Wednesday, November 6, 2024

Stephen J. Ceci and Maggie Bruck on Memory

  

MEMORY

 

What does it mean to “remember” something? Psychologists who study memory have developed several approaches for thinking about the workings of the human memory system. Despite numerous views on how memory works, a common feature of most models is that memory is a “constructive” rather than a reproductive enterprise. That is, memories are not simply passively recorded by our senses, then stored in their natural form in a brain bin that preserves their initial quality; not are memories mechanically accessed in their original state at the time of remembering. Rather, because of the constructive nature of memory, reports may be inaccurate because of a number of factors that intrude at the time of the initial recording (encoding) of the event, during the storage of the event, or at the time of the retrieval of the event.

 

One of the primary factors that affects the quality of memories is our previous knowledge, our assumptions, and our biases about the world. The classic demonstration of this relationship was provided over 60 years ago by Sir Frederick Bartlett of Cambridge University. He demonstrated that when individuals are asked to remember interesting but unusual episodes, they often refashion these so that they make sense to them, given their values and expectations (Bartlett, 1932). For example, adults read a story about North American Indians called “War of the Ghosts” and then were asked to recall the story several times. Bartlett’s European subjects changed certain features of the passage that were inconsistent with their prior expectations and understanding. For example, his subjects omitted a supernatural aspect of the story, and recalled canoes as boats. Bartlett’s study, and hundreds of demonstrations since then, showed that what one remembers is in part influenced by one’s emotional as well as cognitive perspective of the event. Thus, current conceptualizations of memory underscore the fact that it does not resemble a tape recorder or camera—devices that store and retrieve information veridically. Instead, our memory system is an active part of a larger cognitive and social system that constantly interacts with what we know and expect. As long as experiences are in accord with our expectations, there is usually no problem. But when there is a mismatch between what we expect and what we actually experience, it is not uncommon for this to be resolved by the former intruding into our recollection of the latter.

 

The likelihood that we can remember an event from our past depends on the skill with which we execute a complex set of processes, initially during the event in question, then later at the time of its retrieval. Psychologists who study human memory usually discuss these processes in terms of a flow of information from one stage of the memory system to another. The three main stages of the system are encoding, storge, and retrieval. These are briefly described below. For a more detailed view, the reader should consult any one of a number of excellent treatises on the human memory system (e.g., Baddeley, 1990; Klatzky, 1980; Schneider & Pressley, 1989; Zechmeister & Nyberg, 1982).

 

Encoding

 

The first phase of the memory system is called encoding. This refers to the process by which a trace of an experience becomes registered in memory. There is selectivity in what gets encoded into the storage system in the first place. In part, this selectivity reflects the limited attentional resources of the human organism; we cannot attend to everything at one time, and as a result, she may have no attentional capacity left over to attend to peripheral information such as what songs were played on the radio or what signs were posted along the side of the road. Thus, not everything that is “out there” gets attended to. And nothing gets stored in permanent memory unless it is first attended to.

 

There are a number of factors that can potentially influence what enters the memory system, and these same factors may also influence how strongly a trace becomes encoded. These include the amount of prior knowledge about the events (usually, the more knowledge the more easily events are encoded), the interest value or salience of the events, the duration and repetition of the original event, and the stress level at the time of encoding the original event . . .

 

Storage

 

In the second phase of the memory system, encoded events enter a short-term memory store. Not all the memories survive the short- term memory’s limited storage capacity, but those that do survive enter a long-term memory store. At one time, this stage was assumed to be passive; the contents of an encoded event were thought to be dormant in storage until such time as they were retrieved. This view is almost surely wrong, and we now have some good evidence that encoded information can be transformed, fortified, or lost while it resides in storage (Brainerd, Reynard, Howe, & Kingma, 1990).

 

The passage of time, the number of times that the event has been re-experienced, and the number and types of intervening experiences, which have also become encoded and stored, can have a strong impact on the strength and organization of the stored information. Thus, memories can increase or decrease in strength as a function of how long they have been stored (usually shorter delays result in better recall) and of the number of times that the original event has been recalled (in some cases, repeated recall strengthens the memory; at other times it weakens it). It is also true that knowledge and expectancies can change the composition of memory during the storage phase, thus transforming the trace to make it more consistent with one’s attitudes and expectations. Finally, intervening experiences may at times serve to solidify the initial memory (when these are congruent with the initial trace); at other times these experiences may compete with and interfere with the stored memory if they are inconsistent with the original encoded event.

 

There have been challenges to some of these general claims. Of importance for our topic is the claim that certain types of memories, specifically those of emotionally arousing events, are not subject to many of the general principles just cited. Some argue that these memories are highly resistant to decay, whereas others argue that there may be repression of memories that are terrifying. . . .

 

Retrieval

 

The final step in remembering involves the retrieval of stored information. It is not necessarily the case that there is perfect retrieval of stored memories. In fact, there are times when the contents of the memory system are simply not retrievable. A variety of cognitive as well as social factors influence the retrievability of stored memories, although the nature of their influences is not static: Some of these factors at times enhance recall, whereas at other times the same factors may decrease the accuracy of the recall. We will now consider some of these factors.

 

The condition of the original memory trace is important; traces that have undergone some decay will be harder to retrieve than those that retain their original strength. In some cases, retrieval of a memory may be facilitated when the conditions for retrieval parallel those of encoding. One of the better examples of this principle is provided by Godden and Baddeley’s study of state-dependent learning (1975). Deep-sea divers were asked to learn (encode) lists of words while they were beneath the sea. Their later retrieval of those words was better when they were beneath the sea compared with when they were on land. In recent replications of this work, it has been shown that divers retrieve lists encoded on dry land better when they are put back on dry land, and they retrieve lists encoded under water better when they are put back under water (Martin & Aggleton, 1993).

 

An extension of this finding is that when an interviewer provides cues that may reinstate the encoding context, accuracy of recall improves. There are various types of cues that can be given. Some involve reminding the subject about parts of the actual event, whereas other types of cues may involve inducing emotional or cognitive states at retrieval that match those present at the time of encoding. Although these techniques may facilitate the recall of actually experienced events, they may promote false recall if an event was never experienced . . .

 

There are also may constructive factors that enter into the retrieval stage. For example, when asked to recall a faded event, we may use our knowledge about what “typically” happens to fill gaps in our memory. A more specific term for this phenomenon is script-based knowledge, which refers to our expectations and predictions of how events in the world are sequenced and related to each other. According to Hastie (1981), “The memorability of an event increases when the event is relevant to expectations and beliefs about hat event.” But . . .the relationship between script-based knowledge and retrieval is not straightforward. If an event is highly congruent with our script-based knowledge, then it is likely to be retrieved. However, if an event is highly incongruent with our script-based knowledge, it is also likely to be retrieved—presumably because of its bizarreness.

 

Finally, there are a number of higher-level (consciously deployed) factors that influence how well children and adults can recall events. These include a number of intuitively obvious factors as the degree to which the individual is motivated to retrieve old memories, the degree to which the individual wishes to cooperate with the examiner, and the degree to which a person understands what is important to recall. (Stephen J. Ceci and Maggie Bruck, Jeopardy in the Courtroom: A Scientific Analysis of Children’s Testimony [Washington D. C.: American Psychological Association, 1995], 40-44)

 

Further Reading:

 

Steven C. Harper, First Vision: Memory and Mormon Origins (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019)

 

 

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