The Personal Existence of a
Second God
When Justin wishes to convert
Trypho to Christianity, the first essential is to prove to him the existence of
the Second God. There is no such necessity in the Apology where Justin is
addressing polytheists, for with them he has only to assert the existence of
the Logos, while proof is needed soley to identify the historical Jesus with
this Logos. But in the Dialogue, which is a much more thorough and idiomatic,
though by no means a complete expression of Justin's Christianity, Justin is
compelled to prove the existence of a Second God. Herein the Dialogue is
different from the Philonic literature. Philo adduced proof of the existence of
God, which Justin in no passage felt called upon to do Philo, on the other
hand, feels himself under no necessity of justifying his constant appeal to the
Logos for he seems to assume that the existence of the Logos is a corollary to
the existence of God. Such an assumption was possible to Philo for two reasons,
first because he was writing in an environment where the Logos had for more
than a century, at least, been proverbial, and second because he could always
remove apparent inconsistencies with monotheism by treating the Logos
impersonally. But with the Christians this escape was impossible, for it was
precisely upon the personality of the Logos that then religious system was
founded in the Dialogue where the Jewish inheritance of Christianity stands out
more clearly then in the Apology, the urge for monotheism is compelling, so
that any mention of a Second Divine Personality demands the most careful
justification.
Justin states his thesis thus:
"I shall try to persuade you that there is and is said to be (in the
Scriptures) a God and Lord besides the Creator of the universe, who is also
called an Angel because He announces to men whatsoever the Creator of the
universe wishes, but there is no other God higher than the Creator" (Dial
56.4 [275 C]). In the Apology, where the argument for the Second God is briefly
mentioned, but by no means worked out in detail, the same thesis takes the
form: "The Father of the universe has a Son, who also, being the first
begotten Word of the God, is a God" (Ap. I 63 15 [96 C]). Two arguments
are adduced to prove this thesis, the first based upon theophanies, the second
upon passages in the Old Testament where God is represented as speaking to some
other God.
The argument from theophanies is
as follows (Dial 56 entire): Justin quotes to Trypho the passage where God
appeared to Abraham under the oak of Mamre, and the great discussion occurred concerning
the burning of Sodom and Gomorrah. According to the account in Genesis two
ordinary angels accompanied One who must definitely be recognized as God, for
He entered into the tent to announce the coming birth of a son to Sarah and
promised to return later; when He did return He is explicitly called God by the
Scriptures.
But this God cannot be the same
as the God who rules over all He is a messenger God who finally secures
permission from the God of heaven to rain fire and sulphur upon the cities of
Sodom and Gomorrah. There must then be two Gods. One who remains in Heaven and
One who appears in theophanies. Justin goes on to quote the appearance of God
in the incidents of Jacob's dream of the spotted rams and goats, Jacob's
wrestling, the changing of Jacob's name at Luz, Jacob's dream at Bethel (Dial
58), and a little further on the appearance in the burning bush (Dial 60). In
another passage he says that Christ was the Angel with whom Moses communed on
the occasion when he had lost faith in the promise of food (Dial 126 6 [356
C]). In all these passages Justin's emphasis is upon two points, first upon the
independent personality of this Being who can be manifested to man, and second
upon His divine nature. "HE is called God, and He is and shall be God"
(Dial 58 9 [281 D]). Justin exclaims to his Jewish auditors who give their
complete assent.
It is in connection with the
argument from theophanies that Justin makes his strongest assertions of the
transcendence of God. "He who has but the smallest intelligence will not
venture to assert that the Maker and Father of all things, having left all
supercelestial matters, was visible on a little portion of the earth"
(Dial 60 2 [283 B]), but Justin's attention here and throughout is primarily
not upon the nature of God but upon the existence of the personal Second God.
