The
motivation for this project was the observation that very little research has
been done on the consequences of a libertarian concept of free-will on
Christology. Most Christians believe that Jesus Christ was fully human, yet was
unable to sin. If, however, being human implies the power to choose between
good and evil, it seems that Christ cannot be both fully human and impeccable.
. . . .
The
apparent inconsistency resulting from attributing impeccability to Christ can
be formulated as such::
1 If x is
truly human, x must be (potentially) peccable.
2 If x is
truly divine, x must be essentially impeccable.
3 A person
cannot be both (potentially) peccable and essentially impeccable. (Johannes
Grössl, “Introduction: Impeccability and Temptation,” in Impeccability and
Temptation: Understanding Christ’s Divine and Human Will, ed. Johannes
Grössl and Klaus von Stosch [Routledge Studies in Analytic and Systematic
Theology; London: Routledge, 2021], 1-2)
The
difficulty is clear. Why was Jesus driven out into the wilderness to
face temptation and testing from Satan in the first place (Matthew 4:1-11) if
there was no real possibility that he would fail, as humans do? Was it a pro
forma even to put Jesus’ flesh, if not Spirit, to the test? Was Jesus a
divine automaton going through the motions of a temptation story? And if so,
why does he need the ministering of angels at the end of the ordeal, if an
ordeal it was? More difficult still is the prospect that Jesus could have
sinned. Does this suggest that human salvation in Christ rested on Jesus’ human
obedience to the divine will? When Jesus was in the Garden of Gethsemane and
asked for God to take the cup of suffering and death away, was this another
temptation? Even to ask for the cup to be removed? Was the will of Jesus in
tension here with the will of God? If God was in Jesus and Jesus could have
sinned, does this mean that Jesus could have frustrated God’s salvific plans?
What would it mean that God could potentially sin against Godself? (Jeffrey
Siker, “The sinlessness of Christ and human perfection,” in Impeccability
and Temptation: Understanding Christ’s Divine and Human Will, ed. Johannes
Grössl and Klaus von Stosch [Routledge Studies in Analytic and Systematic
Theology; London: Routledge, 2021], 21)
The
Problem
The view
that being tempted implies that the person tempted is able to sin is not a
historical novelty, thought it may have more proponents in the recent past than
it did in the remote past. . . . One can
present the argumentation of these thinkers as follows:
1 If a
person is X, then that person is capable of sinning (i.e., peccable). (Assume)
2 Christ
is X (From Conciliar Christology)
3 Thus,
Christ is capable of sinning (From 1, 2)
4 If a
person is capable of sinning (peccable), then that person is not impeccable.
(Assume)
5 Thus,
Christ is not impeccable. (From 3, 4)
The
argument schema is valid. Thus, if the premises are true from some way of
filing in for X, we have a sound argument for concluding that Christ was not
impeccable. Furthermore, if that substituend for X is something which
traditional Christology teaches for Christ, then we have a proof for the claim
that traditional Christology is internally inconsistent. (Timothy Pawl, “Conciliar
Christology, impeccability, and temptation,” in Impeccability and
Temptation: Understanding Christ’s Divine and Human Will, ed. Johannes
Grössl and Klaus von Stosch [Routledge Studies in Analytic and Systematic
Theology; London: Routledge, 2021], 95)