Friday, October 27, 2017

Lynn Wilder vs. Latter-day Saint (and Biblical) Theology on Divine Embodiment

Lynn Wilder, author of Unveiling Grace and a contributor to the forthcoming Leaving Mormonism: Why Four Scholars Changed their Minds, and whose only claim to fame is the fact she used to teach at BYU (before and after her apostasy, theological/exegetical abilities are not her forte), embarrassed herself with the following post she made on facebook against the Latter-day Saint belief that God the Father is embodied:




 Firstly, Lynn is showing that she is either intellectually disingenuous and/or grossly ignorant of "Mormon" theology about God the Father: nowhere does the Church teach that the Father "must eat, sleep, and do other manly things." Maybe alongside needing to read the Bible more carefully (see below), Lynn also needs to read LDS sources carefully (this is me giving her the benefit of the doubt by assuming she is grossly ignorant and not grossly deceptive, though, IMO, she is probably both from having read her Unveiling Grace volume]).

Secondly, Lynn, by attacking the fact that the Father is embodied, undercuts the Hypostatic Union as formulated in AD 451 at the Council of Chalcedon, a doctrine which clearly teaches that Jesus, apart from being fully human and fully divine during the Incarnation, will remain embodied eternally (more on this below). Indeed, even after His ascension into heaven, Jesus is spoken as being a "man" in the New Testament:

For there is one God, and one mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus (ἄνθρωπος Χριστὸς Ἰησοῦς) (1 Tim 2:5)

Indeed, that Christ remains embodied, per the theology of the New Testament (not just Chalcedon), is explicated elsewhere in the New Testament:


Which also said, Ye men of Galilee, why stand ye gazing up into heaven? this same Jesus, which is taken up from you into heaven, shall so come in like manner as ye have seen him go into heaven. (Acts 1:11; cf. Acts 7:55-56 [exegeted below])

Note the following from Chalcedon:

Following the holy Fathers, we unanimously teach and confess one and the same Son, our Lord Jesus Christ: the same perfect in divinity and perfect in humanity, the same truly God and truly man, composed of rational soul and body; consubstantial with the Father as to his divinity and consubstantial with us as to his humanity; "like us in all things but sin". He was begotten from the Father before all ages as to his divinity and in these last days, for us and for our salvation, was born as to his humanity of the virgin Mary, the Mother of God. (DS 301)

We confess that one and the same Christ, Lord, and only-begotten Son, is to be acknowledged in two natures without confusion, change, division or separation. The distinction between the natures was never abolished by their union, but rather the character proper to each of the two natures was preserved as they came together in one person (prosopon) and one hypostasis. (DS 302)

Lynn's Evangelical friends should inform her that, if she were consistent on this matter, it will result in an anti-Trinitarian Christology. After all, Lynn would have to deny the divinity of Jesus as, in Lynn's view, Jesus could not have any attributes of deity (e.g., omniscience) if he was confined to a body.

That God the Father is embodied is clearly explicated in Scripture. Let us exegete some of the relevant texts used (1) in favour of embodiment and (2) some of the more popular proof-texts used to support the contrary, viz. Gen 1:26-27; Acts 7:55-56; Heb 1:3 and John 4:24:

Gen 1:26-27


And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness: and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth. So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him; male and female created he them. (Gen 1:26-27)

Gen 1:26-27 is explicit biblical evidence for divine embodiment, and, furthermore, represents an argument against a mountain range of scholarship supporting the LDS view, such as:

[T]he Hebrew word for ‘image’ is also employed by P of Seth’s likeness to Adam (Gen 5.3), following a repetition of Genesis 1’s statement that humanity was created in the likeness of God (Gen. 5.1), which further supports the notion that a physical likeness was included in P’s concept. It is also noteworthy that the prophet Ezekiel, who was a priest as well as prophet at a time not too long before P, and whose theology has clear parallels with P’s, similarly speaks of a resemblance between God and the appearance of man. As part of his call vision in Ezek. 1.26, he declares of God, ‘and seated above the likeness of a throne was something that seemed like a human form’ (the word demut, ‘likeness’, is used, as in Gen. 1.26). Accordingly, there are those who see the image as simply a physical one. However, although the physical image may be primary, it is better to suppose that both a physical and spiritual likeness is envisaged, since the Hebrews saw humans as a psycho-physical totality.



The use of selem elsewhere in Genesis and of demut in Ezekiel certainly tells against the view of those scholars who see the divine image in humanity as purely functional in nature, referring to humanity’s domination over the natural world that is mentioned subsequently (Gen. 1.26, 28), an increasingly popular view in recent years. Although the two ideas are closely associated, it is much more likely that humanity’s rule over the world (Gen. 1.26-28) is actually a consequence of its being made in the image of God, not what the image itself meant. (John Day, From Creation to Babel: Studies in Genesis 1-11 [London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2013], 13-14).

Such conclusions are also supported by vv.21-25:

And God created great whales, and every living creature that moves, which the waters brought forth abundantly, after their kind, and every winged fowl after his kind (לְמִינֵהו): and God saw that it was good. And God blessed the, saying, Be fruitful, and multiply, and fill the waters in the seas, and let fowl multiply in the earth. And the evening and the morning were the fifth day. And God said, Let the earth bring forth the living creature after his kind (לְמִינָהּ), cattle, and creeping thing and beast of the earth after his kind: and it was so. And God made the beast of the earth after his kind, and cattle after their kind, and everything that creepeth upon the earth after his kind (לְמִינֵהו): and God saw that it was good. (Gen 1:21-25)

According to this pericope, each class of creation is described as having been created "after its kind (alt. species [מִין])." Subsequently, they were assigned a duty--to multiply and replenish the earth. Horses do not look like mice and fish do not look like cats. They were created after their own kind. This is important as plays an important exegetical role vis-a-vis the relationship between God and the physical nature of man in the verses that immediately follow this pericope:

And God said, Let us make man in our image (צֶלֶם), after our likeness (דְּמוּת): and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth. So God created man in his own image (צֶלֶם), in the image (צֶלֶם) of God created he him; male and female created he them. And God blessed them, and God said unto them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it: and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth. (Gen 1:26-28)

As Presbyterian Old Testament scholar, Meredith Kline, wrote:

By setting the image-likeness formula in the context of sonship, Genesis 5:1-3 contradicts the suggestion that the image idea is a matter of representative status rather than of representational likeness or resemblance. For Seth was not Adam's representative, but as Adam's son he did resemble his father. The terminology "in his likeness" serves as the equivalent in human procreation of the phrase "after its kind" which is used for plant and animal reproduction and of course refers to resemblance. (Meredith G. Kline, “Creation in the Image of the Glory-Spirit” Westminster Theological Journal, 39 [1976/77]: note 34)

Kline, on this theme, also comments that "the traditional avoidance of the visible corporeal aspect of man in formulating the imago Dei doctrine (in deference to the noncorporeal, invisible nature of God) has not reckoned adequately with the fact of theophanic revelation and in particular has missed the theophanic referent of the image in the Genesis 1 context" and that "the theophanic Glory was present at the creation and was the specific divine model or referent in view in the creating of man in the image of God."