Philo, who inherited his
prejudice against theophanies from Plato (Rep II 380 D ff), is clearly in the
direct line of ancestry of Justin's protest, and a comparison between Justin's
and Philo's interpretations of theophanies is illuminating. Though Philo, like
Plato, argued against theophanies from the unchangeableness of God (De Somniis
I 231 ff), he inclined like Justin to base the argument more commonly upon the
transcendence of God than upon His unchangeable perfection Philo had no thesis
to prove from the appearance of God to man, and mentioned the incidents in his
writings only as Scriptural inconsistences with God's character which must be
explained away. Consequently he cared little for general consistency in his
explanations of how these incidents really happened, so long as in each
individual case he could rid the Scriptures of their primitive
anthropomorphism. An excellent illustration of Philo's object is the passage in
which he goes into the matter of the appearances of God in some detail (De
Somniis I 227 ff [I 655, 656]). He begins with the quotation, "I am the
God who was seen by thee in the place of God" (Gen xxxi 13). Are there
then, Philo asks, two Gods? By no means, for only the one God who is truly GOd
may be called ο θεος, but there are numerous beings who are loosely called θεος
without the article. In this Scriptural statement, says Philo, the reference to
the second God is to the Logos. But a few lines below Philo says that God can
appear as He is to incorporeal souls but that He must, without actually
changing, appear in the semblance of an angel when there is need of appearing
to a corporeal man. Again after a digression Philo adds that it is not
surprising that God took the form of an Angel so far as appearance went (though
without changing His nature), for man could not endure to see God as He truly
is. But those who are unable to bear the sight of God look upon His image, His
Angel Logos, as Himself. Philo is obviously not concerned here as to whether he
called the medium of theophany "angels", "an angel", or the
"Logos", far less is he appealing to any secondary deity. His sole
object in treating the passage at all is to free the Scriptures from an
apparent anthropomorphic aspersion upon God. Such after Philo was the incentive
which led the poet Ezekiel to identify God in the burning bush with the Logos.
ο δ' εχ βατου σοι θειος
εκλαμπει λογος (Euseb Pr. Ev. IX 29)
The Jews carried on the same
thought in the Talmudic use of the Memra to explain theophanies and all other
physical or anthropomorphic references to God in the Old Testament. It was the
Memra who was the cloud leading the Children of Israel in the wilderness, as
well as the Deity which gave the Law on Sinai. But here as in Philo the device
is not an end in itself, for not the conception of the Logos or Memra, but the
doctrine of God, is the interest of the commentators.
It is thus apparent that Justin,
in proving the existence of a second personal God from theophanies has used
material from Greek Judaism (cf. the Philonic nature of Justin's comment on the
incident of the "three men" who appeared to Abraham), but has given
it an implication never found in any Judaism, and in deducing therefrom a
second divine Personality has come to conclusions which Jews have always felt
to be unjustified.
Similar is the case of the second
argument to prove the existence of a Second God. This argument is based upon
Scriptural passages where God is represented as speaking to another God or to
other Gods, or where mention is apparently made of two Gods. Justin considered
to whom the ποιησωμεν of Genesis 1. 25 could have been addressed. Jewish
teachers, he asserts, vary in their explanation of this passage. Some say God
addressed the "elements to wit the earth and other similar substances of
which we believe man was formed," while others say that He spoke to the
angels who themselves proceeded to create man's body (Dial 62 1 ff [285 A ff]).
But these suggestions are of no help, says Justin for God addressed another
person who was numerically distinct from Himself and a rational being. To prove
this statement Justin adduces the passage, "Behold Adam has become as one
of us, to know good and evil." Clear the person addressed must have been rational.
Other passages which are found useful witnesses to the existence of a second
rational person God are "The Lord made me from the beginning of His ways
for His works" (Dial. 61 3 [284 C], Prov viii 21 ff), etc. “The Lord says
to My Lord” (Dial 56 14 [277 B], Ps cx I). “Thy throne, oh God, is forever and
ever . . . God, even thy God, hath annointed thee,” etc (Ibid, Ps xlv 6, 7).
Typho is by this time quite willing to admit the existence of a Second God who
is distinct from the Father of All in number, but who fully deserves the title
God (Dial. 63 1 [286 B]).
So far as I know, Justin is here
the first to attempt a term for personalities in the Godhead. He frequently
uses ετερος αριθμω which is always, and on the whole wisely translated “numerically
distinct”, but which meant to Justin “different in person” (Dial 56, 11 [276
D]; 62 2 [285 C]; 128 4 [358 C]; 129 1, 4 [358 D, 359 D]). This sharp
personality of Justin’s Logos is the element which distinguishes it from the
Philonic Logos more than anything except its incarnation. Feder, who attempts
to minimize the Philonic influence upon Justin, draws up six points of contrast
between the Justinian and Philonic Logos. In four of his six points the
distinction is purely in the matter of the personality of Justin’s Logos. But
nothing could be more inaccurate than to conclude that Justin was not
influenced by Philonic tradition merely because his Logos or Second God is
personal, while the Logos of Philo is not, or because Justin, when discussing
theophanies and the Second God, usually prefers to call the Second God Christ
rather than the Logos (as he does even in the Ap I 62 3 [95 B], and of course
almost throughout the Dialogue. In Dial 113, 4 [340 D] theophanies are even
referred to “Jesus”). (Erwin R. Goodenough, The Theology of Justin Martyr [1923],
141-47)