The
text of the Testament of Abraham (recension A) indeed presents a
remarkable configuration of two types of enthronement. In ch. 11, the archangel
Michael and Abraham (who is visiting the heavens) see ‘a man (ανηρ) sitting
upon a gilded throne, and the appearance of that man was terrible, as of the
Master’ (v. 4). This enthroned man is Adam. Although the text characterizes him
as a ‘wondrous’ man (ο ανηρ ο θαυμασιος, 11.6,8), noting indicates the
transformation of his human nature. He is called ‘first-formed’ or
‘first-created’ (ο πρωτοπλαστος). E. Sanders notes that the same term is found
in a number of texts (For instance, Wis. 7:1; 10:1) in which undoubtedly points
to the human nature of Adam. (This is vividly expressed in Wis. 7:1a where the
author says: ‘I also am mortal, like everyone else, a descendant of the
first-formed child of the earth’) Thus, a human being Adam occupies a throne
that is in heaven. The ‘enthronement’, however, entails no particular action on
Adam’s behalf. Adam is depicted as the one who looks at the souls entering the
heaven and who rejoices when seeking righteous souls and ‘walls bitterly’ when
seeing the ‘sinners’. In fact, Adam cannot be regraded as an ‘intermediary’
figure, for no mediation is implied.
A
completely different model of enthronement is presented almost immediately, in
ch. 12-13. Abraham sees now the other throne ‘and upon it sat [again] a
wonderous man (ανηρ θαυματος) bright as the sun, like to the Son of God’ (TestAbr.
12.5). This man is ‘the son of Adam, the first-formed (πρωτοπλαστου), the one
called Abel’ (13.2). Unlike his father, however, Abel does not just take a
position upon the throne but executes judgment: ‘The wonderous man who sat upon
the throne himself judged and sentenced the souls’ (και ο μεν ανηρ ο θαμυασιος
ο καθημενος επι του θρονου, αυτος εκρινεν και απεφηνατο τας ψυχας) (12.11). The
description ‘the son of Adam, the first-formed’ implies that Abel is a human,
and his father, even if his human nature has somehow been transformed so that
he looks like ‘the Son of God’. The human nature of Abel is indirectly
confirmed through the reference to God’s words which explain the position of
Abel as the judge (ο κριτης; 13.1, and elsewhere): ‘For God said, “I do not
judge you, but every man is judged by a man” (Εγω συ κριων ημας, αλλα πας
ανθρωπος εξ ανθρωπου κριθησεται)’ (13.3). God, this, delegates Abel the
function of judgment.
Abel’s
judgment, however, has a temporal value, for it is valid until God’s great and
glorious Parousia (παρουσια, 13.4) only. Moreover, the text implies that
one more judgment will take place between Abel’s judgment and that by God:
Then
(after Parousia) there will be perfect judgement and recompense, eternal
and unalterable, which no one can question. For every person has come from the
first-created, and therefore they are first judged here by his son. And at the
second Parousia they will be judged by the twelve tribes of Israel,
every breath and every creature. And thirdly, they will be judged by the Master
(δεσποτης) God of all, and then thereafter the fulfillment of that judgment is
near, and fearful will be the sentence and there is none who can release. And
thus the judgment and the recompense of the world is made through three
tribunals. And therefore a matter is not ultimately established by one or two
witnesses, but by three witnesses will everything be established.
In
other words, the final judgement remains God’s prerogative. It is not quite
clear to what extent Abel’s judgement has an effect on the results of God’s
judgement, that is, what is the significance of Abel’s judgemnet. But
there is a striking passage in the text which seems to downplay the value of
Abel’s judgement. Abraham and Commander-in-Chief Michael, by praying on behalf
of the soul that had an equal quantity of good deeds and sins, are able to
‘force’ God to execute His judgement already on the primary (that is to
say, ‘Abel’s’) state and thus to ‘save’ this particular soul (TestAbr.
14.5ff); and this case is not an exception in the text (see similarly in ch.
15). In other words, God can intervene in the judgment at any level, and
therefore the role of Abel becomes quite ‘technical’. Abel’s role could be even
considered as a sort of ‘reward’ and not as an ‘assignment’, but Abel’s
judgement has significant limitations and is by no means decisive. In effect,
it is not his exclusive function. This factor relativizes the significance of
Abel as a mediator, for his decision as the judgment is indispensable neither
for human beings nor for God.
But
one should not overlook that the two enthronements in the Testament of
Abraham (those of Adam and Abel) are qualitatively different. Adam takes a
position upon the throne but he does not mediate. In turn, the account of Abel
is focused not so much on his position but rather on his function. It is
noteworthy, however, that Abel received this commitment (‘God gave
judgement’, δεδωκεν κρισιν; 13.4) which is of a temporal and relative
significance.
According
to the text, several angels assist Abel and the author of the Testament explicitly
distinguishes the angels from Abel. A human being, therefore, has been exalted
above at least some angels. This motif seems to be quite common in the writings
of that period. A similar idea is present in 1 Corinthians also, when Pual
addresses the Corinthians with rhetorical questions: ‘Do you not know that the
saints will judge the world? […] Do you not know that we are to judge angels? ‘
(1 Cor. 6:2,4). But as scholars point out, the significant role in the
formation of early Christological views belongs to those human mediators who
have been ‘transformed’, that is, whose human nature has been changed into
celestial nature. (Andrey A. Romanov, One God as One God and One Lord: The
Lordship of Jesus Christ as a Hermeneutical Key to Paul’s Christology in 1
Corinthians (with a special focus on 1 Cor. 8:4-6) [Early Christian Studies
20; Macquarie Centre, Australia: 2021], 236-39)