The Nature of the Logos
From Justin's arguments for the
existence of a Second God, and from his descriptions of the begetting of the
Only Begotten, it has appeared that Justin was attempting to explain a birth or
begetting in the Godhead which produced a Second Person without any separation
or division of the Godhead. But in general Justin found his Philonic figures of
the unity of the ουσια much less important than the dual divine Personalities,
and consequently he makes the real basis of his argument for monotheism not the
unity of ουσια but the subordination of rank of the Second God. The Logos, in
passage after passage is represented as subordinate to the Father. Probably the
figure of Light beams from a source of light expressed his conception much more
fully than he wanted explicitly to admit. Bosse has accurately pointed out that
in the title ετερος θεος the term θεος is of much less importance than ετερος.
It is quite true that in places Justin checks himself from making the
distinction between God and the Logos too sharp, as in the passage where he
says that the Second God is "distinct from Him who made all things: I mean
He is distinct in number but not in intellectual initiative" (Dial 56 11
[276 E] ετερος εστι του παντα ποιησαντος θεου αριθμω λεγω αλλα ου γνωμη). But
even here, where Justin has apparently asserted the equality of the Logos with
the Father, a second glance will at once reveal the fact that to deny
independence γνωμη is quite the reverse of asserting equality of rank. The
sentence is ordinarily rendered as though γνωμη here were equivalent to
θεληματι, will, but it means much more than that. It means that though the
Second God is a distinct personality He yet has no impulsive power in His
thinking, for there is only one such centre in the Godhead, the οντως θεος. The
beam of light has an independent existence, in a sense that it can be treated
as a thing in itself. IT can be broken by a prism, reflected in a mirror, or
checked by a screen without anything having happened to the source. It is
intelligible to speak of a light and its beams, making a plurality of number.
Nevertheless the beam remains nothing in itself apart from its source. So the
Logos, while different in person or number from the Source, has no independence
of intellectual initiative in Himself. He is never a cause, but only a means,
the personal vehicle through whom God may express His will and intentions.
"For I say that He (the Second God) has never done (or said) anything
other than what He who made the world, above whom is no other God, has wished
Him to do or say" (Dial. 56 11 [276 D]). SO Justin says again that Christ
"is also God according to His (God's) will, His Son and He is an Angel
because He ministers to Gods purpose (εκ του υπηρετειν τη ωνημη αυτου)"
(Dial 127 4 [357 B], cf. Dial 60 3 [282 C]). But the similarity between Christ
and the angels is deeper than one of function. It has been seen that His origin
was of the same nature as that of angels, and at least in this point. His
character is like theirs. For though the angels were granted freedom of choice
(Ap II. 7. 5 [45 D]. αυτεξουσιαν; cf. Dial 88 5 [316 A]) they are not
self-directed. There are not two or more centers radiating δυναμεις λογικας but
only ONe, and to that Center Christ, as the angels which prompted Justin to the
great discomfort of later Christian Apologists, to say that the objects of
Christian worship wore God, "and the Son who came forth from Him and
taught us those things and the host of other good angels who follow HIm and are
made like to him," etc (Ap I 6 2 [56 C] τον παρ' αυτου υιον ελθοντα και
διδαξαντα ημας ταυτα και τον των αλλων επομενων και εξομοιουμενων αγαθων
αγγελων στρατον). This passage Father Martindale has recently wished to explain
as meaning "and the others the ministering angels," by a familiar
Greek idiom. But such an interpretation is dubious from the fact that Justin
describes the origin of the Logos and of the angels as of the same nature.
Justin's confusion of the Logos as a distinct and unique existence, and at the
same time as similar ultimately to the angels is entirely Philonic. For Philo
has passages where the Logos seems a unique existence, as when he identifies it
with the κοσμος νοητος but in other passages he repeatedly calls the Logos an
Angel (e.g. De Somniis I 239 [I 656) τον αγγελον αυτου λογον) and one of the
δυναμεις of God, and gives it the angelic title υπηρετης (In Dial. 57.3 [279 E]
Justin has Trypho called the Logos υπηρετης του ποιητου των ολων θεου).
