Tuesday, June 11, 2019

18th Century Theologian David James' Cogent Analysis of Some of the Problems of Trinitarian Theories


Writing in the late 18th century, one critic of Trinitarian orthodoxy noted the following rather cogent problem of various Trinity theories:

The Realist holds three Spirits, each God, and equal in every perfection, but avoids tritheism, as he apprehends, by saying the three are inseparably joined in one substance or essence . . . the sabellian and nominal Trinitarian hold Father, Son, and Spirit, to be one infinite mind . . . the words of our Saviour, my Father is greater than I—greater than l. Here, then, the system of the Realist is embarrassed. If he asserts, that the three persons are equally self-existent, and independent; by his own confession he runs into Tritheism: if he asserts, that the Father alone is from none, he makes the Son and Spirit to be inferior to him, notwithstanding a specifick saments of essence; which is something like semi-arianism. To obviate fairly one of these consequences, requires uncommon dexterity: for by maintaining the perfect co-equality of the three persons, each as God, where is the talked of pre-eminence of the Father? where is the unity? If the realist thinks he saves both by asserting the self-existence and independence of the Father, exclusively; by the very assertion he destroys the co-equality; or this paradox follows, self-existence and independence are no divine perfections; and there is no inequality between him who hath, independently, all perfection of himself, and them who, independently, have of themselves none: for it is to be remembered, that the Realist lays it down as an established principle to preserve the unity, that the Son and Spirit derive their nature, and all their powers from the Father. When these difficulties press hard, the derivation of the Son, especially, is said to be an eternal, immutable, and necessary emanation; as light from the Sun; a tree from its root; or a river from its foundation. In this sense, it is doubted, whether according to the analogy of language, God can, with any propriety, be called the Father of Jesus Christ; as the term, Father, excludes necessity, and implies freedom of will. Could any man, with any propriety, call his arm, his son? These difficulties are pointed out, as an argument for the exercise of charity. In a word, the one God of the Realist is a compound of three Spirits, one underived, and two derived; one a self-existent God, and the other two deriving their deity from him. It is a natural question for a humble enquirer to put in this place, doth the scripture explicitly give us, any where, this idea of one God? The nominal Trinitarian, Sabellian, Arian, and Scina, apprehend that it doth not. The Nominal adopts a system which appears to him less perplexed and encumbered with difficulties.—As being next in order, let us consider his sytem. As he expresses his ideas in the very same terms with the realist, it becomes necessary to have an explanation of those terms.—Pray Sir, when you say, God is three persons, do you mean that he is three spirits, or one Spirit? One Spirit.—Then how do you make it out, that he his three persons, or conscious agents, with distinct understanding and will?—That is not my idea of person.—No? Then, you depart from the idea of the scriptures, which speak of the sacred three, in the same terms, that men commonly speak of three persons properly so called. Sir, “the sacred writings were not addressed to the literi, to philosophers, and scholars, but to the common people, and consequently, they used words in their plain popular significations.” But you are, by your scheme, forced to use the word person in a sense contrary to its plain signification. The Father is a spirit according to the context, John iv. 23, 24. The Holy Spirit, by his very name, is a distinct Spirit from the Father; and the Son, as being begotten before all ages, and having a body prepared him, Heb. x. 5. and coming forth from the Father into the world, John xvi. 28. appears to have been a distinct spirit from both. But, according to you, the Father, Son, and Spirit, each God, are but one Spirit, with one numerical consciousness and will, which seems irreconcileable according to the plain meaning of words with what we read in John xiv. 16, 17, 26. John xv. 16. Ephes. ii. 18. Ephes. vi. 4, 5, 6, &c. &c. Let us consider a particular instance. The Holy Ghost descended in a bodily shape, like a dove upon him (Christ) and a voice came from heaven, which said, thou art my beloved Son, in thee I am well pleased. Luke iii. 22. According to the principles of the nominal Trinitarian, here is one infinite Spirit descending on itself when united with man, and saying to itself in this state; thou art my beloved Son, in thee I am well pleased: or perhaps, more accurately thus, one distinction in the infinite mind, descending upon another distinction in the same mind incarnate, when the mind itself not incarnate, saith to it, thou art my beloved Son, & c.—The Nominals have been, for the most part, embarrassed about giving a definition of the word person. I they use I in a sense denoting different relations or characters, as when one and the same man may be said to be three persons because he sustains the characters of Father, Son, and Brother; or when George the third may be said to be king of England, king of Scotland, and king of Ireland; when they apply it to that sense of the trinity, they are Sabellians, and, in effect, destroy the real personality of the Son (excepting as man) and of the Spirit. (David James, A Short View of the Tenets of Tritheists, Sabellians, Trinitarians, Arians, and Socinians [2d ed.; London: J. Johnson, 1780], 66, 69 45-49, italics and spelling in original)

In a footnote on pp. 67-68, James reproduces an answer to a possible “counter” that Jesus and the Holy Spirit are eternally “necessary emanations from the father, as rays of light are emanations from the sun”:

“The doctor (Randolph) indeed thinks to solve all difficulties by supposing the Son to be an eternal and necessary Emanation from the Father, he would do well however to consider whether eternal Emantion is not a contradiction in terms. In my apprehension, he who always was, would no more have been emaned from the Father than the Father from him. If both co-existed eternally, then neither would emane; because that which never wanted existence, could never receive its existence from any thing whatsoever: And what, I beseech you, is to emane, but to proceed or come forth into existence from some extrinsic course? To emane is therefore but another name for beginning to exit: but how could that begin to exist, which in every point of infinitely past duration, which absolutely without beginning, was just what it now is? Suppose a tree and its branches to have existed necessarily together from eternity; under that supposition the branches certainly never issued from the tree. To suppose them to have issued, would be to suppose, either that there was some point in infinite duration when the branches had no existence, which contradicts their notion of eternity, or that they issued when they were already in existence, which is the grossest of absurdities.” Mr Temples Letters to Dr. Randolph, preface, p. 7.