Monday, May 20, 2024

Some Notes on Miracles from Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, On Divine Revelation: The Teaching of the Catholic Faith (volume 2)

  

At the same time [of Loisy], [ABBÉ CLAUDE FRANÇOIS ALEXANDRE] HOUTTEVILLE, in his French work on the truth of the Chrisitan religion, proposed a new definition for miracles, which he thought to be necessary in order to resolve the objections raised by determinists. This definition caused no small tumult among philosophers and theologians. {{36}] He said that miracles are rare, stupendous, sensible effects exceeding human powers, following in so hidden a manner from the laws of communication of motions that we can in no way naturally know, whether through experience or through reason, that they are consequences of the same sorts of laws. Thus, this author made a distinction, saying that miracles are rightly said to be natural inasmuch as they follow the order of nature (or the laws of motion), though they are called supernatural inasmuch as they cannot be foreseen by man solely trough his natural powers. Houtteville strove to prove this opinion by appealing both to the fact that God acts through utterly simple and general laws and to the fact that body knows all of the possible effects of the general laws of the communication of motions. (Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, On Divine Revelation: The Teaching of the Catholic Faith, 2 vols. [trans. Matthew K. Minerd; Steubenville, Ohio: Emmaus Academic, 2022], 2:52, first comment in square brackets added for clarification)

 

 

Re. the properties of miracles:

 

A miracle is not contrary to nature (i.e., it does not violate nature), whatever those who hold to naturalism might say. Rather, it accords with the obediential potency of nature—namely, with its primary aptitude by which any given creature naturally obeys God in order to accept whatever he may will, as our arm obeys our will. (See ST 1, a. 105, a. 7, ad 2; I-II, q. 113, a. 10; De potentia, q. 6, a. 2) {{42}} Thus, a miracle is not contrary to the laws of nature, is not a violation of the laws of nature, and indeed does not destroy them. Rather, it presupposes and confirms them, as an exception confirms them, as an exception confirms the rule. For example, the dead do not naturally rise again. This law is so true that God alone can supernaturally raise the dead. Indeed, as we will discuss below, the laws of nature are hypothetically necessary—namely, on the supposition that all the various natural causes act in the appropriate conditions. (Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, On Divine Revelation: The Teaching of the Catholic Faith, 2 vols. [trans. Matthew K. Minerd; Steubenville, Ohio: Emmaus Academic, 2022], 2:60)

 

For example, it is necessary that a dead person not rise so long as nature alone acts; however, this does not exclude the possibility that the dead could rise through God’s supernatural intervention.

 

3. Pushing back more, however, the laws of nature are absolute necessary.

 

The principle of causality, even though it holds from the perspective of the efficient cause, is nonetheless likewise absolute necessary, and God cannot act outside of the order that it establishes. Now the laws of nature are laws of causality. Therefore, God cannot act outside of them.

 

{{54}} Response: No parity exists between the utterly universal principle of causality, on the one hand, and the laws of nature, on the other. Indeed, the former principle extends even to the divine causality, outside of which God cannot act, for he cannot bring into existence an uncaused creature. By contrast, the laws of nature express a manner of acting belonging to created nature, and God can modify this manner of acting. The principle of efficient causality is hypothetical only in the sense that it is possible that a contingent being not exist, through it is absolutely necessary that contingency depends upon the most universal first cause.

 

4. Further insistence: Even if the laws of nature are particular, nonetheless, they are absolutely necessary.

 

Indeed, even though mathematical laws are particular, they are absolutely necessary, and God cannot act outside of them. Now, the laws of nature are expressed mathematically, and, hence, are likened unto mathematical laws. Therefore, the laws of nature are absolutely necessary, and God cannot act outside of them.

