The following comes from:
Ali Bonner, The Myth of Pelagianism (British
Academy Monographs; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 124-28
The hardening of Pharoah’s heart and predestination
Two biblical episodes in particular became the focus of the debate
over the nature of predestination: the stories of Jacob and Esau and the
hardening of Pharoah’s heart. Because predestination and prevenient grace were,
as Augustine said, two parts of the same process, these episodes touched
directly on the free will debate, which was itself tied to to the anthropology
of Christianity because it involved the question of whether or not man’s nature
was such that he was able to make an autonomous choice to be virtuous without
God’s prior causation.32
In his Commentary on Eccclesiastes of AD 388–9, Jerome
explained the biblical assertion that God hardened Pharaoh’s heart using an
analogy with the different effects of the sun’s heat which he borrowed from
Origen’s interpretation of the hardening of Pharaoh’s heart:
On this subject we must take evidence from Psalm 17 where God is
addressed: With the pure you will be pure, and with the crooked you will be
perverse [Ps. 17:27], as in Leviticus: If they walk contrary to me, I
too will walk contrary to them in my fury [Lev. 26:27–8]. That will also be
able to explain why God hardened Pharaoh’s heart: just as one and the same
working of the sun liquefies wax and dries mud, the wax liquefying and the mud
drying according to their own nature, so the single working of God in the signs
of Egypt softened the heart of the believers and hardened the unbelievers.
They, through their hard‑hearted impenitence, were: Storing up wrath for
themselves on the day of wrath [Rom. 2:5] from the miracles which they did
not believe, despite seeing them happen.33
Also in his Commentary on Ecclesiastes, Jerome referred
implicitly to Rom. 9:20 and explained that it did not mean that human decisions
were predetermined:
Some think that this passage at that point means that God already
knows the name of all those who will exist and are to be clothed in a human
body; and that man cannot answer back to his maker about why he was made this
way or that. For the more we seek, the more our vanity and superfluous words
are displayed; and it is not that free will (liberum arbitrium) is
removed by God’s foreknowledge, but that there is an antecedent cause for each
and every thing being as it is.34
In the light of the previous passage in his exegesis, ‘antecedent
cause’ must refer to autonomous human action. This reading of biblical
references to the hardening of Pharoah’s heart led Jerome to choose to refer to
God’s ‘foreknowledge’ (praescientia) rather than his ‘predestination’ (praedestinatio).
In the same commentary, he explained how sin caused anxiety in the sinner, and
how God was not the cause of this distress. This passage too should be referred
back to his explanation of the hardening of Pharaoh’s heart and confirms that
Jerome’s view was that man brought about his own punishment, which was not
caused by divine predetermination of human decisions.35
In around AD 406 in his Commentary on Malachi, Jerome
discussed Paul’s reading of the story of Jacob and Esau at Rom. 9:11–13.
Jerome’s ‘spiritual interpretation’ affirmed dual free will:
And the Lord replies that Esau and Jacob were produced from one
stock, which is to say: vices and virtues proceed from the one source, the
heart, while we go in either direction as we wish because of our free will; but
earlier vices are born during infancy, childhood, and youth, which the stronger
age that follows reproaches and overthrows. The older brother is rough and
bloodthirsty for hunting [cf. Gen. 25:27], he delights in forests and wild
beasts. The younger brother is gentle and simple, and dwells at home innocently
. … Moreover God’s love and hatred is born either from His foreknowledge of
future events, or from their works; besides we know that God loves everything,
nor does he hate anything that he has created; but he protects with his love in
particular those who are the enemies of sins and who fight against sins. And
conversely he hates those who wish to rebuild what God has destroyed.36
Jerome’s interpretation of the meaning of the Jacob and Esau story
rejected any notion of predestination as being God’s preordaining of events.
Instead his explanation of the story was that it propounded effective human
free will (‘we go in either direction as we wish’, in utramque partem ut
uolumus declinamus).
