Wednesday, October 13, 2021

Jonathan MS Pearce on Why One Cannot Affirm Libertarian Free Will and Creation Out of Nothing (Ex Nihilo)

  

The Kalam Cosmological Argument and Libertarian Free Will are incompatible

 

Essentially, the KCA implies by assertion that you cannot have ex nihilo creation—than an event cannot be created out of nothing, and by nothing. Only God, Craig and others suppose, can do this. And thus the universe, created out of nothing (arguably) was created ex nihilo by God. The causal chain goes back to the Big Bang and stops. How can this be explained? Well, since causality must continue regressing backwards, if there is a beginning to causality, it can only explained by God.

 

However, the theist is usually, if not a Calvinist, an adherent to the notion of libertarian free will (LFW). By this, I mean that they believe an agent could make free choices—could have done otherwise. This implies that the agent is the originator of a freely willed decision, or the causal chain in a decision. The determinist, on the other hand, believes that every effect has a cause and that that cause is itself an effect or a prior cause, and this goes back to the Big Bang or similar starting point where the physics breaks down, or some other such situation (quantum cosmological loop or suchlike). As Roderick Chisholm claims (Chisholm, as cited in Owen Flanagan, The Problem of the Soul: Two Visions of Mind and How to Reconcile Them [New York: Basic Books, 2003], ix) that when we act freely, we exercise:

 

. . . a prerogative which some would attribute only to God: each of us, when we act, is a prime mover unmoved. In doing what we do, we cause certain things to happen, and nothing—or no one—causes us to cause those events to happen.

 

You cannot get clearer language that ties libertarian free will to the Kalam in insisting on there being uncaused causation. Chisholm might not claim that God is the only prime mover, but most theists, including Craig, certainly do. This is the talk of a prime mover, and God is supposed to be the only one. In case o=you are doubting this, here is Robert Kane, the famous naturalist philosopher rare in his insistence on the existence of LFW (Robert Kane, The Significance of Free Will [New York: Oxford University Press, 1996], 4):

 

Free will . . . is the power of agents to be the ultimate creators or originators and sustainers of their own ends or purposes . . . . when we trace the causal or explanatory chains of action back to their sources in the purposes of free agents, these causal chains must come to an end or terminate in the willings (choices, decisions, or efforts) of the agents, which cause or bring about their purposes.

 

The point is that the denier of LFW claims that the agent is themselves part of a larger causal chain which explains why the agent did what they did; that the reasons were derived from what is known as the causal circumstance—the snapshot of the universe at that prior moment of the events.

 

On the other hand, the theist generally believes that the causal chain starts with the agent; that they originate the causal chain. This allows them ownership over the decision so that the reason for the decision cannot be further deferred to other (antecedent) causes. However, this means that the agent is creating something out of nothing. There is ex nihilo creation, since no prior reason can be given to explain the agent’s decision, otherwise we return to determinism.

 

Yet allowing for ex nihilo creation defies the opening premise of the KCA. William Lane Craig is always espousing the intuitive “truth” (and we know how unreliable institution can be) of the metaphysical claim that ex nihilo nihil fit—out of nothing, nothing is made. But the theist is pretty much always an adherent of the KCA and LFW (it is worth looking at the meta-data for the philpapers philosophical survey to see evidence of this)! Indeed, as Chisholm and Kane point out, agents have to be originators of causality if LFW and ultimate responsibility are to hold. But Craig insists that this is impossible, since only God can be a prime mover, and, unmoved, move the universe.

 

Potential Objections

 

The theist seems to use one of two defences here:

 

1) That prior cause merely influence but do not define the decision

 

2) That the agent is itself a cause—and that this is fine. For example, there is the theory of agent causation supposing that agents are different to events and event causation. People can somehow ground causal chains and decisions in a way which is different to, say, a boulder rolling down a hill, hitting a tree and a pine-cone falling out. That kind of causality has no agency.

 

1) can easily be answered in the following way.

 

One of the most common defences of Libertarian Free Will (or contra-causal free will) is that I sometimes term the 80-20% approach. Most people, to some degree or another, accept that our lives are at least somewhat and, in most cases, a good deal influenced. This may be by genetic, biological or environmental factors. It is hard to deny that, at the point of making a decision, we aren’t having our decision influenced by external or internal motivators. This is expressed often as a claim like “Well, we are influenced quite a bit, but we still have some degree of free will” or “I think we are 80% determined, but 20% of our decision-making is freely willed”. There is this idea that the will can override causality in some force of agency.

 

I will now show thy this approach is entirely incoherent.

 

Before looking at this particular point, it is worth laying out the issue of causality and free will. Contra-causal free will is so called because it appears to want to break the rules of causality. Causality is a more difficult concept than many give credit for as you can see by this very book. Taken in its simple manner of understanding, it presents this issue, known in some parts as the Dilemma of Determinism (Paul Russell, Freedom and Moral Sentiment, 1995, p. 14):

 

. . . the well-known dilemma of determinism. One horn of this dilemma is the argument that if an action was caused or necessitated, then it could not have been done freely, and hence the agent is not responsible for it. The other horn is the argument that if the action was not caused, then it is inexplicable and random, and thus it cannot be attributed to the agent, and hence, again, the agent cannot be responsible for it. In other words, if our actions are caused, then we cannot be responsible for them; if they are not caused, we cannot be responsible for them. Whether we affirm or deny necessity and determinism, it is impossible to make any coherent sense of moral freedom and responsibility.

