Saturday, May 25, 2024

Excerpt from Peter Van Inwagen, “Author’s Preface to the French Translation of An Essay on Free Will"

  

Since the publication of An Essay on Free Will, it has become increasingly to me that free will is a philosophical mystery—something that philosophers do not understand at all. (it is not the only one. For example, no philosopher understands conscious experience of the apparent “passage” of time.) I do not mean to imply that imply that free will is a mystery in the theological sense: something that is beyond all possibility of human comprehension. That may or may not be the case. I contend only that as of this date, no philosopher has achieved an understanding of free will. That may be because free will is indeed something that human beings are incapable of understanding, but it may be because we human beings have not yet discovered the right way to think about free will. I will lay out the essence of this mystery in four fairly simple statements—labelled ‘first’, ‘secondly’, ‘thirdly’, and ‘fourthly’. First, there are excellent arguments for each of the following three propositions:

 

If antecedent conditions are the laws of nature determine the way in which a human being shall act at a certain time, then the person’s act at that time is not free. (This proposition, of course, is the proposition commonly called ‘incompatibilism’.)

 

If antecedent conditions and the laws of nature do not determine the way in which a human being shall act at a certain time, then that person’s act at that time is not free.

 

If a human being’s acts are never free, then the consequence of those acts are not the fault of that human being.

 

Secondly, the following fourth proposition seems to be true beyond all possibility of dispute:

 

Some of the consequences of some of the acts of some human beings are their fault.

 

Thirdly, these four propositions form a logically inconsistent set, and, therefore, either the excellent arguments for at least one of the first three propositions must contain some flaw or else it must be that (to take one example among many millions of compelling examples) the deaths of six million Jews in the extermination camps were not anyone’s fault. Fourthly, no one knows of even a plausible candidate for a flaw in any of the arguments for the first three of the four propositions (not, at any rate, in the arguments I’m thinking of), and to den the fourth would be simply bizarre. I doubt whether many philosophers will agree with my statement that “no one knows of even a plausible candidate for a flaw in any of the arguments for the first three of the four propositions,” but it represents my considered judgment. My own view is that there is a flaw in the argument (the argument that I think is the best argument for this conclusion) for the proposition ‘If antecedent conditions and the laws of nature do not determine the way in which a human being shall act at a certain time, then that person’s act at that time is not free’. But I haven’t any idea what this flaw might be.

 

I would recommend that the “problem of free will” be understood as follows: it is the problem of discovering a flaw in at least one of the arguments for the first three propositions—or else, of explaining how the seemingly self-evident fourth proposition, could, despite all appearances, be false. In my judgment, no one has the least idea how to solve this problem. That is what I mean by saying that “free will is a mystery” (Peter Van Inwagen, “Author’s Preface to the French Translation of An Essay on Free Will,” in Thinking about Free Will [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017], 181-83)