Interestingly, Kline (correctly) rejects the idea that Gen 1:26 is evidence of a plurality of persons within the "one God" (a later reading that desperately tries to read the Trinity back into the Old Testament). On Gen 1:26 in the same article, he wrote:

In Genesis 1:26 it is the plural form of the creative fiat that links the creation of man in the image of God to the Spirit-Glory of Genesis 1:2. The Glory-cloud curtains the heavenly enthronement of God in the midst of the judicial council of his celestial hosts. Here is the explanation of the “let us” and the “our image” in the Creator’s decree to make man. He was addressing himself to the angelic council of elders, taking them into his deliberative counsel.

This understanding of the first-person-plural fiat is supported by the fact that consistently where this usage occurs in divine speech it is in the context of the heavenly councilor at least of heavenly beings. Especially pertinent for Genesis 1:26 is the nearby instance in Genesis 3:22, a declaration concerned again with man’s image-likeness to God: “Man has become like one of us to know good and evil.” The cherubim mentioned in verse 24 were evidently being addressed. In the cases where God determines to descend and enter into judgment with a city like Babel or Sodom, and a plural form (like “Let us go down”) alternates with a singular, [30] the explanation of the plural is at hand in the angelic figures who accompany the Angel of the Lord on his judicial mission. [31] When, in Isaiah’s call experience, the Lord, enthroned in the Glory-cloud of his temple, asks, “Whom shall I send and who will go for us?” (Isa. 6:8), the plural is again readily accounted for by the seraphim attendants at the throne or (if the seraphim are to be distinguished from the heavenly elders, as are the winged creatures of the throne in Revelation 4) by the divine council, which in any case belongs to the scene. (A similar use of the first person plural is characteristic of address in the assembly of the gods as described in Canaanite texts of the Mosaic age.)

Note the following about the ANE background to "image" and "likeness" from two Old Testament scholars:

The idea fundamentally laid down in Gen 1:26f., that humans—and only humans, in contradistinction to the animals—are in the image of God must go back to Egyptian influence where especially the ruler appears as the “image of god.” The throne names and epithets of Egyptian kings perpetuate their “image of god-ness.” Tutankhamun (twt-‘nḫ-Ymn) means ‘living likeness of Amun’. New Kingdom seal amulets (scarabs) have been found in Palestine/Israel as well; on them, the name of Thutmoses III and other pharaohs are provided with the annotation tyt R’, tyt Ymn, or tyt Tmn R’ ‘image of Amun/Re’. But being in the image of God could also refer to human creatures in general. According to the Instruction of Merikare, which says of humanity that “They are his images, who came from his body” (snnw.f pw prn m ḥ’w.f), the relationship rests on the fact that humanity came from the body of the god. The connection is clear, and it is clearly suggested in the Egyptian language. The Egyptian numeral snw ‘two’ (Heb. šanahšenim) is at the core of a broad semantic field to which among others, the following concepts belong: snwy ‘the two’ (dual); šnnw ‘second, companion, associate, colleague’; šn ‘brother’, šnt ‘sister’; šny ‘resemble, copy, imitate’, šnn ‘statue, image, icon’, šnnt ‘similarity’. “Similarity” is accordingly based on physical relationship and actually refers to a sort of “second edition” or “duplicate.”

 

Additional background for “being in the likeness of God” in Gen 1:26f. is the belief, throughout the Orient, in the potent corporealization that an image represents. The statue or stela of an Egyptian, Assyrian, or Babylonian king, set up in a distant province of the empire, represents the king’s power on the spot. The image of the god in the temple represents the presence of the god. The Hebrew word ‘image’ (ṣelem) points linguistically to the Mesopotamian cultural area. It can designate sculptures, statues, or reliefs, but primarily emphasizes their representative function. The Akkadian word ṣalmu has a similar semantic spectrum. Like the Egyptian rulers, the Assyrian kings of the ninth to seventh centuries B.C. were often designated “image” (ṣalmu) of a god: it is clear that the notion of “being in the image of God” clearly developed from the conception of a representative image and was then probably abstracted. The word “likeness/form” (demut), which supplements ṣelem in 1:26f., designates the similar connection of the copy with the model. It alludes to the content of the image, and inner similarity in nature between human and God. (Othmar Keel and Silvia Schroer, Creation: Biblical Theologies in the Context of the Ancient Near East [trans. Peter D. Daniels; Winona Lake, Ind.: Eisenbrauns, 2015], 142-43)

 

In his 2022 book, From Creation to Abraham: Further Studies in Genesis 1-11, John Day has built upon his earlier work as quoted above. Addressing the "functional view" of צֶלֶם (“image”) in Gen 1:27, Day writes that


 

[Scholars have followed this view] because in Gen. 1.26-28 the reference to humanity’s ruling the animals and the earth follows shortly after the allusion to humanity’s being made in the image of God. However—and this is very important—it is more natural to suppose that humanity’s lordship over the animals and the earth is a consequence of its having been made in God’s image, rather than what the image itself denotes. This is made clear by v. 28, where God’s command to humanity to rule over animals and the earth takes place only after God’s blessing of them and commanding them to be fruitful and multiply and fill the earth, whereas humanity has already been made in God’s image in v. 27. This important point is often overlooked by defenders of the functional interpretation.

 

The conclusion that God’s image in humanity refers to something other than humanity’s rule over the animals and the earth is also supported by a consideration of the other Genesis passages which refer to the image of God. Thus, in Ge. 5.1-2, the statement is repeated that ‘When God crated humanity, he made them in the image of God. Male and female he created them, and he blessed them and called their name humanity when they were created.’ Then v. 3 continues, ‘When Adam had lived 130 years, he became the father of a son in his own likeness, after his image, and named him Seth.’ Note the same language is used of Seth’s resemblance to Adam as is used of Adam’s resemblance to God. This resemblance clearly includes a physical resemblance and cannot have anything to do with ruling over animals and the earth. Again, in Gen. 9.6, we read, ‘Whoever sheds the blood of a human, by a human shall their blood be shed; for God made humanity in his own image’. These words are surely implying something about the inherent dignity over the animals and the earth. (John Day, “’So God Created Humanity In His Own Image’ (Genesis 1.27): What Does the Bible Mean and What Have People Thought it Meant?,” in From Creation to Abraham: Further Studies in Genesis 1-11 [London: T&T Clark, 2022], 25-26)

 

Against appeals to evidence from Egypt and the rest of the Ancient Near East for the “functional” view:

 

There are, however, some problems with this view. First, we have no evidence that the Israelite kings themselves were ever spoken of as being in the image of a god. The assumption has to be made that the Israelites borrowed the imagery either from Egyptian or Assyrian kingship and then democratized it to refer to humanity. But with regard to Assyria, it must be noted that the imagery is rare: only six references are known, and of those four come from a single scribe about three individuals in two letters from the time of Esar-haddon (681-669 BCE) and a fifth comes from the reign of his successor of Ashurbanipal (668-c. 627 BCE), while the other is from the time of Tukulti-Nunurta I (c. 1243-1207 BCE). It does not seem very likely, therefore, that P’s language was adopted from the Assyrians. What then of ancient Egypt? It is true that there are far more occurrences of the concept in Egypt, but although there are occasional allusions down to Ptolemaic times, they are overwhelmingly from the eighteenth dynasty (c. 1550-1290 BCE), about 800-1050 years prior to the time of the Priestly writer. Incidentally, although the Priestly writer probably wrote in the exilic or early post-exilic period, either during or not long after the Babylonian exile, no references to the king as the image of a god are attested in Babylonia at any period.

