Thursday, July 29, 2021

Is the "Perfect Law" in James 1:25 the New Testament Texts?

In an attempt to support the doctrine of Sola Scriptura, Weldon Lanfield (ex-RLDS who converted to the Church of Christ [“Cambellites”]) wrote:

 

James expressed the finality and completeness of the New Testament in this manner: “But whoso looketh into the perfect law of liberty, and continueth therein, he being not a forgetful hearer, but a doer of the work, this man shall be blessed in his deed” (James 1:25). By referring to the New Testament as “perfect,” the passage tells us first that it has no room for improvement. Secondly, it is complete, since perfection implies completeness. The original term for “perfect” in this passage is teleion, which means “having reached its end, finished, complete, perfect.” Unquestionably, the wording of James rules out further periods of revelation. (Weldon Langfield, The Truth About Mormonism: A Former Adherent Analyzes the LDS Faith [Bakersfield, Calif.: Weldon Langfield Publications, 1991], 65-66)

 

There are a number of problems with Langfield’s comments on Jas 1:25. Firstly, James cannot be speaking of the New Testament as not all of the 27 books of the New Testament were inscripturated when James wrote his epistle. If Langfield’s comments are correct, this would mean that Jas 1:25 precludes any further books being divinely revealed, resulting in Langfield having to accept a truncated New Testament canon!

 

Furthermore, as discussed in the section "Falling at the First Hurdle: Why Sola Scriptura is an exegetical impossibility" in my lengthy essay, Not By Scripture Alone: A Latter-day Saint Refutation of Sola Scriptura, for Sola Scriptura to be operative as the (final/ultimate) rule of faith, there must first be tota scriptura (i.e., all of the books of scripture must first be inscripturated). As James was writing at a time of special revelation, of all the potential exegetical possibilities of this verse, the “pro-Sola Scriptura” interpretation is not an exegetical possibility.

 

According to non-LDS scholars, while there is some debate as to the meaning of the term “the perfect law,” all are agreed that it is not the New Testament texts. Consider the following:

 

The “perfect law” (νόμον τέλειον) could have several referents. James could be discussing the Torah, the Torah plus Christ, the basic gospel message, or any combination of the three. He adds a further modifier, though, which aids in the identification—the descriptive genitive “of liberty” (τῆς ἐλευθερίας)—demonstrating that this law does not trap, bind, or weigh one down but is characterized by freedom. We would argue that this most likely refers to the gospel message, particularly in its role as fulfilling the OT prophecies about a new or renewed covenant (see esp. Jer 31:31–34). All of the qualifications given in this verse make it unlikely that just the Mosaic law is in view, but rather something that contrasts with or at least adds to it. It is true that similar qualifiers can be found in Jewish literature describing Torah pure and simple (see esp. Aboth 6:2; b. B. Metz. 85b), but when Jas 2:12 refers again to the law of liberty, it is in clear contrast to Old Testament laws (2:11). Even here, v. 25 functions as the concluding positive model to vv. 22–25, just as v. 21b did for vv. 20–21, so it seems likely that the law of liberty must correspond to the implanted word. Additionally, the transition from “word” to “law” occurs within this small pericope that is clearly one section, thus strengthening the correspondence.

 

At the same time, James would not likely have retained the term “law” if the Hebrew Scriptures did not also feature in his thinking. Thus Davids defines the law of liberty as “the OT ethic as explained and altered by Jesus.” Moo concurs, explaining that “the addition of the word ‘perfect’ connotes the law in its eschatological, ‘perfected’ form, while the qualification ‘that gives freedom’ refers to the new covenant promise of the law written on the heart” and “accompanied by a work of the Spirit enabling obedience to that law for the first time.” The earlier this letter is and the more Jewish James’s communities are, the more likely the Hebrew Scriptures form an integral part of “the perfect law of liberty,” even if they must be interpreted in light of the coming of the Messiah and his revelation. (Craig L. Blomberg and Mariam J. Kamell, James [Zondervan Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament 16; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 2008], 91-92)

 

