Note: The author of the book, P. Craig Bresych is not a member of any non-Trinitarian group; as far as I can ascertain, he is a mainstream Protestant.
The Trinity is more than just a belief in the existence
of a triad of three things: Father, Son and Spirit of God. Christadelphians
believe in the existence of the Father, and in the existence of the Son, and the
existence of the outworking power or presence of God referred to as the Holy
Spirit. These are simply three things—a triad. The historical doctrine of the
Trinity goes beyond a simple collection of three things. It involves a complex
and confusing theory which posits that each of these three things are “persons”
and that each of the three “Persons” are each fully God, each being internal
and coequal with the other “persons,” and yet comprising only one God. If this
isn’t confusing enough, by the end of this chapter we’ll also discover that “persons”
in this traditional formula does not actually mean “person.” (P. Craig Bresych,
Are the Christadelphians a Cult? [Dorset, U.K.: New Covenant Press,
2022], 76 n. 2)
Can Someone Please Define a “Person”?
Trinitarians have been accustomed, for many centuries,
to describe the trinitarian “Godhead” with the use of the word person. For
example, theologian and Trinitarian apologist Roger E. Olson writes:
First, what is the doctrine of the Trinity? Without
getting into waters too deep, let’s define it ecumenically and very generally.
It is that God is one God eternally existing inseparably and equally as three “persons”
(hypostases). But we must immediately qualify that by saying that “person”
here, in this doctrine, does not mean what “person” means in everyday American
English. [. . . ] We must explain that when we say three “persons,” we do not
mean “person” in the common, American cultural individualistic sense. What we
do mean is not clear. (Roger E. Olson, “How Important is the Doctrine of the
Trinity?”)
His lack of clarity is mot evident when an inventory is
taken of the numerous ways in which Trinitarian theologians have tried to explain
what a person is in the traditional Trinitarian formulaic context. “Just
as there is nothing more humorous than philosophers trying to define humor, so
there is nothing more confusing than theologians trying to clear up the
confusions of the Trinity.” (Leonard I. Sweet, New Life in the Spirit
[Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1982], p. 33) And when it comes to the
meaning of the word “person,” the endless babel of opinions would be humorous
if it were not so grievous.
For example, after a pastor initially explains to the
unlearned man in the pew that the Trinity is the union of three “person” in a
single Godhead, one who is more expert on the topic comes along and “clarifies”
that the term “person” is misleading and that the Trinity should be understood
as consisting of three distinctions, followed by another expert who
proclaims it rather to be of three diversities, only to be interrupted
by another teacher of mysteries explaining the Trinity to consist of a single
being of three inseparable inter-personalities, who is trailed by
another who teaches that God consists of three intelligent substances,
while another says: three distinct cogitations, three distinct entities,
or three distinct natures. But others prefer the “persons” to be three subsistent
relations (sometimes referred to external relations, or internal relations,
take your pick), and yet others say: three differences, three forms,
three infinite minds, three hypostatic characters, three existences,
three centers of consciousness, three active self-consciousnesses,
three parts, three modes or aspects of being or
existence, three functions, three special faces, three realities,
or three “movements of life and love.” A few are bold enough to identify
the “persons” as three individuals, or three agents, without
realizing how close this is to tritheism. And finally, a few expositors with a
straight face will step forward to clarity that the Trinity is actually a
single being that consists of three “somewhats” or three “whos.” But wait,
there’s more! The grandest of all explanations for how we should properly
understand a “person” of the Trinity has been saved for last:
A person in an impenetrable and
divine mystery of a being, which is a substance possessing either aseity, or at
least inseity, the essence of which is not only a supposit, but also a rational
subsistence which makes it possible for it to lead a self-conscious and free
existence as a self-standing, self-possessing and autonomous center of
attribution; it is incommunicable, indestructible, and unique in its
individuality, and in its positive transcendental relationship to being, to the
ground of all being, to existence, and to becoming. (Petro Borys Tereshkowych
Bilaniuk, Theology and Economy of the Holy Spirit [Rome: Center for Indian
and Inter-Religious Studies, 1980], p. 31)
I am not making this stuff up! This, sadly, is what
these teachers call “explaining.”
Despite all these varying opinions found within arcane
books of systematic theology, never does the man in the pew come to learn from his
instructors what I jus shared: that according to the theologians and doctors of
orthodoxy, the word persons in the definition of the “one God in three
persons” doesn’t actually mean persons as you and I commonly understand
the word!
Adding to all the confusion is the fact that there are
Trinitarian scholars who refer to “God” (Yahweh) as a person, which leaves us
with a formula where God exists as “three persons (Father, Son, Holy Spirit) in
one person (God),” instead of the typical text-book definition of the Trinity
as “three persons in one essence” or “three persons in one being” as most
orthodox theologians would put forward. At least one scholar recognized the
conundrum and tried to solve it by “clarifying” that:
The word “person” does not have the same meaning in the
two sentences which follow:
·
God is
three persons.
·
God is a
person. (Alister E. McGrath, Christian Theology: An Introduction [Chichester:
John Wiley & Sons Ltd., 2017], p. 178)
Such a solution, however, simply compounds the
confusion, for the last thing the average Christian needs is an additional definition
for the word person in this convoluted discussion about God.