 

A popular variant of the functional view maintains that it was the custom of placing actual images of foreign kings in conquered territory as representations of their authority in absence that lies behind the alleged democratized representation of humans as images of the invisible God in Genesis. However, as noted earlier, the fundamental objection to any functional understanding of the image of God is that it does not fit any of the three passages in Genesis very well. Even in Gen. 1.26-28 humanity’s rule over the earth is more naturally a consequence of its being in the divine image, not what the image itself is.

 

Finally, those who adopt the functional view tend to argue that human beings are not said to be made in (or after) the image and likeness of God but rather as an image and likeness of God. This involves taking the preposition beth as so-called beth essentiae, ‘as’, hence ‘as the image and likeness of God’, not ‘in (i.e. after/according to) the image and likeness of God’. However, as J. Maxwell Miller (J.M. Miller, ‘In the “Image” and “Likeness” of God’, JBL 91 [1972], pp. 289-304 [296]) apply pointed out, this is improbable since the preposition beth is used here interchangeably with the preposition kaph, ‘after/according to’, but there is no kaph essentiae in biblical Hebrew. We thus have to conclude that humans are said to be made in (i.e., according to) the image of God (cf. Septuagint, kata, Vulgate ad), not merely as an image of God. (Ibid., 27-28)

 

Providing further evidence that  (“image”) in Gen 1:27 refers to physical likeness, not spiritual (at least merely), Day provides the following four arguments:


 

First, it should be noted that the word used for image, Hebrew ṣelem, is regularly employed elsewhere in the Old Testament to denote the physical representation of something, most frequently images of pagan gods (Nom. 33.52; 2 Kgs 11.18; 2 Chron. 23.17; Ezek. 7.20; 16.17; Amos 5.26). The only other examples are images of the Chaldaeans (Ezek. 23.14) and of tumours and mice (1 Sam. 6.5 [x2]; 6.11). Further, the biblical Aramaic cognate elēm, ṣalmā’ is used eleven times in Dan. 3.1-8 of the statue of a pagan god that the people are commanded to worship by Nebuchadrezzar, and the same Aramaic word occurs several times in Dan. 2.31-35 of the statue symbolizing the four world empires in Nebichadrezzar’s dream. It may seem surprising that a word which is used overwhelmingly of pagan images should be employed in Genesis of humanity’s high dignity. However, the fact that its meaning was not confined to idols but could refer to an image generally, meant that it was acceptable.

 

The word ‘likeness’ (Hebrew demût) tends to be more abstract in meaning. Sometimes it means ‘appearance, form’, though on occasion it is used in the comparison of two things. Most frequently it is used in Ezekiel’s visions, where it sometimes seems to make the comparison more approximate and less definite (e.g. Ezek. 1.5, 26; 8.2; 10.1). So some think that in Genesis it is used to make humanity’s physical resemblance to God a bit more approximate and less definite. However, there are three places in the Old Testament where the word demût is not abstract but a physical depiction of some kind; cf. 2 Kgs 16.10, ‘a model (demût) of the altar,’ 2 Chron. 4.3, ‘figures (demût) of oxen’, and Ezek. 23.15, ‘a picture (demût) of Babylonians’. (Note that in Ezek. 23.14 ṣelem, ‘image’, is likewise used of the Chaldeans [Babylonians].) Interestingly, in a bilingual Aramaic-Akkadian inscription on a ninth-century statue of Hadad-yis’i, king of Gozan, discovered at Tell Fekheriyeh in Syria, the Aramac cognates elēm and demûtā’ are both employed to render the Akkadian word ṣalmu, ‘image’, used of the statue. Ultimately, it is likely that there is no great difference between the ‘likeness’ and ‘image’ of God in Genesis, seeing that both terms are used interchangeably as noted earlier.

 

Second, very tellingly, in Gen. 5.3 we read that ‘Adam . . . became the father of a son in his likeness, after his image and named him Seth’. It will be noted that the identical terminology of Gen. 1.26-27 about humanity being made in the image and likeness of God is employed here. Moreover, just two verses before Gen. 5.3 in v. 1, we read that ‘When God created humanity, he made them in the likeness of God’. Since Seth’s likeness to Adam undoubtedly implies a physical resemblance, the natural conclusion is that there is similarly a physical likeness between God and human beings.

 

Thirdly, in addition to frequent references to Yahweh’s body parts, it ought to be noted that the Old Testament sometimes envisages God as appearing in human form (cf. Gen. 18.1-2; 32.24-25, 30). Perhaps the most well-known example is Isaiah’s famous vision in Isaiah 6, where the prophet ‘saw the Lord sitting upon a throne, high and lifted up; and his train filled the temple’. But most relevant for our present purpose is Ezek. 1.26, where the prophet states that in his vision of God he ‘saw a likeness as the appearance of a human being’. It is significant that Ezekiel was priest, not so long before the Priestly account of creation in Genesis 1 was written. Moreover, the word ‘likeness’ (Hebrew demût), which Ezekiel uses in Ezek. 1.26 (cf. 8.2), is the same word that the Priestly sources employs in Gen. 1.26 to denote humanity’s likeness to God. Ezekiel’s statement that God had ‘a likeness as the appearance of human being/man’ and Genesis’s statement that humanity was made in the likeness of God sound like the obverse and reverse of each other.

 

Fourthly, it should be noted that God says, ‘Let us make humanity in our image . . . ‘ There is general agreement amongst Old Testament scholars that God is here addressing his heavenly court, the angels, since, as ready noted, in Hebrew the verb has no royal plural, and there is no evidence for a plural of exhortation. Accordingly a point often overlooked is that humanity is made in the image of the angels, and not merely of God. Now there is good evidence that angels were envisaged as being in human form. Compare, for example, the angel Gabriel, who is described in Dan. 8.15 and 10.18 as ‘one having the appearance of a man’ and in Dan. 10.16 as ‘one in the likeness of the sons of men’. Again, in Genesis 19, those referred to as angels in v. 1 are called men in v. 5.