into the perfect law of freedom: The law (nomos) has now replaced the mirror as that into which the person gazes. This is the first mention of nomos in James. In 2:9, 10, 11, and 4:11, it appears absolutely. In 2:8, it is called “the royal law” and in 2:12, the “law of freedom.” Here, James combines two terms: teleios (“perfect”) must obviously be associated with the use of the same word in 1:4 and 1:17. God is the source of “every perfect gift,” and the law, for James, is certainly among them. The praise of God’s law is frequent both in Torah itself and in later Jewish literature. LXX Ps 18:8 calls the law amōmos, i.e., without fault/perfect. LXX Ps 118 elaborates the ways the law mediates the qualities of God: it is a source of mercy (118:29), a light (118:105; see Prov 6:23), and truth (118:43). The Ep. Arist. 31 declares the law “full of wisdom and free from all blemish.” That the observance of the law is, in turn, to be associated with freedom (eleutheria) is emphasized by Philo, That Every Good Man is Free 45, 4 Macc 5:22–26; 14:2; PA 3:5; 6:2. It will be remembered that Paul also can characterize nomos as “spiritual” (Rom 7:14) and “good” (Rom 7:16; see 1 Tim 1:8) and the entolē (“commandment”) as “holy and righteous and good” (Rom 7:12). The position that obedience to the law renders a person free reminds some commentators (e.g., Dibelius, 116–18; Mayor, 73–74) of the Stoic principle that only obeying the law of nature makes a person truly free and that, therefore, only the sage is truly free (see Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers [Zeno] VII,121; Epictetus, Discourses IV, 1, 1; Seneca, On the Blessed Life 15:7; Plutarch, To an Uneducated Ruler 3 [Mor. 780C]), but the idea is widespread enough—as the examples from Jewish literature attest—to make any direct dependence on Stoic ideas unnecessary. Of more pertinence is the question of what James includes within the concept of nomos. At the very least, the use of the figure of the mirror suggests that he saw it as containing exempla of moral behavior (see 2:20–26; 5:10–11; 5:16–18), as was seen by Oecumenius. Bede takes the “law of liberty” to mean the grace of the Gospel, and Theophylact identifies it with the “Law of Christ.” (Luke Timothy Johnson, The Letter of James: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary [AYB 37A; New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008], 209)

 

The blessed person looks into “the perfect law of liberty”; this expression is a major interpretive problem for James. On the one hand, it is well known that the Stoics saw life according to the rule of reason, i.e. the law of nature, as a life of freedom (so Epict. 4.1.158; Seneca Vit. 15.7; Cicero Parad. 34; cf. H. Schlier, TDNT II, 493–496; J. Blunck, DNTT I, 715–716). Thus it is quite reasonable to see James’s phrase as linguistically possible in the Stoic world, although this expression has not yet been found (cf. Dibelius, 116–117). It is also true that Philo took the Stoic concept and identified it more or less with the law of Moses (Op. Mund. 3; Vit. Mos. 2.48) and correlated the keeping of that law with freedom (Omn. Prob. Lib. 45; cf. 4 Macc. 14:2), so that even within some Jewish circles such Stoic influence was possible. On the other hand, there is absolutely no question that Jews saw their law as perfect (Pss. 19:7; 119; Aristeas 31; Rom. 7:12), that they found joy in its observance (Pss. 1:2; 19:7–11; 40:6–8; Pss 119; Sir. 6:23–31; 51:13–22), and even that they saw the law giving freedom (m. Ab. 3:5; 6:2; B. K. 8:6; b. B. M. 85b). E. Stauffer, “Gesetz,” claims to find the very expression “law of freedom” in 1QS 10:6, 8, 11, and this has been supported by S. Légasse, 338–339. But while Légasse’s general point of the freedom which the sectaries found in their law is true enough, Nauck, “Lex,” and Nötscher have convincingly proved that this exact citation must be translated “inscribed law” as in Ex. 32:16 before rabbinic exegesis, which Nötscher believes to be a reaction to Christian claims. Still, even without the exact phrase, these Jewish parallels mean that although the author freely uses words and phrases from the general Hellenistic pool to which the Stoics added their share, unless one finds specific Stoic concepts (such as natural law or passionless life) it is more likely that he is still within a Jewish Christian world (cf. Bonhöffer, 193: “With the exception of individual expressions and the relatively good Greek in which it is written, one will hardly discover a trace of Hellenistic influence in James”).

 

It is within this Jewish world that one can understand the phrase. For the Jewish Christian the law is still the will of God, but Messiah has come and perfected it and given his new law (cf. Davies, Torah). Thus one finds the Sermon on the Mount (especially Mt. 5:17) and other similar passages in the early Christian tradition that present Christ as the giver of a new or renewed law. James’s contact with the tradition behind the Sermon on the Mount is certain (see Introduction, 47–48), and one must agree with Davies that James sees Jesus’ reinterpretation of the law as a new law (cf. 2:8, royal law; Davies, Setting, 402–405; Schnackenburg, 349–352). Similar conceptions of Jesus’ teaching appear in Barn. 2:6; Hermas Vis. 1.3; Iren. Haer. 4.34.4; but they also are not lacking in Paul. Certainly Paul was against legalism, the use of the law as a way of salvation—that could only lead to death—but when it came to the ethical life of the Christian, it was another matter. On that topic Paul draws on the earlier Christian tradition in terms similar to James (Gal. 5:13, which combines freedom and law; Gal. 6:2; 1 Cor. 9:21; and 1 Cor. 7:10, 25, where a dominical saying ends the discussion; cf. Dibelius, 119). Although in James one is in a different area of Christianity than in Paul, he nonetheless finds similar ideas, especially when looking at what Paul says about James’s sphere of concern (cf. Eckart, 521–526).