Jerome wrote his Letter to Hedibia (Letter 120) in
around AD 406–7, and in it he answered 12 questions Hedibia had put to him. Her
tenth question asked for an explanation of Rom. 9:14–29, and in response Jerome
gave his longest account of the question of human free will and the related
issues of the stories of the hardening of Pharaoh’s heart, and of Jacob and
Esau. It is important to study Jerome’s explanation of the passage in detail
because of the date when it was composed, and because of its fullness. With
regard to the date, it is clear from what Jerome wrote that he was aware of the
sensitivity of this question. He described Paul’s letter to the Romans as
difficult and mysterious, and mentioned a commentary he had read that made
Paul’s response to his own question entangle the matter more rather than
resolve it. In a reference to the idea of reincarnation, he asserted that the
desire to preserve God’s justice led some into heresy through the suggestion
that preceding causes led to God’s choice to love Jacob and hate Esau; he
himself, however, only wanted to express the consensus view: ‘But nothing
pleases me except what the Church states and what we are not afraid to say in
public in church’.37 With this comment Jerome showed, first, that he felt a
need for caution in interpreting this subject and, second, that he believed
that what he went on to expound was the Church’s view and represented the
mainstream.
Jerome’s interpretation was that this passage in Romans was, in
fact, an assertion of effective free will in humans. According to him, Paul
raised an objection in order to then counter it:
In his usual way, he proposes a question that comes in from the
flank, and discusses it, and when he has resolved it, he returns to the point
with which he began the discussion. If Esau and Jacob were not yet born and had
not done anything either good or evil such that they either deserved well of
God or offended him, and their election and rejection shows not the merits of
individuals but the will of the one choosing and rejecting, what then shall we
say? Is God unjust? . … If we interpret this, says the Apostle, as saying that
God does whatever he wants and either chooses someone or condemns him without
merit and works: Then it is not of him who wills nor of him who runs, but of
God who shows mercy [Rom. 9:16], especially when in the same Scripture the
same God says to Pharaoh: I have raised you up for the very purpose of
showing my power in you, so that my name may be proclaimed in all the earth [Rom.
9:17, cf. Exod. 9:16]. But if this is so, and if God shows mercy to Israel and
hardens Pharaoh’s heart as he pleases, therefore it is in vain that He
complains and blames us for not doing what is good or for doing evil, when it
lies in His power and will, without reference to good or bad human actions,
either to select someone or to cast him aside, especially when human weakness
is unable to resist His will. This strong argument, woven from Scriptural
authority and almost insoluble, the Apostle in a brief sentence: O man, who
are you to answer back to God? [Rom. 9:20]. And this is the meaning: the
fact that you answer back to God and accuse Him and make such a search through
the Scriptures so that you can speak against God and search for grounds to
accuse His will, shows that you have free will and you do what you want, either
to be quiet or to speak. For if you think that you were created by God in the
likeness of a clay vase and cannot resist His will, consider this, a clay vase
does not say to the potter: Why did you make me like this? [Rom. 9:20]
For a potter has the power to make from the same clay and: From the same
lump of clay one vase for honorable use but another for discredit [Rom.
9:21]. But God made all men with the same condition and he gave them freedom of
the will so that each person might do what he wants, whether good or bad; but
he gave this power to all mankind to such an extent that the impious speaker
argues against his Creator and scrutinises the reasons for his Creator’s will.38
So, according to Jerome, Paul’s answer to his own question was
that the fact that man answered God back and accused Him of injustice showed
that God gave man the free will to be able to show impiety by answering Him
back, and Paul’s intention in the passage was to reject the idea that man was
moulded by God as a potter shapes clay. Jerome explained that Paul said that
God’s patience hardened Pharaoh’s heart. God allowed Pharaoh free will, and
Pharaoh chose to abuse His forebearance. This passage therefore showed how
particularly just God was:
If God’s patience, says the Apostle, hardened Pharoah’s heart and
God’s patience put off punishment of Israel for a long time so that he might
more justly condemn those whom he had sustained for a long time, God’s patience
and infinite mercy should not be criticised, but the stubbornness of those who
abused the benevolence of God for their own destruction should be criticised.39
Jerome then used once again Origen’s interpretation of the
hardening of Pharaoh’s heart to explain it by analogy with the twofold effects
of the sun: hardening mud and melting wax. God’s forbearance caused men who
were good to love God more, and men who were bad to be stubborn. Jerome
concluded that man had free will and that God’s justice was transparent:
He does not save randomly and without true discernment, but on the
basis of preceding causes, namely because some did not receive the son of God,
and others of their own free will wanted to receive him.40 But this vessel of
mercy represents not only the Gentiles but also those of the Jewish people who
wanted to believe, and one people of believers was created; from which fact it
is demonstrated that it is not races that are chosen, but the wills of men.41
In his final paragraphs on the question, Jerome repeated a further
three times his assertion that the will to believe was the effective agent of
salvation or punishment, referring to ‘those who wanted to believe’. He ended
with an injunction to be silent and not to disturb God with this question.