 

So it seems likely that human beings were thought to have a similar physical appearance to God, and that this is at least part of what the image of God in humanity includes. To the objection that men and woman do not have an identical appearance, L. Koehler (L. Koehler, ‘Die Grundstelle der Imago-Dei-Lehre’. TZ 4 [1948], pp. 16-22) argued that we could think more generally of human beings sharing upright form as what constitutes their resemblance to God. With him we may compare Ovid’s Metamorphoses 1.83-86, where Prometheus ‘moulded them into the image of all-controlling gods’ and in contrast to the animals, ‘gave human being an upturned aspect . . . and upright’. (Ibid., 30-32)

 

In a footnote to the above, we read that

 

[Similar to Ezek 1:26] Ezek. 8.2, referring to God, the prophet says he saw ‘the likeness (demût) as the appearance of a man’. It is generally accepted that the LXX preserves the original reading, ‘man’, and that the last word in the Hebrew text, ēš, ‘fire’, should be emended to ‘îš, ‘man’. The parallel description in Ezek. 1.27 confines the fire to the lower part of the divine body, which supports this emendation in Ezek. 8.2, as does the personal possessive in ‘his loins’, later in the verse. The occurrence of ‘fire’ later in Ezek. 8.2 could well have given rise to the confusion. (Ibid., 31 n. 33)

 

While acknowledging there may not be only one intended meaning behind the terms "image" and "likeness," M. David Litwa argues that Gen 1:26-27 affirms that humans are "iconically" like God, sharing his 3-dimensional 'image' and 'likeness':

 

In Genesis, what the "image" (εικων) of God consists of may never (and may never have been meant to) be reduced to a single element. A range of characteristics and functions have been proposed in medieval and modern theology: sexuality, relationality, reason, etc.

 

Initially, I am less interested in pinpointing the specific divine quality possessed by humans than in stating the basic fact: human beings, according to the first chapter of the Bible, are iconically like God. The fundamental likeness provides (as we see in Gen 3, 6, and 11) the basis for the further step: mixing with and potentially entering the class of divine beings.

 

Those who were part of the class of divine beings were, as we noted, called "the sons of God" (οι υιοι του θεου) (Gen 6:2; Ps 28[29]:1; 88:7 [89:6]; 81[82]:6). Divine sonship links back to the divine image, as is indicated in Gen 5:3. Here Adam begets a son "in his likeness, according to his image" (כצלמו בדמותו; κατα την ιδεαν αυτου και κατα την εικονα αυτου). The language in Gen 1:26 is similar, except for the prepositions which appear to be interchangeable: "in our image, according to our likeness" (בצלמנו כדמותנו; κατ εικονα ημετεραν και καθ ομοιωσιν). It seems, then, that even in Gen 1:26, Yahweh want to draw humankind (אדם; ανθρωπος) into a kinship relation with himself. As an image of God, the human is a son of God. Accordingly, the author of the Gospel of Luke can write that Adam, created in God's image, is genealogically (and genetically?) speaking, "son of God" ([υιος] του θεου) (3:38; cf. 17:28b). By making mankind in the image and likeness of himself and the other divine beings (note: "Le us"), Yahweh makes humans his children and thus strikingly close to the "sons of God" who in Gen 6 and Ps 28(29):1 are part of the class of divine beings.

 

When we turn to the historical meaning of human iconicity, Hebrew Bible scholars have allowed us to see it at least in part as a morphological and thus physical similarity to Godself. In the words of Benjamin Sommer, Genesis 1:26-27 "asserts that human beings have the same form as God and other heavenly beings." The words צלם (εικων) and דמות (ομοιωσις) refer to the "physical contours" of God. To share God's image thus means to share God's corporeality. Although scholars of all stripes and times have downplayed the corporeality of God in the Jewish scriptures, the notion is unavoidable.

 

In Genesis 2.7 God blows life-giving breath into the first human—an action that might suggest that God has a mouth or some organ with which to exhale. Less ambiguously, in Genesis 3.8, Adam hears the sound of God going for a stroll in the Garden of Eden at the breezy time of the day. A being who takes a walk is a being who has a body—more specifically, a body with something closely resembling legs. As we move forward in Genesis, we are told that God comes down from heaven to earth to take a close look at the tower the humans are building (Genesis 11.5) and that God walks to Abraham's tent, where He engages in conversation. (Genesis 18) (Sommer, Bodies of God, 2).

 

Thus by making humankind iconically similar to himself, God apparently shares his bodily form. Humans become the statues (εικονες) of God ("statue" being a common meaning of εικων in Paul's day). This line of interpretation is confirmed in later Jewish literature. In Vita Adae et Evae, Adam's bodily face and likeness take on the image of God (13:3). The patriarch Isaac affirms that not preserving the body profanes the image of God (TIsaac 6:33-7:1). R. Hillel goes to the bath to take care of the image of God (his body!) (Lev. Rabb. 34.3). Likewise, when Adam shares his image with Seth, he shares his bodily form (Gen 5:3). Just as Seth is embodied in a form akin to that of Adam, so Adam in Gen 1:26-27 is embodied in a form akin to that of God. (M. David Litwa, We Are Being Transformed: Deification in Paul's Soteriology [Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche 187; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2012], 100-2)

 

Such conclusions are strongly consistent with Latter-day Saint theology.

Acts 7:55-56

One text that speaks of Christ remaining, even after his exalted state post-ascension, embodied is that of Acts 7:55-56 (see discussion above), which is another strong piece of exegetical evidence for the Father's divine embodiment, too:

But he [Stephen], being full of the Holy Ghost, looked up stedfastly into heaven, and saw the glory of God, and Jesus standing on the right hand of God. And said, Behold, I see the heavens opened, and the Son of man standing on the right hand of God. (Acts 7:55-56 [KJV])

It is common for Latter-day Saints to cite Acts 7:55-56 as evidence of (1) that the Father and Son are separate persons and (2) that the Father has a “bodily form.” Point number 1 is something Trinitarians and most others will not dispute, though how one defines a “person” will differ (see the debate between Latin/Creedal and Social Trinitarianism, for instance, on this point). Point no. 2, however, is something most within the broad Christian spectrum will disagree with Latter-day Saints. Some may claim that Stephen only saw the “glory” of God (v.55), but only if one isolates this verse from the proceeding verse that speaks of Jesus being at the “right hand” of God (the Father). 

A typical response to LDS usage of this verse as evidence for our theology is that the term, “right hand” can be used in a metaphorical sense. Therefore, they argue, it is being used in a metaphorical sense in this passage. There are a couple of things wrong with this approach, most notably it is the fallacy of undistributed middle—

First premise: Some instances of “right hand” are metaphorical.
Second premise: “Right hand” is used in Acts 7:55-56
Conclusion: Therefore, the use of the term, “right hand” is metaphorical in Acts 7:55-56.