 

The one who looks and remains in the law of freedom, i.e. the OT ethic as explained and altered by Jesus, is clearly defined: he is one who does not simply hear and forget, but practices what he hears. Both expressions are unusual Greek: ἀκροατὴς ἐπιλησμονῆς (the latter word found in biblical literature only in Sir. 11:27) is a Semitism, “hearer of forgetfulness,” and ποιητὴς ἔργου is apparently built so as to make an obvious parallel (the problem is that there is a change from a genitive of quality to an objective genitive; cf. Mayor, 74; but while the Greek is unusual the meaning is clear enough; cf. m. Ab. 3:8 and the citations in Str-B III, 754).

 

Such an obedient Christian is pronounced μακάριος (another term with a Semitic background as in 1:12; Matthew 5; Psalm 1; Is. 56:2, etc.) in his deeds (οὗτος is for emphasis: this person, the doer, in contrast to the hearer only). Does this eschatological type of pronouncement refer to blessing as one acts or a future joy at the parousia (Schrage, 23)? The future ἔσται, the use of μακάριος in 1:12, and the normal eschatology of James make one agree with Mussner, 110, that this saying is future-oriented: there is an eschatological blessing in store for the one whose deeds (ποιήσις, hapax legomenon in the NT) are the doing of the law of freedom, the teaching of Jesus. (Peter H. Davids, The Epistle of James: A Commentary on the Greek Text [New International Greek Testament Commentary; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1982], 99-100)

 

With respect to the use of τελιος, while Langfield believes this supports his thesis, it actually serves to refute him even further. How so? Consider Jas 1:4:

 

And let endurance have its perfect result, so that you may be perfect and complete, lacking in nothing. (NASB)

 

The Greek terms "perfect" and "complete" are τελειος and ολοκληρος. These are very strong adjectives to be used to describe something. The problem here is that they are used to describe, not Scripture (or just the New Testament, per Langfield’s interpretation of Jas 1:25), but endurance. Absolutising Jas 1:4 in the way that Sola Scriptura apologists like Langfield absolutise 2 Tim 3:16-17 and Jas 1:24, endurance/patience is all that is needed to live a Christian life to the exclusion of Scripture, which, of course, is absurd, but is a strong warning against the eisegesis apologists like Webster, King, White, and others engage in, as I document in my essay.

 

On this topic, Catholic apologist Trent Horn wrote the following in his The Case for Catholicism:

 

In 2 Timothy 2:21 Paul says that if Timothy keeps himself from bad influences, “he will be a vessel for noble use, consecrated and useful to the master of the house, ready for any good work.” The Greek phrase “every good work” (pan ergon agathon) is identical to what is used in 2 Timothy 3:17, but not Protestant would claim that a Christian only needs to stay away from bad influences in order to live the Christian life. James 1:4 uses stronger language to describe how endurance makes one “perfect” (teleioi) and “complete” (holokeroi) rather than “equips” believers but of course our faith does not rest on the virtue of patience alone. (Trent Horn, The Case for Catholicism: Answers to Classic and Contemporary Protestant Objections [San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2017], 27)

 

In a footnote (Ibid., 27 n. 42), Horn refutes an attempted “counter” to an appeal to Jas 1:4 by Eric Svendsen (a 4 1/2-point Calvinist) in his hit-and-miss book Evangelical Answers:

 

Svendsen objects, saying, “The Greek word used here is different than that found in [2] Tim 3:17 ([teleos] is used, not [artios]” (Ibid., 138), but this is actually worse for the Protestant apologist because teleos communicates a stronger sense of completeness than artios (which the New American Standard Bible renders in 2 Timothy 3:17 as “adequate”). Svendsen then comments that James 1:4 only says that patience perfects a man of God in relation to “the ‘testing of your faith’ whereas Scripture makes the man of God ‘fully equipped’ to ‘teach, rebuke, correct, and train’” (Ibid. 139). But a person’s faith can certainly be tested by someone who challenges it and requires correction or proper teaching in response Therefore, this does not change the fact that Protestant arguments for sola scriptura based on 2 Timothy 3:16-17 can also be applied, in the style of argumentum ad absurdum, to James 1:4 and show that if patience is not a rule of faith despite its ability to perfect us in the ace of trials, then Scripture is not a sole rule of faith despite its ability to equip us to teach and correct others.

 

It should be obvious that Jas 1:25 is not talking about the New Testament texts, nor does it support the formal sufficiency of the Bible. Langfield is guilty of eisegesis.


Further Reading


Not By Scripture Alone: A Latter-day Saint Refutation of Sola Scriptura