II.
What Were the Causes of the First Sin?
The first sin of man had its
origin, not in God, but was brought about by the instigation of the devil, and
the free will of man. The devil tempted man to fall away from God; and man, yielding
to this temptation, willingly separated himself from God. And although God left
man to himself in this temptation, yet he is not the cause of the fall, the
sin, or the destruction of man; because, in this desertion, he neither
designed, nor accomplished any of these things. He merely put man upon trial,
to show that he is entirely unable to do, or to retain aught that is good, if
he is not preserved and controlled by the Holy Spirit; and with this, his
trial, God, in just judgment, permitted
the sin of man to concur. [Objection:] But God withdrew, from man, his grace,
in the trial through which he was called to pass, so that man could not but fall.
Therefore, God was the cause of the fall of man. Ans. The major proposition is
true only of him who withholds grace, when he is obligated not to withdraw it;
who takes it from him who is desirous of it, and does not wilfully reject it;
and who withholds it out of malice. But it is not true of him who is not bound
to preserve the grace which he at first gave, and who does not withdraw it from
him who desires it, but only from him who is willing for him so to do, and who,
of his own account, rejects the grace that is proffered him; and who does not,
therefore, withhold it because he envies the sinner righteousness and eternal
life; but that he may make a trial of him to whom he has imparted his grace. He
who thus forsakes anyone, is not the cause of sin, even though it necessarily follows
this desertion and withdrawal of grace. And in as much as God withheld his
grace from man in the time of his temptation, not in the first, but in the last
manner just described, he is not the cause of his sin and destruction; but man
alone is guilty for wilfully rejecting the grace of God. . . .
IV.
Why Did God Permit Sin?
God had the power of preserving
man from falling, if he had willed so to doubt he permitted him to fall, that
is, he did not grant him the grace of resisting the temptation of the devil,
for these two reasons: first, that he might furnish an exhibition of the
weakness of the creature, when he left to himself, and not preserved in original
righteousness by his Creator; and secondly, that by this occasion, God might
display his goodness, mercy, and grace, in saving, through Christ, all them
that believe; and manifest his justice and power in punishing the wicked and
reprobate for their sins, as it is said, “God hath concluded them all in unbelief,
that he might have mercy upon all, and that every mouth might be stopped.” “What
if God, willing to shew his wrath, and to make his power known, endured with
much long-suffering, the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction; and that he
might make known the riches of his glory on the vessel of mercy, which he had afore
prepared unto glory.” (Rom. 11:32; 9:22.) (The Commentary of Zacharias
Ursinus: On the Heidelberg Catechism—The Protestant Christian Doctrines, Dating
to 1563 [trans. G. W. Williard; Pantianos Classics, 1888], 54, 55-56)
3. It remains to be demonstrated that
God is not the author of sin. There are some who argue: God willed I thus, and
if he had not willed it, we had not sinned. Who can resist his power? Again:
When God had the power to present us from sinning, and did not, he is the
author of our sins. These are the cavils, the foul slanders, and sophisms of
the wicked. God might, indeed, by his absolute power, prevent evil; but he will
not wrong and despoil his own creature, man, whom he created righteous and
holy. He acts with man in a manner that corresponds with the nature with which
he has endowed him hence he proposes laws to which he attaches rewards and
punishments—he commands us to embrace the good and shun the evil; and that we
may do this, he both grants his grace, without which we can do nothing, and
also encourages our diligence and partaker of her sin. The Scriptures teach
this, where it is said, “And when the woman saw that the tree was good for food,
and that it was pleasant to the eyes, and a true to be desired to make one wise,
she took of the fruit therefore and did not eat, and gave also unto her husband
with her, and he did not eat.” (Gen. 3:6.)
Here we have the beginning of
evil, the devil; and that which moved the will of man, viz: the false praise and
commendation of the devil, and therefore, a manifest lie; and the pleasant and
attractive appearance of the tree. Hence, Adam and Eve did, of their own choice
and free will, what they did, being deceived by the hope of obtaining greater
and more excellent wisdom, which the seducer had falsely and deceptively
promised. (Ibid., 71)
The third objection is in respect to
contradictory wills.
He who, in his secret counsel,
will and prohibits by his law the same work, to him there are contradictory
wills. But in God there are no contradictory wills. Therefore he does not, by
his secret determination, will those things which he prohibits in his law, as
robbery, murder, lust, theft, &c. Ans. 1. We grant the whole
argument in as far as these things are done by creatures contrary to the law,
and are sins. In this sense God neither wills nor approves of them, but only in
as far as they are certain motions and punishments of the wicked. 2. We
must make a distinction in reference to the major proposition; for it is
contradictory to say he wills and forbids the same work in the same respect,
and with the same end. God wills and forbids the same things, but in a
different respect, and with a different end. He willed, for instance, the
selling of Joseph in as far as it was the occasion of his elevation, the
preservation of the family of Jacob and the fulfillment of the prophecies
concerning the bondage of the seed of Abraham in Egypt. But in as far as he was
sent away by the hated of his brethren, he did not will it, but denounced and condemned
it as horrible fratricide. And so of the other examples we have adduced. The
fourth objection relates to liberty and contingency and contingency. That which
is done by the immutable decree of God cannot be done contingently and freely,
but necessarily. But many things are done contingently and freely. Therefore
many things are not done by the immutable decree and providence of God, or else
liberty and contingency are taken away. Ans. 1. We reply to the major:
what which is done by the unchangeable decree of God cannot be done
contingently, viz: in respect to the first cause, or in respect to the same
immutable divine decree; yet it may be done contingently in respect to order
between a changeable cause and its effect: just as necessity is the order
between a necessary cause and its effect. Hence the cause must be of the same character
as the effect. But the same effect may proceed from a changeable and necessary
cause in different respects, as is the case with all things which God does
through his creatures; of which both God and his creates are the cause. Thus in
respect to God there is an unchangeable order between cause and effect; but in
respect to creatures, there is a changeable order between the cause and the same
effect. Hence in regard to God it is necessary, but in regard to the creature
it is contingent in the same effect. Therefore it is not absurd that the same
effect should be said to be necessary and contingent in respect to different
causes, that is, in respect to an unchangeable first cause acting necessarily,
and in respect to a changeable second cause acting contingently. 2. We
also deny what is said in the major that that is not done, or may be done
freely which is done by the immutable decree of God. For it is not immutability,
but constraint; or it is not the necessity of unchangeableness, but that of
constraint which take away liberty. God is unchangeably and necessarily good,
and yet he is at the same time most freely good: the devils are unchangeably
and necessarily evil; and yet they are evil, and do that which is evil with the
greatest freedom of the will. (Ibid., 177)