The predicates in both the major and minor premises does not exhaust all the occurrences of this term and would therefore not necessitate such an interpretation in Acts 7:55-56. A more non-dogmatic and accurate conclusion would be that Acts 7:55-56 could have a metaphorical meaning, but such should be said with much caution as the argument for such a meaning is not nearly as simplistic as critics would like it to be.

It is true that the term can be used in a sense of authority (e.g. Biden is Obama’s “right hand man”). However, to claim that this is how it is to be interpreted in Acts 7:55-56 is eisegesis. This passage is describing what Stephen saw in vision; it is not a metaphore for the relationship Jesus has with Father vis-à-vis authority. Indeed, what is being described is the spatial-relationship between the Father and the Son. Those who critique the LDS understanding have to ignore the literary genre of this pericope. Furthermore, the author of Acts 7:55-56 is alluding to a Messianic text from the Old Testament, Psa 110:1 (109:1, LXX). The LXX of this verse reads:

τῷ Δαυιδ ψαλμός εἶπεν ὁ κύριος τῷ κυρίῳ μου κάθου ἐκ δεξιῶν μου ἕως ἂν θῶ τοὺς ἐχθρούς σου ὑποπόδιον τῶν ποδῶν σου

Psalm of David: The Lord said to my lord, sit at my right hand, until I make your enemies your footstool (my translation)

Here, the first Lord (in the Hebrew, Yahweh) says to a second lord (adoni in Hebrew, meaning “my lord”) to sit at his right hand. The only meaningful, and exegetically sound interpretation of this verse is that the second lord is sitting at the right-hand of God, and not that he is the “right-hand man” of God (though he does indeed serve as God’s vizier, to be sure).

In Trinitarian theology, there is an allowance (albeit, an ambiguous one) for a distinction between the persons of the Father, Son and Spirit (e.g. the Father is not the Son). However, there is no allowance for a distinction between “God” and any of the persons. However, the Christology of the New Testament tends to distinguish “God” (θεος) from the Son, not simply the “Father” from the Son, as it does here, differentiating between ο θεος (literally, the God) from Jesus. Indeed, the other instances of the New Testament’s use of Psa 110:1 differentiates, not just the persons of the Father and the Son, but θεος and the Son. For instance, consider 1 Cor 15:22-28 and Heb 10:12-13:

For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive. But every man in his own order. Christ the firstfruits; afterward they that are Christ's at his coming. Then cometh the end when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father; when he shall have put down all rule and all authority and power. For he must reign, till he hath put all enemies under his feet. The last enemy that shall be destroyed is death. For he hath put all things under his feet. But when he saith all things are put under him, it is manifest that he is expected, which did put all things under him. And when all things shall be subdued unto him, then shall the Son also himself be subject unto him that put all things under him, that God (θεος) may be all in all. (1 Cor 15:22-28)

But this man, after he had offered one sacrifice for sins for ever, sat down on the right hand of God (θεος); From henceforth expecting till his enemies would be made a footstool for his feet. (Heb 10:12-13)


In both these pericopes, Psa 110:1 is used, and clearly, a distinction is made between not just the persons of the Father and the Son (which is accepted, equivocatingly, by Trinitarian theology), but God (θεος) and Jesus, a distinction not tolerated by Trinitarianism, and something one also finds in Acts 7:55-56.

Heb 1:3

Speaking of Christ, the author of Hebrews writes the following:

Who being the brightness of his glory, and the express image of his person, and upholding all things by the word of his power, when he had by himself purged our sins, sat down on the right hand of the Majesty on high; (Heb 1:3)



There is also scripture that can used to potentially support the idea that God could have a physical body. One of these is Hebrews 1:3. Christ could only be the exact representation of the Father if the Father himself possessed a body of some sort. In fact, some who wish to avoid what I feel is the plain meaning of Hebrews 1:3 actually go so far as to separate the natures of Christ or declare that the passage could not possibly infer that the Father is embodied.
Those who criticize this meaning thus, however, do not take into account the fact that there is not one portion of the passage that differentiates between the divine or human nature of Jesus. Secondly, the particle ων on indicates being, i.e., the present state of existence of Jesus from the perspective of the author of Hebrews. It has absolutely nothing to do with only Jesus’ previous state or of only a portion of his supposed dual nature. It only speaks of his total existence as a person.
Further, many grammarians have severely misunderstood the Greek απαυγασμα apaugasma (English: [active] effulgence or radiance; [middle, passive] reflection) in this passage to have the active sense. The Greek kai kai (English: and) is here a coordinating conjunction which combines the first and second parts (the second part being of a passive character) of a parallel couplet. Due to this fact, as much as the Evangelicals wish doggedly to hold to their interpretation, the Greek απαυγασμα aapaugasma should be understood as having a passive sense.
Why? Because the second portion of the couplet indicates that Jesus is the exact representation of the Father’s substantial nature, not that he is synonymous with that nature. Since this passage is a couplet, with the second portion being passive in nature, the first portion must be understood as having a passive sense as well. Thus, Jesus is properly to be seen as he “who is the reflection of the glory (of God) and the exact representation of the substantial nature of him (i.e., the Father).”
In short, the glory of God reflects from Jesus rather than having Jesus as its source, according to the theology of the author of Hebrews. Thusly, Jesus exactly represents God as he exists in all aspects of Jesus’ existence. The passage does not allow differentiation of Jesus’ divine and human natures in relation to God. Quite the opposite is in view here, although I doubt that Evangelicals will wish to agree with my assessment of the passage. Nevertheless, if it is true that Jesus is the exact representation of the Father’s substantial nature in all aspects, the Father must have possession of a physical body. Otherwise, Jesus is not and could not be the exact representation of the Father, for the two would differ. This fact is further strengthened by another pertinent fact: the Father is never said to be bodiless in any place within the text of the Bible. That was for a later generation to develop.

Supporting the claim that απαυγασμα is passive in Heb 1:3, note the following non-LDS sources:

The meaning of απαυγασμα in Heb 1:3 is disputed. Actively, the word can denote radiance or effulgence (Phil, Spec. Leg. iv.123), or passively, reflection or the light that is reflected (Wis 7:26; Philo Op. 146; Plant. 50). The sentence structure in Heb 1:3 favors understanding απαυγασμα and → χαραχτηρ as synonyms and, therefore, interpreting απαυγασμα as pass.: Christ “reflects the glory of God and bears the very stamp of his nature.” Both predicates characterize the Son as the perfect image of God and thus correspond to the expression → εικων του θεου (Col 1:15; 2 Cor 4:4). (Exegetical Dictionary of the New Testament, volume 1, eds Horst Balz and Gerhard Schneider [Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1990], 118)

