Building on his recent consolidation of the Huaxyacac area, Ahuitzotl directed his next major campaign into the Tecuantepec region around 1497. It was ostensibly precipitated by the murder of merchants from Tenochtitlan, Acolhuacan, Cuauhtitlan, Toltitlan, and the Tepanec towns, as well as Tenanyocan, Cuetlachtepec, Xochi-milco, Cuitlahuac, Mizquic, and Chaleo. These southern coastal lands had been at least partially conquered before, but they were difficult to secure because they were so far from Tenochtitlan. In an effort to quell future rebellions Ahuitzotl resolved not only to retaliate but also to make a major demonstration of power: he would kill 2,000 people for every merchant who had been killed.
An army was raised in eight days by drawing soldiers from the basin of Mexico and areas to the west, north, and east. The army was told to kill everyone, adult or child, because it would be too far to take captives back to Tenochtitlan, but 1,200 captives were brought back from Tlacuilollan.
The Aztec army conquered Miahuatlan and Izhuatlan . . . and then, with guides from these cities, headed to Max-tlan ( Amaxtlan) and Tecuantepec. Also conquered in this campaign were the towns of Xochitlan (Izquixochitlan, Xochtlan), Tlacuilollan, Chiltepec, Apanecan, and Acapetlahuacan. Amextloapan, Nacaz-cuauhtlan (Cuauhnacaztitlan), and Quetzalcuitlapilco (Quetzalcui- tlapillan) were also conquered, apparently capitulating on the demonstration of Ahuitzotl's superiority. The entire trek covered 1,900 kilometers (1,200 miles), requiring 59 to 99 days, exclusive of days needed for combat, rest, and regrouping. However, only 300 kilometers (190 miles) of that trek extended beyond the area of previous logistical support, requiring a round trip in that portion of 9 to 16 days.
On the army's return messengers were sent ahead, partly to notify local lords of its approach and ensure a proper reception. But the primary purpose of the messages was to spread the news of the army's success and compel the local rulers to acknowledge their allegiance. The leaders' only alternative was to revolt openly, but both the speed with which the Aztecs would appear and their new campaign success doomed that option. (Ross Hassig, Aztec Warfare: Imperial Expansion and Political Control [Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1988], 215, 217, emphasis added)
Elsewhere, we read that:
Weapons, armor, and shelter were necessary for a major campaign, but food (yaoihtacatl, war victuals) was the greatest logistical barrier on distant and lengthy campaigns. The records are silent on the actual quantities of food consumed on a campaign, but reasonable conjecture can shed light on the matter. Sixteenth-century records of Indian food consumption place daily adult male rates at around 3,800 calories (approximately .95 kg. or 2.1 lb. of maize).
Under normal transport conditions, each porter carried an average load of two arrobas (23 kg. or 50 lb.) per day. And while war would demand that loads be heavier, military conditions limited their size. Because the porters had to carry their burden day after day for the duration of the campaign, the size of their load was limited. They nevertheless provided the army with considerable logistical support through sheer numbers. In the war against Coaixtlahuacan, for example, the Aztec army numbered 200,000 warriors and 100,000 porters, an average of 1 porter for every 2 warriors, or an additional fifty pounds of supplies for every 3 men (2 warriors and 1 porter). Nevertheless, this porter-to-warrior ratio and the above consumption rates meant that the army could travel only eight days if all the porters' loads were dedicated to food (which they were not). (Ross Hassig, Aztec Warfare: Imperial Expansion and Political Control [Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1988], 63-64)