But in spite of Justin's
identification of the metaphysical nature of the Logos with the angels, no
greater injustice can be done Justin's thought than to regard the Logos as
adequately described in terms of His angelic character. The Logos is the Only
Begotten the only one properly called Son of God, and it is impossible to
suppose that Justin thought of the Logos as simply the chief of the Angels. If
He is an angel in nature, He is not one in rank for He alone, except the
Father, merits the titles κυριος and θεος.
The title θεος which Justin
repeatedly insists is properly applied to the Logos is very hard to define, for
Justin by no means meant to teach that there are two First Gods. To express the
distinction between the First and Second Gods. Justin took over a locution
which Philo was the first to my knowledge to have defined that it is the
distinction between ο θεος and θεος, which
has already been quoted. Justin had no occasion to define this distinction as
Philo did, for apparently it was a perfectly familiar manner of speech. It was
indeed familiar enough by the time when the Fourth Gospel was written to enable
its use without definition in that Prologue which is only intelligible on the
assumption that the writer was summarizing in familiar language a familiar
conception. The Proglogue says, ο λογος εν προσ τον θεον, και θεος ην ο λογος. But Justin departs from the Philonic use to
make θεος not only a title distinguishing Him from the First God, but also a
mark of the superiority of the Logos to the other angels. Philo says that many
may loosely be called θεος, but Justin indicates the title as the distinction
of the unique rank of the Logos (The title is thus used Dial 48 2 [267 C]; 56 8
[276 B], 125 3 [354 D], 126 2 [355 C], 127 4 [357 B], 128 1, 4 [357 D, 358 C],
it must however be borne in mind that Justin is by no means a nice writer, and
does not check his terminology. Hence when he has just quoted an Old Testament
theophany in which the God of the theophany is called ο θεος, Justin
occasionally applies the article to the God of the theophany.), though in the
Apology he prefers toe equally Philonic term θειος λογος (Ap I 10 6 [58 D], 33
9 [75 D], 36 1 [76 D] The term θειος λογος would be more easily intelligible to
people not familiar with the Philonic tradition than the simple θεος. The
Apology was probably designed for readers unacquainted with the Philonic
tradition, the Dialogue for readers who had such acquaintance). Justin says
that the Logos is θεος because He is the Son of God (Dial 125 3 [354 D], 128 1
[357 D]), but this means nothing. However, when he says that the Logos is θεος
because it is the will of the Father that He should be θεος (Dial 127 4 [357
B]) we have a statement of much great significance. For this statement recalls
the fact that Justin says the Logos is Son of God because God wills it. Indeed
all of the glory and power which the Logos possesses is His, not by His own
right but by the will of the Father. He is ο κυριος ημων κατα το
θελημα του πεμψαντος αυτον πατρος και δεσποτου των ολων (Dial. 140 4 [369 D]). God gave His glory only to His
Christ (Dial. 65 3 [289 E]). Christ Himself received from the Father the title
of King, and Christ, and Priest, and Angel, and such like other titles which He
bears or did bear (Dial 86 3 [313 C]). The Logos is worshipped because God
wills it (Dial 93 2 [321 A]). The Logos is then θεος, κυριος, Son, King,
Christ, Priest, Angel, glorious and worshipful only because God wills this to
be the case. otherwise, we must conclude He would be merely like any of the
other angels. For the Logos was an emanation of Power, a permanent δυναμις like
all the other permanent δυναμεις but by the will of God granted powers, glory,
and eminence so far superior to the others that He alone is properly called
Son, and Lord, and to Him alone is the word θεος (or θειος) to be applied. (Erwin
R. Goodenough, The Theology of Justin Martyr [1923], 155-59)