3a. The divine Son’s relation to the Father is expressed as a ‘reflection’ (apaugasma) of the Father’s glory and a ‘stamp’ or ‘imprint’ (charaktēr) of his nature. Apaugasma has been variously interpreted in an active sense (‘radiation, emanation’ of light) and in a passive sense (‘reflection’ of a luminary’s light on another surface). The active sense was the one commonly accepted in early exegesis, with conclusions at times orthodox, at times pantheistic or gnostic, but the parallel with charaktēr indicates that it is the passive sense which is intended by our author. Charaktēr is the imprint of a seal, the mark of one thing found in something else. ‘Glory’ is the form of God’s manifestation (Ex 24:16; 33:18; 40:34; cf Jn 1:14), and in late Judaism often meant God himself. Hypostasis is essence, substance, nature; to try to make the clear-cut metaphysical or speculative distinctions of a later theology is out of place; the word is chosen on the basis of theological imagery and metaphor. Without pressing these images further than the author intends, we may say that ‘reflection of his glory’ denotes the Son’s divine origin and perfect similarity to the Father, and ‘stamp of his nature’ that similarity qualified by his distinction from the Father. ‘Upholding the universe by his word of power’: pherōn has the double sense of maintaining the existence of creation and of governing, directing the course of history. The ‘word’ here is the dynamic OT ‘word’ which produces the physical or historical effects, and ‘word of power’, of course, is a Semitism for ‘powerful word’. (Dom Aelred Cody, “Hebrews” in Reginald C. Fuller, Leonard Johnston, and Conleth Kearns, eds. A New Catholic Commentary on Holy Scripture [London: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd., 1969], 1224, emphasis in bold added)





John 4:24

God is a Spirit: and they that worship him must worship him in spirit and in truth. (John 4:24)


John 4:24 is one of the most common proof-texts used against the Latter-day Saint belief that God the Father is embodied. However, from the get-go, one must note the irony that most critics who raise this verse are Trinitarians. Why? In this verse, there is a differentiation, not just between the persons of Jesus and the Father, but between Jesus and God (θεος)! Notwithstanding, there are some elements on this verse that are often overlooked by critics.

Firstly, the Greek of this verse is:

πνεῦμα ὁ θεός, καὶ τοὺς προσκυνοῦντας αὐτὸν ἐν πνεύματι καὶ ἀληθείᾳ δεῖ προσκυνεῖν

The phrase, often translated, “God is spirit” is in bold. In Greek grammar, this is a qualitative predicate nominative, which deals with, not composition, but one's qualities. Furthermore, from the context, this refers to man’s worship of God, not the composition of deity. Jesus is addressing a Samaritan, whose theology privileged Mount Gezirim, while the Jews privileged Jerusalem, one of the many disputes between them. Jesus, instead, echoing the universalism of the New Covenant, states that proper worship of God will not be localised in one place. In other words, this verse does not address God's physiological nature--only the means by which men communicate with God. Such must be done spiritually (i.e., spirit to spirit), and must develop a spiritual nature.

Furthermore, taking the absolutist view of this verse to its "logical" conclusion, one would have to state that it is a requirement that men are to shed their physical bodies in order to worship God--if God is only spirit and this passage requires men to worship God "in spirit," then men must worship God only in spirit. Thus, to cite John 4:24 against the teachings of Mormon theology is to claim that men cannot worship God as mortal beings, which is ludicrous. It would also akin to absolutising 1 Cor 15:45, and stating that Christ currently exists in an unembodied spirit, notwithstanding Christ's corporeal ascension (Acts 1:11) and His being depicted as embodied in post-ascension visions of Jesus (e.g., Acts 7:55-56).

A related criticism that has been raised by some opponents (e.g., Craig Blomberg in How Wide the Divide?) is that if God were to possess a physical body, this would make divine omnipresence impossible as God would be rendered "limited" or "finite" by that body. Therefore, God, in LDS theology, could not be omnipresent, something required by this verse. However, Latter-day Saints affirm only that the Father has a body, not that his body has him. The Father is corporeal and infinitely more, and if a spirit can be omnipresent without being physically present, then so can a God who possesses a body and a spirit.

Indeed, the Bible affirms that, though the Father has a body (e.g., Heb 1:3), His glory, influence and power fills the universe (Jer 23:34). He is continually aware of everything in the universe and can communicate with, and travel to, any spot instantaneously (Psa 139:7-12).

Furthermore, a question that is begged is that “spirit” is immaterial. However, many early Christians believed that “spirit” was material (e.g., Origen, On First Principles, Preface 9 and Tertullian, Against Praxaes, 7), something consistent with LDS theology (D&C 131:7). This is all the more telling when Origen did not hold to "divine embodiment"--instead, he rejected such. Notwithstanding, unlike modern Evangelical critics, he realised that John 4:24 does not support such an interpretation. As one scholar, Maurice F. Wells, noted about the early Christian interpretation of John 4:24:

Finally, and most distinctively, we have in iv. 24 the words ‘God is Spirit, and they that worship Him must worship in spirit and in truth’. Origen fully recognises the importance of this text. It has, he says, every appearance of being a definition of the ουσια of God. But if we were to take it as such we would be committing ourselves to the view that God is σωμα. In its literal sense πνευμα is as physical a word as fire or light. Its use is therefore just as metaphorical in this case as in the others. The significance of the metaphor is this. Just as the literal πνευμα around us provides the essential breath of physical life, so God is called πνευμα because it is he who leads men to real (αληθινος) life (Origen, Commentary on the Gospel of John 13, 21-23). So for Origen the assertion that God is πνευμα is not a straightforward assertion of the incorporeal nature of God. Rather God is incorporeal, in spite of the fact that he is called πνευμα (Origen, Con. Cel. 6, 70). In the second half of the text he does allow that the appropriate contrast with worship in the spirit is bodily or fleshly worship, but this is based more on the total context and on the conjunction with worship in the truth than on the inherent meaning of the word πνευμα itself (Origen, De Principiis, 1, 1, 4; Con. Cel. 6, 70).

 

Tertullian agrees with Origen in asserting a physical element in the literal meaning of πνευμα. He writes ‘Who will deny that God is a body, although “God is a Spirit”? For Spirit is body of its own kind, in its own form’ (Tertullian, Adv. Prax. 7, 8) The conclusion is the exact opposite of that of Origen, but the premises are identical. (Maurice F. Wells, The Spiritual Gospel: The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel in the Early Church [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960], 67-68)

 

Another related verse that is often raised by critics is that of Luke 24:39. However, as with John 4:24, this is another example of eisegesis. What Evangelical critics fail to note is that the converse of the statement is not true. A living physical body most definitely does have a spirit. In fact, it is physically dead without one (James 2:26). A spirit alone does not have a physical body. But if God has a physical body, he also has a spirit. Therefore, even though God is corporeal, it is appropriate to say that God "is spirit" (as in John 4:24), for spirit is the central part of His nature as a corporeal being.

As Daniel Smith wrote on this passage and its underlying theology:


Are We Seeing a Pneuma?

