Sunday, May 19, 2024

Excerpts from Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, On Divine Revelation (volume 1)

  

What is required for accepting truth from a divine teaching authority? This is deduced from the two things required for accepting truth from a teaching authority in general. A divine teacher can propose a truth in two manners: (1) with evidence of the truth, as he manifests his essence immediately to the blessed; (2) without evidence of the proposed truth, which must be believed on account of the authority of him who reveals, as he reveals supernatural mysteries to wayfarers. However, based on what we have said heretofore, it is already obvious to some degree that two things are essentially [per se] required for accepting truth from a teaching authority [magisterium] on account of its authority, namely: (A) something on the part of the object—that is, the supernatural proposing of the truth to be believed—and (B) something on the part of the subject—namely, the light proportioned [to that truth].

 

. . .

 

A. The supernatural proposal of the truth to be believed, by which such truth is manifested, is objectively required.

 

{{149}} However, this involves three [lit. duo] things: (a) that something that was previously hidden is proposed by God, (b) to be accepted in a determinate sense, and (c) that the divine origin of the revelation is most certainly made manifest.

 

(a) That something that was previously hidden is proposed by God. In this way, revelation is distinguished from mere inspiration, which does not, of its very essence, involve the supernatural acceptance of an object but, rather, only an infallible judgment concerning something to be narrated or written—that is, concerning something “which man apprehends in the ordinary source of nature.”

 

. . .

 

(b) It is also necessary that that was previously hidden be proposed to be accepted in a determinate sense. Otherwise, if the prophet in no way understood the sense in which this teaching is to be believed, he could not believe anything determinately, nor propose revelation to other men fittingly so that it may be believed. Nevertheless, in the prophetic instinct by itself, which is something imperfect in the genus of prophetic revelation, “sometimes he whose mind is moved to express certain words does not understand what the Holy Spirit intends through these words, as is obvious in the case of Caiaphas when ‘he prophesized that Jesus was to be killed for the people’ as is read in John 11:51.”

 

. . .

 

(c) It is necessary that the divine origin of revelation be manifested in a most certain manner. Otherwise, the proposed truth could not be believed most firmly and formally on account of the authority of God who reveals but would be only an object of religious opinion, which Protestants often call faith—confidence or religious experience. Indeed, [without such certitude,] the prophet could not distinguish that is said by God from those things that proceed either from the inspiration of a demon or from his own imagination or subconscious; not, hence, could be divinely believed the revealed mystery, nor propose the divine word, properly so called, to others, not affirm the connection of an invisible and interior revelation with a miracle to be performed in confirmation of it. However, this manifestation of the divine origin of revelation is brought about from the prophet under the prophetic light, . . . (Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, On Divine Revelation: The Teaching of the Catholic Faith, 2 vols. [trans. Matthew K. Minerd; Steubenville, Ohio: Emmaus Academic, 2022], 1:282, 283)

 

RE. “Revelation of Supernatural Mysteries is hypothetically, but strictly, necessary”:

 

It is suitable that this revelation at first is obscure. Rationalists object that if this revelation remains obscure, it is not suitable, because it proposes to us mysteries that are unintelligible and useless for directing our life.

 

We must respond to this objection: If God were to reveal his essence to us in full clarity, as he does to the blessed in heaven, we would not meritoriously incline ourselves toward the supernatural end by our own exertion. Now, man must meritoriously incline himself to this end, for by his nature he is rational and free, and grace is conformed to nature.

 

Moreover, even if supernatural mysteries are obscure, they nonetheless are in some way analogically intelligible, not as seen but as believed.

 

This argument is proposed by St. Thomas in ST II-II, q. 2, a. 3, when he says:

 

{{388}} Man’s ultimate beatitude consists in a kind of supernatural vision of God. Now, man cannot reach such vision except by being taught by God, according to those words of St. John (John 6:45, DR): “Everyone that hath heard of the Father and that learned cometh to me.” However, man does not become a participant in such learning all at once but, rather, does so gradually and over time, in accord with the mode of his nature. Now, everyone learning in this way must believe in order to arrive at perfect knowledge, as the Philosopher says, “he who is to learn must believe.”

