Thursday, October 22, 2020

R.T. Mullins on the Problems of an Impassible God and His Comprehending Human Suffering

 

 

The Impassable God Cannot Comprehend Suffering

 

The first reason that the impassible God cannot satisfy the conditions for mutual closeness is because the impassible God cannot comprehend what it is like to suffer, and thus cannot comprehend what it is like to be Sally in her suffering. An impassible God cannot suffer because an impassible God is necessarily in a state of undisturbed bliss. For such a God, it is metaphysically impossible for Him to comprehend what it is like to be Sally in her situation of agony. Sally is in a deep mental anguish, and that is a mental state that an impassible God cannot possibly understand.

 

Recall that the classical theist maintains that God has a perfect cognitive grasp of His own nature. In grasping His own nature, God experiences perfect, undisturbed bliss. Thus, the impassible God knows that it is metaphysically impossible for Him to suffer. (R.T. Mullins, God and Emotion [Cambridge Elements Philosophy of Religion; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020], 46-47)

 

The Impassible God Cannot Be Moved

 

There is a second reason that the impassible God cannot comprehend what it is like to be Sally, and thus is prevented from enjoying mutual closeness with her . . . [in Classical Theism] it is metaphysically impossible for an impassible God to be moved or acted on by anything outside God. His emotional state of perfect happiness is based entirely on Himself. Since an impassible God’s emotional state is based purely and entirely on Himself, it is metaphysically impossible for an impassible God to comprehend what it is like to have one’s emotional states wrapped up in another person. As Randles explains: “The happiness of God is from the perfection of His nature independently of all other beings . . . it is not in the power of the creature to spoil or diminish His infinite blessedness” (Marshall Randles, The Blessed God: Impassibility [London: Charles H. Kelly, 1900], 44) . . . An impassible God cannot possibly comprehend what it is like for Sally to place the emotional weight or subjective value that she does on her son Ben because it is metaphysically impossible for God to have His emotional states depend on something external to the divine nature. It is metaphysically impossible for an impassible God to be emotionally invested in another person because such an investment would render God’s emotional life dependent on something ad extra to the divine nature. Such a dependence would be in clear violation of divine impassibility. So an impassible God cannot possibly understand what it is like to be Sally in her emotional vulnerability towards her son. Ibid., 47-48)

 

. . . the impassibilist might try to argue that some person P could have an understanding of what it is like to suffer without ever having suffered. Perhaps something like the following story will get your intuitions pumping in the impassibilist’s favor:

 

STORY: Imagine that the universe popped into existence only five minutes ago. The universe came into existence with all the appearance of age, including a whole host of memories and psychological states, etc., that lead the inhabitants of the universe to believe that it is in fact 13.5 billion years old. Imagine that Bill finds himself in this universe with the distinct memory of having his foot caught in a bear trap fifteen years ago. The memory of this experience does not cause Bill any pain or discomfort at present. However, Bill does understand what it is like to experience having his foot caught in a bear trap.

 

The impassibilist might insist that Bill understands what it is like to suffer even though his understanding of suffering is not based on any actual experience of suffering. The goal of this thought experiment is to give the impassible God comprehension of Sally’s suffering without God’s actually experience Sally or her conscious states in order to help the impassible God satisfy the desire for union with the beloved. The passibilist finds this suggestion to be perplexing to say the least. This is because there is a deep disanalogy in the thought experiment between Bill and God.

 

In the thought experiment, Bill is not in an analogous epistemic situation to that of an impassible God. Even though Bill does not actually experience suffering, Bill is at least capable of suffering. The ability of Bill to suffer is one way a philosopher might try to justify the claim that Bill understands what it is like to suffer. Thus, one point of disanalogy is this: Bill has the ability to suffer whereas the impassible God lacks the ability to suffer. Yet there is another point of disanalogy: an omniscient and impassible God knows that it is metaphysically impossible for Him to suffer. The impassible God can never be in the same epistemic state as Bill because He knows His nature well enough to know that such a thing is impossible. (Ibid., 48-49, emphasis in bold added)