Having Peter, the primary witness of the appearance traditions, verify the empty tomb is a significant development, since it narrowly limits how the appearances can be interpreted. It requires complete bodily continuity between the dead Jesus in the tomb and the risen Jesus who appears—which is very different from the complete transformation Paul envisioned. Of all the Gospels, Luke is the most explicit about the mode of Jesus’ postresurrection bodily existence. When he appears suddenly among the Eleven and the rest (24:36), Jesus himself explains that he is not a spirit (Gk., pneuma), for he has flesh and bones as a spirit cannot . . . In Greco-Roman antiquity, it would not be out of the question to see someone who was dead . . . Although such an apparition could be interpreted as some aspect of the dead person—that is, the soul, shadow, or daimon—becoming visible to living persons. We would call this a ghost—as ancient Greek and Latin speakers would as well, with varying terminology—or possible, a “post-mortem apparition.” In fact, most current translations render pneuma here in Luke 24:39, 39 not as “spirit” but as “ghost.”

According to ancient thinking, certain types of people were more likely to appear after their death in ghostly manifestations. As noted, the typical view was that those who had died young (or before marriage), those who had died violently, and those whose bodies were not given proper burial or cremation were more likely to have a restless post-mortem existence and to cause trouble for the living. Jesus, executed as a criminal, would of course all into the category of those dead by violence. Virgil (70-19 BCE) held that among those doomed to a restless afterlife, excluded for a time from rest in Hades, were people unjustly executed or who took their own lives. Lucian (c. 125-80 CE) has one of his characters number the crucified (or impaled) among those especially given to appearing in ghostly manifestations: “such as, if a person hanged himself, or had his head cut off, or was impaled on a stake, or departed life in some other way such as these” (Lucian, Philops, 29) . . . An outsider could have concluded that followers of Jesus who were talking about his post-mortem appearances had simply seen his ghost. As it seems, this would not have been considered unusual or extraordinary. But Luke makes it clear to his readers that however the appearances of Jesus could have been interpreted, they were epiphanies of someone who had been raised from the dead—with an empty tomb. As already seen, this is confirmed by Peter himself when he finds the tomb empty except for the grave clothes . . . Another potential concern arises, however, in view of the interpretation of the resurrection appearances as ghostly apparitions . . . The corpus of spells and incantations called the Greek magical papyri attests to this, in particular to the ways that body parts could be used to control the ghosts of the dead—and the shade or spirit (often called a daimōn) of a person who died by violence would be particularly powerful if controlled. (Daniel A. Smith, Revisiting the Empty Tomb: The Early History of Easter [Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2010], 106-7)

Further evidence for such an interpretation can be seen in Ignatius to the Symrnaens 3:2. The Ante-Nicene series renders the text as:

 

When, for instance, He came to those who were with Peter, He said to them, "Lay hold, handle Me, and see that I am not an incorporeal spirit." And immediately they touched Him, and believed, being convinced both by His flesh and spirit. For this cause also they despised death, and were found its conquerors. (ANF 1:87)

 

However, the Greek underlying "and see that I am not an incorporeal spirit" is actually:

 

καὶ ἴδετε, ὅτι οὐκ εἰμὶ δαιμόνιον ἀσώματον

 

And see that I am not a bodiless demon

 

While it is still debated if Ignatius is dependent upon Luke 24:39 or an oral tradition concerning Jesus' post-resurrection appearances to the Apostles, it is clear that he understood, as most exegetes do, that Jesus was negating the claim he was a ghost/demon, as most exegetes argue is happening in Luke 24:39.


The apologetic value of this to Latter-day Saints can be seen by the fact that some critics tie Jesus’ words in Luke 24:39 with John 4:24 as “proof” that God cannot be embodied. Apart from the fact that Jesus is assuring his followers in Luke 24:39 that he was not a ghost, critics are guilty of eisegesis of John 4:24, too.

Moreover, it would not be appropriate to say that God is only a spirit based on this verse--here, Christ clearly has a spirit and a physical body. His spirit had just been recombined with His perfected and glorified physical body in the resurrection, a point He took great pains to demonstrate (Luke 24:41-43). He was not, however, "a spirit" in the sense of being only a spirit.

In unique LDS Scripture, we find something similar to John 4:24 echoed in D&C 93:33-35:

For man is spirit, The elements are eternal, and spirit and element, inseparably connected, receive a fullness of joy. And when separated man cannot receive a fullness of joy. The elements are the tabernacle of God; yea, man is the tabernacle of God, even temples; and whatsoever temple is defiled, God shall destroy that temple.


In this pericope, man is said to be “spirit,” though such does not preclude embodiment. 

Biblical scholars would also disagree with the common eisegesis of John 4:24. New Testament scholar, C.H. Dodd wrote:

It should be observed that to translate 'God is a spirit' is the most gross perversion of the meaning. 'A spirit' implies one of the class of πνευματα, and as we have seen, there is no trace in the Fourth Gospel of the vulgar conception of a multitude of πνευματα. (C.H. Dodd, The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel [Cambridge: 1958], 225 n. 1)

On the absurdities of understanding John 4:24 as teaching the ontological nature of God, Origen wrote:

Many writers have made various affirmations about God and His ουσια. Some have said that He is of a corporeal nature, fine and aether-like; some that he is of incorporeal nature; others that He is beyond ουσια in dignity and power. It is therefore worth our while to see whether we have in the Scriptures starting-points (αφορμας) for making any statement about the ουσια of God. Here [1 John i.2] it is said that πνευμα is, as it were, His ουσια. For he said, πνευμα ο θεος. In the Law He is said to be fire, for it is written, ο θεος ημων πυρ καταναλισκον (Deut. iv.24, Heb. xii. 29), and in John to be light, for he says, ο θεος πως εστι, και σκοτια εω αυτω ουκ εστιν ουδεμια (1 John i.5). if we are to take these statements at their face value, without concerning ourselves with anything beyond the verbal expression, it is time for us to say that God is σωμα; but what absurdities would follow if we said so, few realise. (Origen, Commentary on John xiii.21-23, as cited by Dodd, ibid., 225-26).

Note: Origen in this passage understood it unwise to appeal to John 4:24 "at face value" to support God not being embodied, notwithstanding his use of such a verse in On First Principles to support God (the Father) not having a body. Origen is not a witness for divine embodiment, but only a witness that early Christians, including those who would use John 4:24 as evidence that the Father does not have a body, would not go "beyond what is written" about this text (Origen is, sadly, very complex, in comparison to other early Christian authors).

This is mirrored by the comments of Raymond Brown in his magisterial 2-volume commentary on John's Gospel:


[This verse is] not an essential definition of God, but a description of God's dealing with men; it means that God is Spirit toward men because He gives the Spirit (xiv 16) which begets them anew. There are two other such descriptions in the Johannine writings: "God is light" (1 John i 5), and "God is love" ( 1 John iv 8 ). These too refer to the God who acts; God gives the world His Son, the light of the world (iii 19, viii 12, ix 5) as a sign of His love (iii 16). (The Gospel According to John (i-xii), vol. 29 of the Anchor Bible [Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1966], 167.)

