Saturday, March 13, 2021

Erwin R. Goodenough on the Nature of the "Logos" in Justin Martyr's Theology

  

The Nature of the Logos

 

From Justin's arguments for the existence of a Second God, and from his descriptions of the begetting of the Only Begotten, it has appeared that Justin was attempting to explain a birth or begetting in the Godhead which produced a Second Person without any separation or division of the Godhead. But in general Justin found his Philonic figures of the unity of the ουσια much less important than the dual divine Personalities, and consequently he makes the real basis of his argument for monotheism not the unity of ουσια but the subordination of rank of the Second God. The Logos, in passage after passage is represented as subordinate to the Father. Probably the figure of Light beams from a source of light expressed his conception much more fully than he wanted explicitly to admit. Bosse has accurately pointed out that in the title ετερος θεος the term θεος is of much less importance than ετερος. It is quite true that in places Justin checks himself from making the distinction between God and the Logos too sharp, as in the passage where he says that the Second God is "distinct from Him who made all things: I mean He is distinct in number but not in intellectual initiative" (Dial 56 11 [276 E] ετερος εστι του παντα ποιησαντος θεου αριθμω λεγω αλλα ου γνωμη). But even here, where Justin has apparently asserted the equality of the Logos with the Father, a second glance will at once reveal the fact that to deny independence γνωμη is quite the reverse of asserting equality of rank. The sentence is ordinarily rendered as though γνωμη here were equivalent to θεληματι, will, but it means much more than that. It means that though the Second God is a distinct personality He yet has no impulsive power in His thinking, for there is only one such centre in the Godhead, the οντως θεος. The beam of light has an independent existence, in a sense that it can be treated as a thing in itself. IT can be broken by a prism, reflected in a mirror, or checked by a screen without anything having happened to the source. It is intelligible to speak of a light and its beams, making a plurality of number. Nevertheless the beam remains nothing in itself apart from its source. So the Logos, while different in person or number from the Source, has no independence of intellectual initiative in Himself. He is never a cause, but only a means, the personal vehicle through whom God may express His will and intentions. "For I say that He (the Second God) has never done (or said) anything other than what He who made the world, above whom is no other God, has wished Him to do or say" (Dial. 56 11 [276 D]). SO Justin says again that Christ "is also God according to His (God's) will, His Son and He is an Angel because He ministers to Gods purpose (εκ του υπηρετειν τη ωνημη αυτου)" (Dial 127 4 [357 B], cf. Dial 60 3 [282 C]). But the similarity between Christ and the angels is deeper than one of function. It has been seen that His origin was of the same nature as that of angels, and at least in this point. His character is like theirs. For though the angels were granted freedom of choice (Ap II. 7. 5 [45 D]. αυτεξουσιαν; cf. Dial 88 5 [316 A]) they are not self-directed. There are not two or more centers radiating δυναμεις λογικας but only ONe, and to that Center Christ, as the angels which prompted Justin to the great discomfort of later Christian Apologists, to say that the objects of Christian worship wore God, "and the Son who came forth from Him and taught us those things and the host of other good angels who follow HIm and are made like to him," etc (Ap I 6 2 [56 C] τον παρ' αυτου υιον ελθοντα και διδαξαντα ημας ταυτα και τον των αλλων επομενων και εξομοιουμενων αγαθων αγγελων στρατον). This passage Father Martindale has recently wished to explain as meaning "and the others the ministering angels," by a familiar Greek idiom. But such an interpretation is dubious from the fact that Justin describes the origin of the Logos and of the angels as of the same nature. Justin's confusion of the Logos as a distinct and unique existence, and at the same time as similar ultimately to the angels is entirely Philonic. For Philo has passages where the Logos seems a unique existence, as when he identifies it with the κοσμος νοητος but in other passages he repeatedly calls the Logos an Angel (e.g. De Somniis I 239 [I 656) τον αγγελον αυτου λογον) and one of the δυναμεις of God, and gives it the angelic title υπηρετης (In Dial. 57.3 [279 E] Justin has Trypho called the Logos υπηρετης του ποιητου των ολων θεου).

 

But in spite of Justin's identification of the metaphysical nature of the Logos with the angels, no greater injustice can be done Justin's thought than to regard the Logos as adequately described in terms of His angelic character. The Logos is the Only Begotten the only one properly called Son of God, and it is impossible to suppose that Justin thought of the Logos as simply the chief of the Angels. If He is an angel in nature, He is not one in rank for He alone, except the Father, merits the titles κυριος and θεος.

 

The title θεος which Justin repeatedly insists is properly applied to the Logos is very hard to define, for Justin by no means meant to teach that there are two First Gods. To express the distinction between the First and Second Gods. Justin took over a locution which Philo was the first to my knowledge to have defined that it is the distinction between ο θεος and θεος, which has already been quoted. Justin had no occasion to define this distinction as Philo did, for apparently it was a perfectly familiar manner of speech. It was indeed familiar enough by the time when the Fourth Gospel was written to enable its use without definition in that Prologue which is only intelligible on the assumption that the writer was summarizing in familiar language a familiar conception. The Proglogue says, ο λογος εν προσ τον θεον, και θεος ην ο λογος. But Justin departs from the Philonic use to make θεος not only a title distinguishing Him from the First God, but also a mark of the superiority of the Logos to the other angels. Philo says that many may loosely be called θεος, but Justin indicates the title as the distinction of the unique rank of the Logos (The title is thus used Dial 48 2 [267 C]; 56 8 [276 B], 125 3 [354 D], 126 2 [355 C], 127 4 [357 B], 128 1, 4 [357 D, 358 C], it must however be borne in mind that Justin is by no means a nice writer, and does not check his terminology. Hence when he has just quoted an Old Testament theophany in which the God of the theophany is called ο θεος, Justin occasionally applies the article to the God of the theophany.), though in the Apology he prefers toe equally Philonic term θειος λογος (Ap I 10 6 [58 D], 33 9 [75 D], 36 1 [76 D] The term θειος λογος would be more easily intelligible to people not familiar with the Philonic tradition than the simple θεος. The Apology was probably designed for readers unacquainted with the Philonic tradition, the Dialogue for readers who had such acquaintance). Justin says that the Logos is θεος because He is the Son of God (Dial 125 3 [354 D], 128 1 [357 D]), but this means nothing. However, when he says that the Logos is θεος because it is the will of the Father that He should be θεος (Dial 127 4 [357 B]) we have a statement of much great significance. For this statement recalls the fact that Justin says the Logos is Son of God because God wills it. Indeed all of the glory and power which the Logos possesses is His, not by His own right but by the will of the Father. He is ο κυριος ημων κατα το θελημα του πεμψαντος αυτον πατρος και δεσποτου των ολων (Dial. 140 4 [369 D]). God gave His glory only to His Christ (Dial. 65 3 [289 E]). Christ Himself received from the Father the title of King, and Christ, and Priest, and Angel, and such like other titles which He bears or did bear (Dial 86 3 [313 C]). The Logos is worshipped because God wills it (Dial 93 2 [321 A]). The Logos is then θεος, κυριος, Son, King, Christ, Priest, Angel, glorious and worshipful only because God wills this to be the case. otherwise, we must conclude He would be merely like any of the other angels. For the Logos was an emanation of Power, a permanent δυναμις like all the other permanent δυναμεις but by the will of God granted powers, glory, and eminence so far superior to the others that He alone is properly called Son, and Lord, and to Him alone is the word θεος (or θειος) to be applied. (Erwin R. Goodenough, The Theology of Justin Martyr [1923], 155-59)