Clearly, he thought his explanation of Rom. 9—namely, that Paul’s letter
asserted effective human free will—should be the end of the matter. So instead
of using this passage to argue that God controlled man, Jerome interpreted it
as showing that He did not control man. And he considered this interpretation
to be mainstream: the sort of thing he would not be afraid to say in public in
church; it was ecclesiasticus.
In the same letter to Hedibia, in answer to another of her questions,
Jerome repeated his assertion of effective free will. Dealing with the question
of how there could still be people who did not believe after all Paul’s work,
Jerome replied that this happened because of human free will:
Because men are left to their own judgement, for they do not do
good by necessity but voluntarily, so that those who believe may receive a
crown and the unbelievers are delivered up to punishments. Therefore sometimes
the aroma that we spread, though intrinsically good, is transformed into either
life or death, depending on the virtue or the vice of those who receive or
reject the Gospel.42
For Jerome, the story of the hardening
of Pharoah’s heart could not signify that God caused Pharoah’s stubborness.
Thomas Scheck referred to Jerome’s ‘strong defence of the freedom of the human
will in the process of salvation and damnation’, and identified Jerome’s
position as ‘reminiscent of Origen and the Greek theological tradition’.43 Commenting
on Isa. 63:17: O Lord, why do you make us stray from your ways, and harden
our heart so that we do not fear you?, Jerome explained that God did not
actually harden any human heart but his patience made it seem that He did so,
because he stayed His hand from punishment; those uttering this prayer: ‘Refer
to God what is their own fault.’44 As Scheck noted, Jerome always read divine
foreknowledge as foreknowledge of autonomous human action, not as a causal agency
founded on divine predetermination of events.45
Notes for the Above:
(32) For Augustine’s statement that prevenient grace and
predestination were two parts of the same process, see Chapter 1, n. 42.
(33) Jerome, In Ecclesiasten, on Eccles. 7:14 (ed. Adriaen,
CCSL 72, pp. 305–6), ‘Sumendum est in hoc loco testimonium de septimo decimo
psalmo, in quo ad Dominum dicitur: Cum sancto sanctus eris et cum peruerso
peruerteris [Ps. 17:27]. Et dicendum sanctum Dominum esse cum eo, qui
sanctus est et peruerti apud eum, qui sua uoluntate fuerit ante peruersus.
Iuxta illud quoque, quod in Leuitico scriptum est: Si ambulauerint ad me
peruersi et ego ambulabo ad eos in furore meo peruersus [Lev. 26:27–8].
Quod quidem et illud poterit exponere, quare indurauerit Deus cor Pharaonis.
Quomodo enim una atque eadem solis operatio liquefacit ceram et siccat lutum,
et pro substantia sua et liquescit cera, et siccatur lutum; sic una Dei in
Aegypto signorum operatio molliebat cor credentium et incredulos indurabat, qui
iuxta duritiam suam, et impaenitens cor: Thesaurizabant sibi iram in die
irae [Rom. 2:5] ex his mirabilibus, quae cum uiderent fieri, non
credebant.’