Alan Kerr offered the following comments on John 4:24:


6.6.4 God Is Spirit Commentators generally agree that this statement is not a philosophical proposition but a message about God in his relation to people. Two similar sentences about God in 1 John bear a similar sense: God is light (1:5) and God is love (4:8). It is also generally agreed that ‘Spirit’ here captures the Old Testament nuances of רוח as the life-giving creative power of God. The decisive issue for John is summed up in the stated purpose of the Gospel: ‘These things are written that you may come to believe that Jesus is the Messiah, the Son of God, and that through believing you might have life through his name’ (20:31). The goal is life (ζωή), and it is God the Spirit who gives life (6:63). This life is traced back to being born of the πνεῦμα, the life-Giver (3:5). In some way this life is bound up with knowing—knowing the only true God and Jesus Christ whom he has sent (17:3)—that is, knowing the truth.Given this statement—πνεῦμα  θεός—we must interpret ἐν πνεύματι in the light of it. It cannot refer to any spirit, but only to the Spirit that is God. While the primary emphasis of ἐν πνεύματι is on the life-giving and creative power of the worship, there is also a secondary significance intimated by 3:8 where πνεῦμα is the unconfined, uncontrolled and uncomprehended wind/Spirit that blows where it wills. The presence of God who is πνεῦμα is not to be confined to Jerusalem or Gerizim. The true worshipper should therefore not be confined by spatial limitations.
On the other hand, for John the Spirit is the Spirit of Jesus. This emerges most clearly in the pronouncement about the Johannine Paraclete, who extends and communicates the presence of Jesus while Jesus is away. So in Jn 14:18 Jesus can say, ‘I am coming to you,’ and refer directly to the Spirit Paraclete in the previous verses (14:16, 17). C.F.D. Moule succinctly comments on how Christology dominated pneumatology in early pneumatic experience, a comment that aptly sums up the entwinment of the Spirit and Jesus in John: ‘The Spirit is Christified; Christ is Spiritualized.’ So given Johannine pneumatology it would be in order to say that worshipping ‘in Spirit’ would be partially equivalent to worshipping ‘in Jesus’. (Alan Kerr, The Temple of Jesus' Body: The Temple Theme in the Gospel of John [New York: Sheffield Academic Press, 2002], 192-94)



Conclusion

Such is not the first time Lynn Wilder has embarrassed herself on the topic of theology. Indeed, one of her favourite "proof-texts" for Sola Fide is that of John 5:24, which reads thusly:


Verily, verily, I say unto you, He that heareth my word, and believeth on him that sent me, hath everlasting life, and shall not come into condemnation; but is passed from death unto life.
Only by isolating this verse from the pericope it is contained in can Lynn claim that such supports the material doctrine of Protestantism, sola fide. However, this represents eisegesis yet again. Let us quote the entirety of the relevant pericope, not just v.24:

Verily, verily, I say unto you, he that heareth my word, and believeth on him that sent me, hath everlasting life, and shall not come into condemnation; but is passed from death unto life. Verily, verily, I say unto you, The hour is coming, and now is, when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God: and they that hear shall live. For as the Father hath life in himself; so hath he given to the Son to have life in himself. And hath given him authority to execute judgment also, because he is the Son of Man. Marvel not at this: for the hour is coming, in the which all that are in the graves shall hear his voice. And shall come forth; they that have done good, unto the resurrection of life, and they that have done evil, unto the resurrection of damnation. (John 5:24-29)

Notice that good works are the criterion, not simply of heavenly rewards, but of one’s final destiny (eternal life vs. eternal death). Such is part-and-parcel of New Testament soteriology, such as 2 Cor 5:10:

For we must all reappear before the judgement seat of Christ; that every one may receive the things everyone may receive the things done in his body, according to that he hath done, whether it be good or bad.

Such texts, which could be multiplied, proof that good works are not merely the fruits of one being in a “saved” state, but decide one’s eternal destiny. For a detailed discussion of this and other key themes in Pauline soteriology, see Chris VanLandingham, Judgment and Justification in Early Judaism and the Apostle Paul (Hendrickson, 2006). Sola Fide is not in view in John 5:24-29 and other similar texts when read in their context.

Furthermore, such also ignores how, elsewhere in the Gospel of John, Jesus taught baptismal regeneration. See:

Baptism, Salvation, and the New Testament, Part 4: John 3:1-7

See also:

Christ's Baptism is NOT Imputed to the believer

Sadly, Lynn, her husband, and her family have been duped into believing in a false gospel (Protestantism), one whose very formal doctrine, Sola Scriptura, is soundly refuted by any meaningful exegesis of the Bible itself (see Not by Scripture Alone: A Latter-day Saint Refutation of Sola Scriptura), and a theology whose other presuppositions are antithetical to sound exegesis, too (see An Examination and Critique of the Theological Presuppositions Underlying Reformed Theology). They have embraced a "gospel," and as we have seen in the above, a theology of God which, in this lifetime, gives the proponent thereof the consolation prize of an anti-biblical false gospel and false hope in this lifetime and damnation in the age to come.

Update: In a recent debate between Lynn Wilder and Corey Miller versus James Holt (accessible here), Lynn appealed to the Temple presentation wherein God sends messengers to find out what is happening on the earth as proof that God the Father, in LDS theology, is limited with respect to knowledge of prayers being offered to Him and other things. However, (1) the temple is symbolic and (2) using Lynn's "logic," "the God of the Bible" is ignorant too. After all, we read the following in Genesis wherein God is questioning Adam. Putting on my "Evangelical anti-Mormon" hat, God did not know where Adam was hiding, or who told him he was naked:

And the Lord God called unto Adam, and said unto him, Where art thou? And he said, I heard thy voice in the garden, and I was afraid, because I was naked; and I hid myself. And he said, Who told thee that thou wast naked? Hast though eaten of the tree, whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldest not eat? (Gen 3:9-11)

Furthermore, what would Lynn do with a text such as 1 Kgs 22:19-22, where God confers with the heavenly court and takes advice from a member thereof?

And he said, Hear though therefore the word of the Lord, I saw the Lord sitting on his throne, and all the host of heaven standing by him on his right hand and on his left. And the Lord said, Who shall persuade Ahab, that he may go up and fall at Ramoth-gilead? And one said on this manner, and another said on that manner And there came forth a spirit, and stood before the Lord, and said, I will persuade him. And the Lord said unto him, Wherewith? And he said, I will go forth, and I will be a lying spirit in the mouth of all his prophets. And he said, Thou shalt persuade him, and prevail also: go forth and do so.

Evangelicals should be careful when giving Wilder any credence--ultimately, it hurts their intellectual integrity as she lacks such, as well as any theological and exegetical abilities.