 

Response: I concede the major premise. God cannot, even extraordinarily, make a triable whose three angels would not be equal to two right angels. However, I make a distinction regarding the minor premise. I concede that the laws of nature are likened unto mathematical laws as regards their quantitative (or numeric) expression. However, I deny that they are such as regards their very nature. For mathematical laws are drawn from the formal principle of figures or numbers and hence are absolutely necessary. By contrast, the causal laws of nature are drawn from extrinsic causes—namely, from efficient or final causality—and hence are hypothetically necessary. In other words, something that is mathematically impossible is absolutely impossible, whereas what is physically impossible is impossible for sensible nature, though not absolutely for every possible cause. Spinoza erred when he reduced physics to mathematics, for only mathematics abstracts from efficient and final causality.

 

5. Further insistence: Even if they are distinguished from mathematical laws, the laws of nature are absolutely necessary.

 

Indeed, natural things have a determinate essence, whence flow determinate properties and a determinate manner of acting. Now, God cannot change what is essential to some given thing and simultaneously have that thing remain what it is. Therefore, God cannot change the natural manner of action in natural things.

 

Response: I make a distinction regarding the major premise. I concede that natural things have a determinate manner of acting as regards the power of acting. However, I deny that this is so as regards the exercise of their activity. I concede the minor premise. I distinguish the conclusion along with the same lines as the major. Ss St. Thomas says in De potentia, q. 6, a. 1, ad. 20: “in the furnace’s fire, an order to burning remains, even though it did not burn the three young men therein.”

 

6. Further insistence: Not even in relation to the exercise of a thing’s acidity can God act outside the laws of nature.

 

Indeed, God cannot do something outside the order of justice. Now, the order of justice is the rule of the very exercise of moral action, for the omission of due action is a sin. Therefore, similarly, God cannot act outside of the order of nature, by which the exercise of natural agents’ action is ruled.

 

Response: As St. Thomas explains (in De potentia, q. 6, a. 1, ad 3), there is no parity here, for the order of justice directly designates an order to the ultimate end, outside of which God cannot act, whereas, by contrast, the laws of nature do not directly designate an order to the ultimate end but, rather, an order of one creature to another. Thus, God cannot, in an extraordinary manner, order us to despair or to hate God, for this would represent the denial of his infinite goodness.

 

7. Further insistence: Moreover, God cannot act outside of the particular moral precepts that rule the interrelationships between men. For example, God cannot, in an extraordinary manner, command murder. Therefore, similarly, God cannot act outside of natural laws.

 

Response: I deny the major premise. See what St. Thomas says in ST III, suppl., q. 67, a. 2: “There can be a divine dispensation even to the first principles of the natural law, for the sake of signifying or showing forth some divine mystery. {{55}} For example, we see the dispensation to the precept given to Abraham in relation to the slaying of his innocent son. However, such dispensations are not granted to all generally, but only to certain individual persons, as also is the case for miracles.” Likewise, see ST I-II, q. 94, a. 5, ad 2 and q. 100, a. 8, ad 2: “When Abraham consent to kill his son, he did not consent to murder, for his son was due to be slain by the command of God. Who is Lord of life and death, for He Himself inflicts the punishment of death on all men, both godly and ungodly, on account of the sin of our first parent. If a man executes that sentence upon the Divine authority, he will no more be a murderer than God would be.” Likewise, as Cajetan’s comments on this article:

 

Just as this statement, “the dead cannot rise,” is necessary (according to natural power) . . . and when God raises someone, He does not falsify that proposition or do away with it, but, instead, acts above (not contrary to) nature, so too in the present case, this conclusion, “One must not murder” in the sense in which it is expressed, namely, by a private authority with certain other conditions, is a necessary conclusion; . . . however, since God orders the performance of an act which would be murder he not to command it, he orders an action that is not outside or contrary to the precept but, rather, as it were, one that is above it, provided that he orders that the commanded act be performed by a superior authority. (Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, On Divine Revelation: The Teaching of the Catholic Faith, 2 vols. [trans. Matthew K. Minerd; Steubenville, Ohio: Emmaus Academic, 2022], 2:78-80)