Wednesday, September 11, 2019

Henry Cowles vs. the Reformed Understanding of Imputed Righteousness and Nature of the Atonement


In his Excursus on the Atonement, Henry Cowles wrote the following against the Reformed understanding of (1) the atonement and (2) imputation:

It would be turning aside unprofitably from this course of argument to quote from those who insist that Christ suffered the penalty of the law, and show that having made this the test and standard of orthodoxy, many, if not most of them then proceed to explain it almost utterly away, and to say (e.g.) on one page: “God demanded from Christ the very same punishment as to kind of punishment, though not as to the degree or as to the nature of the suffering, which the law denounced upon us”; and on another, (two pages after): “We say that Christ suffered in the least the same kind, much less the same degree of suffering as was penalty due for those for whom he acted” (Prof. A.A. Hodge, pp. 36, 38). This certainly appears to be a case of holding on tenaciously to the words of a favorite definition while rejecting the legitimate sense of it. The latter is a concession to truth and evidence; the former is not so easily explained. However, it is in most respects gratifying to find that those who begin with the definition: “Christ suffered the very penalty of the law for sinners,” proceeds to modify it by eliminating its essential ideas, toning it down usually to this general and unobjectionable statement: Christ suffered in behalf of sinners all that God’s justice and holiness demanded for the ends of an adequate atonement

This theory must be rejected, not because (like that previously considered) it signifies too little to fulfill the scriptural testimony, but because it signifies too much. In respect to both the nature and amount of Christ’s sufferings, it demands more than the historic record requires or admits; and more than the nature of the case demands or even allows.

If it be said that the altar-language, e.g., “bearing our sins”; “gave himself a random for all”; “made a curse for us,” etc., admits this theory, and naturally expresses it, I answer: Even if that be granted, it does not demand it. Another view, exempt from the insuperable difficulties of this, suffices to fill out the necessary and indeed the natural sense of this altar-language, and should, therefore, be accepted.—There is not the last occasion to press this altar-language to signify that Christ suffered the same in kind and amount as the redeemed must else have suffered; or that his death was the same thing as the sinner’s eternal death would else have been; for a less suffering might suffice and a very different death might avail. An analogy doubtless exists between what Christ suffered and what is due to the sinner; but analogies call only for certain resemblances and not for identities. This is the point where this theory makes its capital mistake. It pushes these analogies unreasonably far. It puts into them more than the terms and figures demand, and more than the nature of the case can possibly admit.

Special notice should be taken of Gal. 3:13 much relied on as proof that Christ suffered the whole curse of the law for us. Here Paul says: “Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us, for it is written, Cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree.” But observe that this passage, for the purposes of the theory under consideration, is made to read virtually thus: Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made to suffering the curse of the law for us. This is a large interpolation. Very important words are put into the passage, in addition to what Paul put in, which therefore are not there by his authority. This adding to words inspired of God is by no means admissible unless it appears from the context of from other legitimate authority that Paul must have meant what these added words express. But Paul’s context shows that he is thinking, not of Christ’s being made the very curse of the law which sinners had broken, but only of his being accounted—considered to be—accursed in the sense in which any and every man hung on a tree was in Jewish sentiment held to be accursed; for in support of his view he quotes Deut. 21:23, which is a special statute against leaving the malefactor’s body on the tree over night. Paul’s meaning therefore is that suspending Christ on the tree was in the popular view an extreme reproach because it was supposed to imply the execration of God. But this is a very different thing from Christ’s suffering the eternal death to which the law doomed every transgressor.

As commonly held, this theory of the work of Christ for sinners is in two quite distinct parts, viz.: (1) Christ bearing for sinners the full penalty of the law. (2) His perfect obedience to the law, which, upon the condition of faith, is imputed, i.e., transferred in law to the believer and accounted as his own.—On this theory it would seem that the sinner is justified twice; in each case on entirely distinct and independent grounds; viz., first, because Christ has suffered the full penalty of the law in his stead, so that nothing in law stands against him; second, because Christ has obeyed the law perfectly for him, and this is accounted to be his own obedience, as if he had rendered it himself. Of course, on either of these grounds it would seem he should be fully justified.

This theory is obnoxious to the following insuperable objections:

1. Obedience and disobedience are, in their essential nature, personal and non-transferable. Every moral agent must obey or disobey on his own sole responsibility. The law says to him, do this, do not that, and holds him to his own duty. No law binding on me permits another moral agent to do my duty for me, and then reckons his act as being really my act, and so releases me from my personal responsibility. Neither can it permit another moral agent to disobey for me, and then account his disobedience as mine. The supposition of a transfer from one moral being to another, of personal obligation and of consequent merit or demerit, is simply absurd. Law knows nothing of the sort.

2. If there be two distinct provisions for justification, each in itself all-sufficient, then one or the other must be superfluous. If either is a fact, it supersedes the other. There is not the least occasion for the sinner to be justified twice over; i.e., on two entirely distinct and independent grounds. No such superfluous provision can be consistent with God’s wisdom.

3. This supposed transfer of Christ’s righteousness t the believer is not the scriptural doctrine of mercy and forgiveness; nor is it taught in the scriptures by any right interpretation of their words. The sense of it is not there. For, according to the Scriptures, sinners become right before God (1) by their repentance; (2) by their faith in Christ—upon the basis of which faith their sins are, through Christ’s atonement, forgiven. Once renewed in heart and forgiven of their sin, they are accepted before God. Nothing more can possibly be requisite.

4. If Christ’s righteousness were really transferred to the believer, there would be no more room for the exercise of mercy in his forgiveness, since he would be righteous even as Christ himself is. Nor does it appear, how he could need grace for future holy living, having the perfect holiness of Jesus Christ for his own.

5. In its practical bearings, this doctrine tends dangerously to antinomianism, inasmuch as if I really believed, it naturally quenches the sense of personal responsibility for obedience; supersedes watchfulness, prayer and perpetual endeavor to do all the will of God. For why should not the believer say in his heart. This imputed righteousness of Christ is all I need to make me right before God? It is infinitely better than any obedience of my own, and it really makes mine of the least possible consequence. Why would I concern myself over my own doings, as if they had any bearings upon my standing before God, or as if He would ever look at them?

Does any sensible man receive such impressions from the thoughtful, prayerful reading of the Scriptures? (The Governmental View of the Atonement: A Compilation of Various Christian Authors [comp. Jesse Morrell; Biblical Truth Resources, 2012], 134-38)

The Reformed doctrine of imputed righteousness is a topic I have written a great deal about (and against) including: