Wednesday, May 3, 2023

John P. Joy on Objections to Penal Substitution

  

One such objection states: “It is unjust to punish an innocent person, even if he is willing to be punished.” Analytic philosopher Eleonore Stump argues this objection as follows:

 

[Penal substitution] seems not to emphasize God’s justice but to rest on a denial of it. For all the talk of debt is really a metaphor. What (P) is in fact telling us is that any human being’s sins are so great that it is a violation of justice not to punish that person with damnation. What God does in response, however, is to punish not the sinner, but a perfectly innocent person instead (a person who, even on the doctrine of the Trinity, is not the same person as God the Father, who does the punishing). But how is this just? (Eleonore Stump, Aquinas [London: Routledge, 2003], 428)

 

Christ’s innocence is clearly attested in Scripture (Jn 8:46; 1 Pet. 2:22; 2 Cor. 5:21; Heb. 4:15; 7:26), as is God’s justice (1 Pet. 2:23; Rom. 3:25). If the objection stands, then penal substitution falls; and the objection, moreover, seems to be supported not only by natural moral reason, but also by divine revelation: “The soul that sins shall die. The son shall not suffer for the iniquity of the father, nor the father suffer for the iniquity of the son; the righteousness of the righteous shall be upon himself, and the wickedness of the wicked shall be upon himself” (Ez. 18:20). The authors reply by appealing to the concept of Christ’s representation in order to explain how our sins really become Christ’s on account of our union with him in faith; but the balance that they attempt to strike between representation (we in Christ) and substitution (Christ instead of us) is at best unconvincing. Unable to integrate the two concepts, they are forced to alternate between them: at the moment of judgment and condemnation Christ is our representative (but not our substitute); while at the moment of execution he is our substitute (but not our representative). (John P. Joy, The Atoning Death of Christ: St. Thomas’s Doctrine of Vicarious Satisfaction [Grass Lake, Mich.: Cruachan Hill Press, 2022], 31-32)

 

 

. . .another objection becomes a real problem, namely that “Penal substitution implies a division between the persons of the Trinity.” . . . The essential punishment of hell, deeper than its fiery flames, is the state of separation from God (Mt. 25:41; Lk. 13:27; 14:4; Rev. 22:15). If Christ suffered this, one can only choose between a Nestorian schism between the divine and human natures of Christ, such that his humanity alone experienced damnation, and an Arian schism between Father and Son, such that the Son was really abandoned by the Father. (John P. Joy, The Atoning Death of Christ: St. Thomas’s Doctrine of Vicarious Satisfaction [Grass Lake, Mich.: Cruachan Hill Press, 2022], 33, 34)

 

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