 

Nay, in a befitting manner, this obscure revelation was indeed gradually proposed in the Old Testament before being given in its fullness through Christ. (Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, On Divine Revelation: The Teaching of the Catholic Faith, 2 vols. [trans. Matthew K. Minerd; Steubenville, Ohio: Emmaus Academic, 2022], 1:634)

 

 

 

 

As regards the exegesis of Sacred Scripture, it follows that the rationalist or heretic can only materially know the latter of Sacred Scripture, but not its supernatural spirit, which is the formal principle of the literal sense. For in order to rightly understand the literal sense of Sacred Scripture, it does not suffice that one have knowledge of grammar, vocabulary, and merely rational rules of exegesis.  Beyond this, one must bear in mind Christian and Catholic rules of exegesis, which proceeds under the light of infused faith in order to rightly understand the expression of the mysteries of faith contained in Sacred Scripture. Just as the philologist does not correctly understand the literal sense of Aristotle’s Metaphysis if he does not have a philosophical spirit, so too the biblical critic who does not have the Christian spirit does not understand the literal sense of the Gospel: “But the sensual man perceiveth not these things that are the Spirit of God. . . . But as we have the mind of Christ” (1 Cor. 2:14-16 DR).

 

Likewise, the Thomistic thesis [on the resolution of faith] makes clear how Sacred Scripture is to be formally interpreted—namely through a resolution of the First Truth who reveals to the intimate life of God, and not according to a resolution to the psychological or religious experience of the sacred author (that is, of Jeremiah, Isaiah, or St. Paul). This psychological method, which is especially used by contemporary Protestants, is indeed useful if kept within due bounds. However, it often leads to relativism and naturalism, for gradually that which was only an instrumental cause of Sacred Scripture [namely, this psychological experience] becomes a kind of principal cause, leading one to no longer consider Scripture as being God’s Book but, rather to think of it as being [merely] a collection of human books. (Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, On Divine Revelation: The Teaching of the Catholic Faith, 2 vols. [trans. Matthew K. Minerd; Steubenville, Ohio: Emmaus Academic, 2022], 1:774-75, italics in original)

 

 

 

As regards the history of the Church, on the basis of our thesis, it is certain that the rationalist or heretic cannot write Church history in an appropriate manner, for the Church is an essentially supernatural society [institutio] that is ruled by the Holy Spirit. Of itself, human reason can only materially gather together many facts about the Church's life. However, in order to know the true relationship among these facts, recourse must formally be had to the Church’s intimate life, to the supernatural and special providence of God, and not only, as is done by rationalists or heretics, to human causes the influence of Greek philosophy. {{481}} Roman politics, the natural character of St. Paul, St. Athanasius, St. Cyprian, or of their adversaries. These causes remain secondary.

 

All of these consequences are of the greatest importance and proceed from the fact that our faith is essentially supernatural, not only as regards the pious affects of belief but also as regards that which is intellectual in it. Hence, in theology, exegesis, and Church history, one must essentially proceed not only under the objective direction of revealed doctrine but also under the subjective influence of the internal light of faith, under the illumination of the Holy Spirit. Only in this way are the words of the Lord confirmed: “He that followeth me walked not in darkness, but shall have the light of life” (John 8:12, DR). This light of life, already inchoately existing in believers like a seed of glory, is not only necessary for [personal] piety but also for sacred science. Hence, theology is called “sacred,” as being distinct from the sciences of the natural order. (Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, On Divine Revelation: The Teaching of the Catholic Faith, 2 vols. [trans. Matthew K. Minerd; Steubenville, Ohio: Emmaus Academic, 2022], 1:775, italics in original)

 

 

“It is not difficult for the first Master of souls to exercise a secret, omnipotent, and irresistible magisterium within the intimate depths of our intellects. As He never does anything unless, He can make use of the religious knowledge of the pagan—all the while correcting and completing them.

 

“Indeed, our apologists note, as an ordinary means utilized by Providence, either forgotten evangelization which has nonetheless left its traces or also primitive tradition [that such people have] . . .

 

“These hypotheses could be acceptable for the theologian as for the apologist on the condition that one always makes appeal to the supernatural action of an infinitely merciful Providence which, sincerely wishing that all men be saved, owes to itself to illuminate each of them according to this or her condition.

 

“Let us try to resolve the problem by using responses that would be too satisfying to rationalist eyes. It is always God’s side of the things that St. Thomas considers, only ever accepting solutions that are worthy of God and of His grace.

 

“Since the faith required for salvation is essentially supernatural, it is necessary, in any hypothesis, that the revelation on which it is supported to be supernatural. God will know how to intervene, in His sublime manner, to arrange the grace of illumination and inspiration, to take, if necessary to correct, and to transform the elements of paganism that can be used, placing them in the service of the conceiving of supernatural truths needed for salvation.” (Édouard Hugon, Hors de l’eglise pas de salut [2d ed; 1914], ch. 4 (The salvation of pagans), 105, in Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, On Divine Revelation: The Teaching of the Catholic Faith, 2 vols. [trans. Matthew K. Minerd; Steubenville, Ohio: Emmaus Academic, 2022], 1:806 n. 80)