When so many opinions are presented among Trinitarians
themselves respecting their own doctrine, it only seems fair that the
Christadelphians be permitted to entertain an opinion of their own, yet very
different from all the rest, and that is, that the Trinity itself consists of
error. (Ibid., 118-20)
Unity
Does Not Imply Ontological Equality
One
of the most common “go to” proof-texts utilized by Trinitarians is from John 10:30,
where Jesus states, “I and my Father are one.” But the unity expressed in this
verse was not one of essence or substance, but of purposes. There are many ways
in which two or more persons can be said to be one without experiencing unity
in an ontological sense. One example is marriage, where a man and a woman
become “one flesh” (Genesis 2:24). Another example can be found in John 17:11,
where Jesus prayed for oneness among his disciples “as we are one,” that is,
just as the Father and Son are “one.” Yet just as the unity among the followers
of Jesus was not a unity of essence, but rather of purpose, so was the oneness
of Jesus spoke of between himself and the Father in John 10:30. Moreover, since
10:29 unequivocally states that “my Father is greater than all,” which Jesus repeats
in John 14:28, there should be no occasion for Trinitarians to claim that some
divine nature can be found in these texts. And yet many have claimed such, and
still do.
Going
as far back as the second century, early Church fathers, with the exception of
Origen, took John 10:30 as teaching the ontological equality between the Father
and the Son. Yet during the Reformation period, both Philip Melanchthon and John
Calvin, who were staunch defenders of the Trinity, questioned whether this text
could be appropriated as a proof of the deity of Jesus. These Protestant reformers
understood the “oneness” spoken of in John 10:30 as a oneness of purpose and
will. Calvin went so far as to harshly criticize the Church fathers for their
exegetical overreach, stating: “The ancients made a wrong use of the passage to
prove that Christ is hommousios, of the same essence with the Father.
For Christ does not argue about the unity of substance [In the Godhead] but
about the agreement which he has with the Father [. . . ].” (P. Craig Bresych, Are the Christadelphians a Cult?
[Dorset, U.K.: New Covenant Press, 2022], 92-93)
My God, My God, My God, My God!
John 20:28 is not the only place where we can find the
words “my God” and Jesus in close proximity to one another. For example, when
Jesus was hanging on the cross: “about the ninth hour Jesus cried with a loud
voice, ‘Eli, Eli, lama sabachthani?’ that is, ‘My God, my God, why hast thou
forsaken me?’” (Matthew 27:46, RSV). In addition to revealing the deep agony
and sense of despair experienced by Jesus in his final hours, his words “my God,
my God” confirm an easy to overlook truth: Jesus had a God.
This simple truth—that there was God over him whom he worshiped and served,
and whom he referred to in John 17;3 as “the only true God”_-this truth was
reaffirmed by Jesus after his resurrection. Prior to ascending to this God, Jesus
stated, “Go to my brethren and say to them, I am ascending to my Father and
your Father, to my God and your God” (John 20:17, NRSV).
This very same reference to “My God” (i.e., the God of
Jesus) can be found upon Jesus’ lips even after he ascended into heaven,
and even after he was “exalted at the right hand of God” (Acts 2:33). In
Revelation 3:12, the exalted Son for a total of four times uses these very same
words, “My God,” to affirm that he still has a God over him:
He who conquers, I will make him a pillar in the
temple of my God; never shall he go out of it, and I will write on him
the name of my God, and the name of the city of my God, the new
Jerusalem, which comes down from my God out of heaven, and my own new
name. (Revelation 3:12, RSV). (P. Craig Bresych, Are the Christadelphians a
Cult? [Dorset, U.K.: New Covenant Press, 2022], 95-96)
On the close proximity of the Messiah and “my
God”:
A noteworthy variant where the two ideas are found
together is Psalm 89:20-27: “I have found David, my servant; with my holy oil I
have anointed him [. . . .] He shall cry to me, ‘Thou art my Father, my God,
and the Rock of my salvation.’” A strong case can be made that the “David”
being referred to in this passage has a dual application, first to the
patriarch David, Israel’s anointed king, but ultimately to the greater son of
David, the Messiah Jesus. In this second application, the prophet who is
speaking of things to come, proclaims that he (the Messiah, though not yet
born) has a God over him: “ . . . my Father, my God . . .” (Ibid., 95 n. 25)
On Rev 3:12:
This statement by Jesus raises some uncomfortable yet
necessary questions for Trinitarians: If God is a Trinity, consisting of three
coequal “persons,” Then why is it that Jesus always identifies the Father with
this one God? Why does Jesus never refer to the Holy Spirit as God? Was Jesus
ascending only to one of the three “persons” in the “Godhead”? Why didn’t Jesus
say, “I am ascending to my Father, and your Father, and to the Holy Spirit . .
. ?” Why is it that the Holy Spirit is always absent in NT passages where Jesus
interacts with and refers to God, e.g., when Jesus prays to the Father? Why does
Jesus never pray to the Holy Spirit? Why are worshipers exhorted to worship the
Father at the exclusion of the remaining coequal “Persons” of the “Godhead” (John
14:23)? Why are we instructed to pray to the Father alone, if all three “persons”
of the Trinity are coequal (Matthew 6:9; Luke 11:12)? (Ibid., 96 n. 26)