(34) Jerome, In Ecclesiasten, on Eccles. 6:10 (ed. Adriaen,
CCSL 72, p. 300), ‘Nonnulli illud in hoc loco significari putant, quod omnium,
qui futuri sunt, et hominum corpore circumdandi, iam Deus uocabulum nouerit;
nec possit homo respondere contra artificem suum, quare ita uel ita factus sit.
Quanto enim amplius quaesierimus, tanto magis ostendi uanitatem nostram et
uerba superflua; et non ex praescientia Dei liberum tolli arbitrium, sed causas
ante praecedere, quare unumquodque sic factum sit.’
(35) Jerome, In Ecclesiasten, on Eccles. 2:24–6 (ed.
Adriaen, CCSL 72, p. 272), ‘It is not to be wondered at that he said: To the
sinner he has given anxiety, etc; this is to be referred to the sense that
I have repeatedly discussed: the reason anxiety or distress has been given to
him is that he was a sinner, and the cause of the distress is not God, but the
man who, of his own volition, sinned beforehand’; ‘Nec mirandum, quod dixerit: Peccatori
dedit sollicitudinem, et cetera. Ad illum enim sensum de quo saepe
tractaui, hoc referendum est: Propterea datam ei esse sollicitudinem siue
distentionem, quia peccator fuerit, et non esse causam distentionis in Deo, sed
in illo qui sponte sua ante peccauerit.’
(36) Jerome, In Malachiam, on
Mal. 1: 2–5 (ed. Adriaen, CCSL 76A, pp. 905–6), ‘Dominusque respondit, Esau et
Iacob de una stirpe generatos, hoc est uitia atque uirtutes ex uno cordis fonte
procedere; dum ex arbitrii libertate in utramque partem ut uolumus, declinamus;
sed priora nascuntur uitia per infantiam, pueritiam, iuuentutem, quae postea
aetas firmior corripit atque supplantat. Maior frater hispidus est et
sanguinarius uenationibus [cf. Gen. 25:27], siluis et bestiis delectatur. Minor
leuis et simplex, et innocenter habitans domum . … Porro dilectio et odium Dei
uel ex praescientia nascitur futurorum, uel ex operibus; alioquin nouimus quod
omnia Deus diligat, nec quicquam eorum oderit quae creauit; sed proprie eos
suae uindicet caritati, qui uitiorum hostes sunt et rebelles. Et econtrario
illos odit, qui a Deo destructa cupiunt rursum exstruere.’
(37) Jerome, Ep. 120.10.2 (ed. Hilberg, CSEL 55, p. 500),
‘Nobis autem nihil placet, nisi quod ecclesiasticum est et publice in ecclesia
dicere non timemus’. In his Letter 124 To Avitus, Jerome
explained how in order to preserve God’s justice, Origen hypothesised that ‘preceding
causes’ for God’s love of Jacob and hatred of Esau lay in their actions in
previous lives. Jerome translated Origen’s On First Principles, and
borrowed from Origen frequently.
(38) Jerome, Ep. 120.10.6–11 (ed. Hilberg, CSEL 55, pp.
502–3), ‘Venientem e latere quaestionem more suo proponit et disserit, et hac
soluta reuertitur ad id, de quo coeperat disputare. Si Esau et Iacob necdum
nati erant, nec aliquid egerant boni aut mali, ut uel promererentur Deum uel
ofenderent; et electio eorum atque abiectio non merita singulorum, sed
uoluntatem eligentis et abicientis ostendit, quid ergo dicimus? Iniquus est
Deus? . … Si hoc, inquit, recipimus, ut faciat Deus quodcumque uoluerit, et
absque merito et operibus uel eligat aliquem uel condemnet: Ergo non est
uolentis neque currentis, sed miserentis Dei [Rom. 9:16], maxime cum eadem
Scriptura, hoc est idem Deus loquatur ad Pharaonem: In hoc ipsum excitaui
te, ut ostendam in te uirtutem meam, et adnuntietur nomen meum in uniuersa
terra [Rom. 9:17, cf. Exod. 9:16]. Si hoc ita est, et pro uoluntate sua
miseretur Israheli et indurat Pharaonem, ergo frustra queritur atque causatur
nos uel bona non fecisse, uel fecisse mala, cum in potestate illius sit et
uoluntate, absque bonis et malis operibus, uel eligere aliquem uel abicere,
praesertim cum uoluntati illius humana fragilitas resistere nequeat. Quam
ualidam quaestionem Scripturarum ratione contextam, et paene insolubilem, breui
Apostolus sermone dissoluit, dicens: O homo! Tu quis es qui respondeas Deo? [Rom.
