In his Excursus on the Atonement, Henry Cowles wrote the following against the
Reformed understanding of (1) the atonement and (2) imputation:
It would be turning aside unprofitably from
this course of argument to quote from those who insist that Christ suffered the
penalty of the law, and show that having made this the test and standard of
orthodoxy, many, if not most of them then proceed to explain it almost utterly
away, and to say (e.g.) on one page: “God demanded from Christ the very same
punishment as to kind of punishment, though not as to the degree or as to the
nature of the suffering, which the law denounced upon us”; and on another, (two
pages after): “We say that Christ suffered in the least the same kind, much
less the same degree of suffering as was penalty due for those for whom he
acted” (Prof. A.A. Hodge, pp. 36, 38). This certainly appears to be a case of
holding on tenaciously to the words of a favorite definition while rejecting
the legitimate sense of it. The latter is a concession to truth and evidence;
the former is not so easily explained. However, it is in most respects
gratifying to find that those who begin with the definition: “Christ suffered
the very penalty of the law for sinners,” proceeds to modify it by eliminating
its essential ideas, toning it down usually to this general and unobjectionable
statement: Christ suffered in behalf of sinners all that God’s justice and
holiness demanded for the ends of an adequate atonement
This theory must be rejected, not because
(like that previously considered) it signifies too little to fulfill the
scriptural testimony, but because it signifies too much. In respect to both the
nature and amount of Christ’s sufferings, it demands more than the historic
record requires or admits; and more than the nature of the case demands or even
allows.
If it be said that the altar-language, e.g.,
“bearing our sins”; “gave himself a random for all”; “made a curse for us,”
etc., admits this theory, and naturally expresses it, I answer: Even if that be
granted, it does not demand it. Another view, exempt from the insuperable
difficulties of this, suffices to fill out the necessary and indeed the natural
sense of this altar-language, and should, therefore, be accepted.—There is not
the last occasion to press this altar-language to signify that Christ suffered
the same in kind and amount as the redeemed must else have suffered; or that
his death was the same thing as the sinner’s eternal death would else have
been; for a less suffering might suffice and a very different death might
avail. An analogy doubtless exists between what Christ suffered and what is due
to the sinner; but analogies call only for certain resemblances and not for
identities. This is the point where this theory makes its capital mistake. It
pushes these analogies unreasonably far. It puts into them more than the terms
and figures demand, and more than the nature of the case can possibly admit.
Special notice should be taken of Gal. 3:13
much relied on as proof that Christ suffered the whole curse of the law for us.
Here Paul says: “Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made
a curse for us, for it is written, Cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree.”
But observe that this passage, for the purposes of the theory under
consideration, is made to read virtually thus: Christ hath redeemed us from the
curse of the law, being made to suffering the curse of the law for us. This is
a large interpolation. Very important words are put into the passage, in
addition to what Paul put in, which therefore are not there by his authority.
This adding to words inspired of God is by no means admissible unless it
appears from the context of from other legitimate authority that Paul must have
meant what these added words express. But Paul’s context shows that he is
thinking, not of Christ’s being made the very curse of the law which sinners
had broken, but only of his being accounted—considered to be—accursed in the
sense in which any and every man hung on a tree was in Jewish sentiment held to
be accursed; for in support of his view he quotes Deut. 21:23, which is a
special statute against leaving the malefactor’s body on the tree over night.
Paul’s meaning therefore is that suspending Christ on the tree was in the
popular view an extreme reproach because it was supposed to imply the
execration of God. But this is a very different thing from Christ’s suffering
the eternal death to which the law doomed every transgressor.
As commonly held, this theory of the work of
Christ for sinners is in two quite distinct parts, viz.: (1) Christ bearing for
sinners the full penalty of the law. (2) His perfect obedience to the law,
which, upon the condition of faith, is imputed, i.e., transferred in law to the
believer and accounted as his own.—On this theory it would seem that the sinner
is justified twice; in each case on entirely distinct and independent grounds;
viz., first, because Christ has suffered the full penalty of the law in his
stead, so that nothing in law stands against him; second, because Christ has
obeyed the law perfectly for him, and this is accounted to be his own
obedience, as if he had rendered it himself. Of course, on either of these
grounds it would seem he should be fully justified.
This theory is obnoxious to the following
insuperable objections:
1. Obedience and disobedience are, in their
essential nature, personal and non-transferable. Every moral agent must obey or
disobey on his own sole responsibility. The law says to him, do this, do not
that, and holds him to his own duty. No law binding on me permits another moral
agent to do my duty for me, and then reckons his act as being really my act,
and so releases me from my personal responsibility. Neither can it permit
another moral agent to disobey for me, and then account his disobedience as
mine. The supposition of a transfer from one moral being to another, of
personal obligation and of consequent merit or demerit, is simply absurd. Law
knows nothing of the sort.
2. If there be two distinct provisions for justification,
each in itself all-sufficient, then one or the other must be superfluous. If
either is a fact, it supersedes the other. There is not the least occasion for
the sinner to be justified twice over; i.e., on two entirely distinct and
independent grounds. No such superfluous provision can be consistent with God’s
wisdom.
3. This supposed transfer of Christ’s
righteousness t the believer is not the scriptural doctrine of mercy and
forgiveness; nor is it taught in the scriptures by any right interpretation of
their words. The sense of it is not there. For, according to the Scriptures,
sinners become right before God (1) by their repentance; (2) by their faith in
Christ—upon the basis of which faith their sins are, through Christ’s
atonement, forgiven. Once renewed in heart and forgiven of their sin, they are
accepted before God. Nothing more can possibly be requisite.
4. If Christ’s righteousness were really
transferred to the believer, there would be no more room for the exercise of
mercy in his forgiveness, since he would be righteous even as Christ himself
is. Nor does it appear, how he could need grace for future holy living, having
the perfect holiness of Jesus Christ for his own.
5. In its practical bearings, this doctrine
tends dangerously to antinomianism, inasmuch as if I really believed, it
naturally quenches the sense of personal responsibility for obedience;
supersedes watchfulness, prayer and perpetual endeavor to do all the will of
God. For why should not the believer say in his heart. This imputed
righteousness of Christ is all I need to make me right before God? It is
infinitely better than any obedience of my own, and it really makes mine of the
least possible consequence. Why would I concern myself over my own doings, as
if they had any bearings upon my standing before God, or as if He would ever
look at them?
Does any sensible man receive such
impressions from the thoughtful, prayerful reading of the Scriptures? (The Governmental View of the Atonement: A
Compilation of Various Christian Authors [comp. Jesse Morrell; Biblical
Truth Resources, 2012], 134-38)
