategies for gaining status and wealth. Thus
adultery enjoys a decidedly social and cultural meaning in terms of honor )to
the adulterer) and shame (to the aggrieved husband). In the choreography of
honor challenges, the adulterer challenges, while the cuckolded husband is challenged.
(Jerome H. Neyrey, Honor and Shame in
the Gospel of Matthew [Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox Press, 1998],
199-200, comment in square brackets added for clarification)