Monday, May 20, 2024

Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange on how prophecy is distinguished form conjecture

  

How is prophecy distinguished from conjecture, which is verified fortuitously (that is, by chance happenings)? Chance is the per se accidens cause of those things that rarely take place, either happily or unhappily, outside of the order of intention, as though it were intended. For example, someone digging a grave may accidentally find a treasure chest, or an arrow may accidentally kill a man as though it had been intentionally launched toward him.

 

Five things follow from this, by which the order of the world proves the existence of a Supreme Orderer of all things. (a) Many things cannot concur by chance in order to bring about something that is essentially structured and unified (aliquid per se et unum), like the various conditions needed in the eye so that the act of vision may be possible. Otherwise, something unified, like vision, would be produced by a being that is per se accidens and the perfect by the imperfect, thus meaning that the unity of an effect would lack a raison d’être. {{118}} (b) Form one per se principle, there cannot arise by chance many things that are connected in an essential and most excellent way, as the various parts of the oak come forth from the acorn; chance (or the accidental conjunction of many things) is excluded by the simplicity of the terminus a quo. (c) A fortiori, from one per se principle, something that is per se unified cannot proceed by way of chance, like intellection from the intellective faculty or vision from the visual faculty. Chance (or the accidental conjunction of many things) is ruled out here on account of the simplicity of the terminus a quo and the terminus ad quem involved. And it is utterly manifest, in this last example, that the faculty is ordered to its correlative action, for potency is designated in relation to act, and every agent acts on account in its end. This is the principle of finality. (d) Similar things that always or frequently take place do not take place on account of chance, for otherwise their constancy would lack a raison d’être. (e) Chance cannot be the first cause of the ordering of things, for a per accidens cause presupposes the per se cause to which it befalls [accidit]. For otherwise, being per accidens (e.g., a musician-doctor) would be prior to the per se, and the order of things would come from the privation of order as well as the more would be produced from the less. (Nay, nothing is chance in relation to God but instead only in relation to other causes. [See ST I, q. 22, a. 2, ad 1])

 

These various principles which make manifest the fact that the order of the world cannot come from chance, proportionally also manifest the distinction between the fulfillment of true prophecies and the fortuitous fulfillment of natural conjecture.

 

Indeed, (a) many things cannot concur, by chance, to bring about a unified determinate thing, for otherwise the unity of the effect would lack a raison d’être. Now, in the fulfillment of many prophecies, man things concur in order to bring about the determinately foretold thing, which is contingent and unified. Therefore, this fulfillment is not fortuitous. For example, Christ announced his Passion and Resurrection, along with its principal circumstances. For example, in Mark 10:33-34 (DR): “Behold we go up to Jerusalem, and the Son of man shall be betrayed to the chief priests and to the scribes and ancients. And they shall condemn him to death and shall deliver him to the Gentiles. And they shall mock him and spit on him and scourge him and kill him: and the third day he shall rise again.” Likewise, he foretold Peter’s threefold denial, the indefectibility of the Church, and the circumstance of the destruction of Jerusalem. Similarly, the Old Testament prophets announced the various virtues of the of the Messiah, as well as the principal facts of his life.

 

(b) From one per se principle, there cannot arise by chance many things that are connected in an essential and most excellent way. Now, from the primitive and simple promise of the Redeemer there have followed many things that are connected in an essential and most excellent way—namely, the series of messianic prophecies and the whole of Judeo-Chrisitan religion, as we will show below. Therefore, this process cannot be chance in nature but, rather, is something ordered by God.

 

(c) The unity of an ultimate consummation [unitas consummationis], along with that of the perfection of countless souls, cannot proceed in a chance manner from one principle. Now, as we will discuss below, from the primitive promise of the Redeemer (which represents the commencement of all future prophecies), there proceeded the consummation of the whole of Judeo-Christian religion, which in Christ has some to restore to unity countless souls of good will. Therefore, this process is not chance in nature but, rather, is ordered by God.

 

(d) Similar things that frequently or always take place do not take place on account of chance. Now, the various Old Testament prophecies announce similar things, especially the Messiah / Christ and his works. Therefore, these prophecies are not fulfilled by chance.

 

{{119}} (e) The whole of Judeo-Christian religion, cannot be from chance and unintended by God. Now, the whole of Jewish religion exists as a prophecy that is fulfilled in Christianity. Therefore, the fulfillment of this general prophecy is not a chance occurrence. Nay, nothing is chance in relation to God but, rather, only in relation to other causes.

 

Hence, for the most part, true prophecies can be distinguished with the greatest certitude from conjectures that are fortuitously fulfilled. (Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, On Divine Revelation: The Teaching of the Catholic Faith, 2 vols. [trans. Matthew K. Minerd; Steubenville, Ohio: Emmaus Academic, 2022], 2:171-73)