According to amillennialists by
calling it the “first” resurrection, the apostle was not simply designating it
the first in a series of resurrections of the same kind—he was indicating
that this resurrection was of a different quality than the resurrection that
follows. IN other words, the modifier “first” indicates a qualitative
difference between two resurrections rather than merely establishing a
numerical sequence between two events. According to this view, the qualitative
difference is that the “first” resurrection is spiritual whereas the
second resurrection is physical. (Matt Waymeyer, Amillennialism and
the Age to Come: A Premillennial Critique of the Two-Age Model [The Woodlands,
Tex.: Kress Biblical Resources, 2016], 216)
Even though this argument was
first articulated in 1975 by Meredith Kline, the chiastic relationship between
the two deaths and two resurrections was identified in 1960 by Summers (Ray Summers,
“Revelation 20: An Interpretation,” RevExp 57, no. 2 [April 1960]: 182).
(Ibid., 221 n. 48)
[One difficulty] with this argument
relates to the perspicuity of Scripture. Simply stated, it is difficult to imagine
that any interpreter would have ever taken this approach to the “first resurrection”
prior to its discovery in the second half of the 20th century. How
could even the most diligent Bible students be expected to connect all the dots
necessary to arrive at this conclusion? Why would the apostle John sue such
obscure language, demanding such a convoluted interpretive process? How could John
be sure his readers would identify this double binary pattern, much less think
to consult these other three passages, to determine the meaning of the “first
resurrection”? And why would the fact that “first” never modifies “resurrection”
outside of Revelation 20 send his readers on this complicated interpretive
journey in the first place (The fact that a given adjective modifies a given
noun only once in the entire New Testament should not lead the interpreter to
expect a specialized meaning of the adjective-noun combination which ascribes
an unprecedented meaning to the noun. But the amillennial approach does not
just that)? Isn’t it more likely that “first resurrection” simply means “first
resurrection”? (Ibid., 221)
. . . most importantly, even if the amillennial
view of πρωτος is granted for the sake of
argument, an insurmountable problem arises because of the definitions given to πρωτος and αναστασις. To review, in light of the
perceived antithesis between “first/old” and “second/new,” amillennialists
insist that πρωτος in Revelation 20 means “to belong
to the present state of affairs which is passing away.” As the qualitative and
polar opposite of “new,” πρωτος
is said to describe that which is merely provisional, transient, and temporary,
in contrast to what is consummate, final, and enduring. In other words,
whatever is “first” is antithetical to permanence and will eventually be
superseded and replace by what is “new” when it passes away. For this reason,
amillennialists believe the adjective πρωτος “is used to designate elements that belong . . . to the present,
sin-cursed creation order, in contrast to the new heaven and new earth.” As the
diametrical opposite of that which characterizes eternity and resurrection
life, “Whatever is first does not participate in the quality of finality
and permanence which id distinctive of the age to come.”
The difficulty arises when the
amillennialist takes this definition of πρωτος and applies it to αναστασις
in Revelation 20 as a reference to a spiritual resurrection. For those
amillennialists who believe that the “first resurrection” refers to regeneration,
the contradiction is obvious. In what way does the believer’s regeneration belong
to the present state of affairs which is passing away? How can the new life
received at conversion be described as provisional, transient, and temporary, in
contrast to what endures? How can the new birth be considered the qualitative
and polar opposite of the future resurrection? Is the believer’s regeneration
antithetical to permanence? Will the new life received at conversion pass away
and be replaced by his bodily resurrection? Can it really be said that the
spiritual birth of believers belong to the present, sin-cursed creation and
therefore that the spiritual life of regeneration does not participate in the
age to come? . . . For those amillennialists who believe that the “first
resurrection” refers to the believer being ushered into the presence of Christ
at the point of death, the dilemma is similar In what sense does the believer’s
entrance into the blessings of heaven belong to the present state of affairs
which is passing away? How can being ushered into the presence of Christ be
described as transitory or diametrically opposed to the future resurrection?
How can a “resurrection of heavenly glories?”—including the blessings it brings
to those who are resurrected—be considered part of the present, sin-cursed
creation order? (Ibid., 222-25)
In the footnotes to the above, we have the following interesting
comments:
Most amillennialists would likely
affirm that regeneration is the means by which believers partake of the
age to come, even now in the present age. In contrast, they see the “first man”
(1 Cor 15:47) and the “first covenant” (Heb 8-10) as that which leads to death
(Riddlebarger, A Case for Amillennialism, 246; Beale, The Book of
Revelation, 1007). This alone demonstrates the inconsistency of the
amillennial position, at last for those who see the “first resurrection” as
regeneration. (224 n. 63)
Beale responds to this argument
by instating that the inconsistency is resolved “by understanding that the
intermediate state of the soul’s resurrection is, indeed, an incomplete state,
since these souls await the final, consummated physical resurrection in the new
heavens and earth” (The Book of Revelation, 107; also see Kline, “The
First Resurrection,” 371). But as demonstrated above, the amillennialist
ascribes far more to the meaning of πρωτος
than simply “incomplete.” The amillennial antithesis between “first/old” and “second/new”
presents the two as polar opposites in which πρωτος describes that which belongs to
the order of this sin-cursed world, being transitory and destined to pass away
when it is replaced by what is “new.” So the inconsistency remains.
Kline seeks to resolve the tension
in a similar way, noting that this resurrection “is still not the ultimate
glory of the Christian” because “it stands on this side of the consummation” (“The
First Resurrection,” 371). But this too significantly dilute the amillennial
view of the antithesis between the two terms. According to amillennialists, “first”
does not mean pre-consummative in the chronological sense of existing or taking
place prior to the consummation. (If it did, the New Covenant itself could not be
considered “new” since it was inaugurated and became operative prior to the
consummation.) Amillennialists present προωτος not as a chronological modifier describing what exists (or
takes place) during the present world, but as a qualitative modifier describing
what belongs to the present world order. For this reason, Klines’s
appeal to the timing of the “first resurrection”—as that which “stands on this
side of the consummation”—fails to offer any substantial response to the
objection. (Ibid., 225 n. 66)