 

What this means is that an action is either caused or it’s random. To claim it is caused but not determined is nonsensical. The basis of rejecting LFW is this, since neither option allows for free will. To think otherwise would imply that the agent caused the action but that it wasn’t determined; that the agent could have done otherwise. For example, at 9:15am this morning in the universe, when the phone rang, I could have picked it up, or I could not have done. I had the ability to do either. Or, at t=1 in causal circumstance CC the agent could have done X or Y. If the agent had done X and we continued the universe until t=10 and then rewound the universe, do you know what, he could have done Y.

 

The problem with this is that with CC at t=1, the agent had a set of reasons for doing X. This is what determined that he chose X. The universe up until that moment, his genes and biology, the environment up to every single atom, had causal influence to produce the “choice” of doing X. So if we went on 10 minutes and then rewound at CC t=1, considering the entire universe would be identical, and the person identical, what could cause the agent to choose Y and not X? In order to do so, the agent would have to be ever so slightly different, or the environment (universe) would have to be different. In order to claim that the agent could have done differently would surely require a reason. Since a freely willed action cannot be randomly defined, as the agent has no ownership over random, then there must necessarily be a reason.

 

Causality takes on the form of a chain of events, when seen in its simplest (and I argue in this book, erroneous) form., but it is useful for explaining the point here. A causes B which causes C and then D. This goes back until the beginning of the universe or some such similar causal scenario. What Libertarian free willers believe is that since the causal chain cannot regress back to the Big Bang or similar, as this implies determinism, the agent must be the originator of the causal chain. Let’s look at this in terms of “why” questions. Why did D happen? Because of C. Why C? Because of B, and so on. In the case of an agent, we cannot keep asking the why question because we keep going back and back, beyond the decision. So at some point, the agent has to be ultimately causally (and thus morally, it is argued) responsible for the decision—the originator of the causal chain. The problem is that without the ability to answer the why questions, the basis of the causal chain becomes “just because” which is synonymous with random or irrationality. This is why, in Freedom Evolves, philosopher Daniel Dennett claims that free will requires determinism since without it, there is no reason for an action, and it becomes meaningless.

 

Which is all good and well, but what about the issue at hand? Well, when people claim we are, say, 80% determined, but that 20% of an action is still freely willed, we have exactly the same problem—we have just moved that argument into a smaller paradigm, into the 20%. Assuming that we forget the 80% fraction which is determined so not being of interest to the LFWer, we are left with the 20%. But this is devoid of determining reasons. So what, then, is the basis of that 20% in making the decision? The agent cannot say, “Well my genetically determined impulses urged me to A, my previous experience of this urged me towards A, but I was left with a 20% fraction which overcame these factors and made me do B” because he still needs to establish the decision as being reasonable; as having causal reasoning behind it. So if that 20% is not just random or unknown )but still grounded in something) and had any meaning, then it would be reasoned! The two horns of the Dilemma of Determinism raise their ugly heads again. We are left with reasoned actions or actions without reason, neither of which give the LFWer the moral responsibility that they are looking for.

 

It is not so much the scientific reasoning and evidence that the LFWer has to contend with (which is mountainous, and enough in its own right) but the metaphysical reasoning about causality which demands serious attention.

 

2) (that the agent is itself a cause—agent causation) is a non-starter, as far as I am concerned. Agent causation is a theory developed by philosophers like Roderick Chisholm half a century ago. I am not that sure that many people adhered to it these days, preferring models like event causation (such that people are reliant on brain states which are physical events). It seems there is no good reason for asserting that agents are causally different to standard events. One can appeal to some kind of dualism, but causality is metaphysical as a concept, and dualistic substances would surely need to “adhere” to it in the same way matter does. To merely suppose an agent can be sufficient explanation for the cause of a decision is particularly question-beginning. Without causal reasons, a decision grounded in no reason other than “the agent” is synonymous with random. Brain events, genetics and biology, we know, cause agents to make the decisions they do. Mixed with the environment, and you have a causal circumstance and determinism.

 

We know, for example, that in the Benjamin Libet style experiments (where we can observe that the brain kicks into gear before the conscious brain “decides” to press a button), we can actually ask the subject to press a left or right button and send transcortical stimulation (magnetic stimulation) in to the brain and make the agent choose left or right, depending in where we send it. The agent then assigns their own agency to that afterwards claiming that they freely chose left or right. These are just the tip of a very large iceberg which extends to the sea floor of causal determination. . . the agent cannot be asserted as an entity able to start a causal chain, because this assumes that a causal reason is given for a causal chain, but in a causal vacuum. There can simply be no sense to be made of rational agent origination.

 

This all means that someone who subscribes to the KCA cannot consistently and coherently be a subscriber to libertarian free will. (Jonathan MS Pearce, Did God Create the Universe from Nothing? Countering William Lane Craig’s Kalam Cosmological Argument [Onus Books, 2016], 39-45, 46)