9:20]. Et est sensus: ex eo quod respondes Deo et calumniam facis et de
Scripturis tanta perquiris, ut loquaris contra Deum et iustitiam uoluntatis
eius inquiras, ostendis te liberi arbitrii, et facere quod uis, uel tacere uel
loqui. Si enim in similitudinem uasis fictilis te a Deo creatum putas, et
illius non posse resistere uoluntati, hoc considera: quia uas fictile non dicit
figulo: Quare me sic fecisti? [Rom. 9:20] Figulus enim habet potestatem
de eodem luto et: De eadem massa, aliud uas facere in honorem, aliud uero in
contumeliam [Rom. 9:21]. Deus autem aequali cunctos sorte generauit, et
dedit arbitrii libertatem, ut faciat unusquisque quod uult, siue bonum siue
malum. In tantum autem dedit omnibus potestatem, ut uox impia disputet contra
Creatorem suum, et causas uoluntatis illius perscrutetur.’
(39) Jerome, Ep. 120.10.12 (ed. Hilberg, CSEL 55, p. 504),
‘Si, inquit, patientia Dei indurauit Pharaonem et multo tempore poenas distulit
Israhelis, ut iustius condemnaret, quos tanto tempore sustinuerat, non Dei accusanda
patientia est et infinita clementia, sed eorum duritia, qui bonitatem Dei in
perditionem suam abusi sunt.’
(40) That is, ‘preceding causes’ that were not reincarnation but
were instead autonomous human decisions.
(41) Jerome, Ep. 120.10.13–14 (ed. Hilberg, CSEL 55, p.
504), ‘Non saluat inrationabiliter et absque iudicii ueritate, sed causis
praecedentibus, quia alii non susceperunt Filium Dei, alii recipere sua sponte
uoluerunt. Haec autem uasa misericordiae non solum populus gentium est, sed et
hi qui ex Iudaeis credere uoluerunt, et unus credentium effectus est populus.
Ex quo ostenditur non gentes eligi, sed hominum uoluntates’.
(42) Jerome, Ep. 120.11.10 (ed.
Hilberg, CSEL 55, p. 509), ‘Quia homines suo arbitrio derelicti sunt, neque
enim bonum necessitate faciunt sed uoluntate, ut credentes coronam accipiant,
increduli suppliciis mancipentur. Ideo odor noster, qui per se bonus est,
uirtute eorum et uitio, qui suscipiunt siue non suscipiunt, in uitam transit
aut mortem.’
(43) Scheck, St Jerome, Commentary on Isaiah, pp.
41–2.
(44) Jerome, In Esaiam 17.32, on Isa. 63:17–9 (ed. Gryson
et al., p. 1798), ‘It is not that God is the cause of human straying and
obstinacy, but that his patience, which waits for our salvation, while he does
not correct those who transgress, appears to be the cause of error and
obstinacy’; ‘Non quo Deus erroris causa sit et duritiae, sed quo illius
patientia, nostram exspectantis salutem, dum non corripit delinquentes, causa
erroris duritiaeque uideatur’; ‘Suam culpam referre in Deum.’
(45) For example, Jerome, In Esaiam
5.74, on Isa. 16:13 (ed. Gryson et al., p. 597), ‘It is not that the
foreknowledge of God offered the cause of the devastation, but that the coming
devastation was foreknown by the majesty of God’; ‘Non quo praescientia Dei
causam uastitatis attulerit, sed quo futura uastitas Dei maiestati praenota
sit.’