. . . if
apologists like [William Lane] Craig want to take the tack that actual
infinites exist only in the abstract, as I would, then since a divine being
must exemplify an actual infinity of positive properties, such a divine being
is itself necessarily abstract. On the other hand, if apologists like Craig
wish to revise the claim that there are actual infinites present in the
deity—making a case by special pleading for their increasingly abstruse
God—then they face the fact that the existence of each infinity implies a
larger infinity. This hand is no good for the apologist, though, because it
undermines the meaningfulness of a “most high” being entirely, as we have seen.
Curiously, then, given the situation, both “being infinite” and “not being
infinite” seem to be positive properties for God, undermining Gödel’s second
axiom.
There is
no winning here. God simply cannot be “Most High,” neither finite nor infinite,
neither quantitative nor qualitative. There is no such thing. Anselm’s argument
ins only half-baked, due to a lack of solid understanding of imprecisely used
concepts thrown about in a religious, and therefore, inappropriate, context. Of
course, if the ontological argument actually did succeed in getting off the
ground, the believer would be besought by the fact that it applies equally well
for Muslims to believe in Allah, for the cantankerous to believe in Irony the
Equivocator, and for any sort of divine being conceived as “most high.” It
would still require a substantial amount of ink (and hopefully, though
doubtfully, no more blood) to attempt to justify one choice over another. (James
A. Lindsay, Dot Dot Dot: Infinity Plus God Equals Folly [Onus Books,
2013], 182-83)
