As most critics of Latter-day Saint theology come from Reformed theology, I think it would be wise to provide the definitions of infralapsarianism, supralapsarianism, and imputation from an informed Reformed theologian:
infra lapsum: below or subsequent to the fall; as opposed to supra lapsum (q.v.); the usual identification of the human objects
of divine willing in the infralapsarian understanding of predestination,
according to which God eternally wills the salvation of some persons out of the
fallen mass of humanity. Some of the Reformed orthodox (e.g., Turretin, Institutio theologiae elencticae 4.9.3,
30) prefer to use the term in lapsu,
in the fall, rather than infra lapsum,
holding that the object of God’s eternal willing is not humanity after the fall
so much as humanity considered corporately in the fall. In this usage, the term
infra lapsum is reserved for those
who, like the Arminians, understand the object of divine willing as after the
fall and after the promise of redemption, and foreknown either as believers or
unbelievers. (Richard
A. Muller, Dictionary of Latin and Greek
Theological Terms: Drawn Principally from Protestant Scholastic Theology [Grand
Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, 2017], 172–173)
supra lapsum: above or prior to the fall; as opposed
to infra lapsum (q.v.). Two basic
views of predestination emerged from the development of Reformed doctrine in
the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries: (1) the supralapsarian
view, sometimes referred to as full double predestination (election and
reprobation being coordinate, albeit not causally parallel, aspects of the
decree); and (2) the infralapsarian view, which can indicate either a double or
a single predestination (in which election alone is identified as a positive
divine willing). Both views arise out of consideration of an eternal, logical
order of the things of the decree, or ordo
rerum decretarum (q.v.), in the mind of God: neither view, in other words,
argues for a temporal relationship of divine willing to the fall, as either
before or after it in time. The distinction between the supra- and
infralapsarian definitions lies in their understanding of the human objects of
the eternal divine willing.
According to the supralapsarian view, the election or reprobation of
individuals is logically prior to the divine ordination to permit the fall and,
in many formulations, prior also to the divine decree to create. The human
objects of divine willing are, accordingly, understood as possibilities that
are either creatable or as to be created and as capable of falling. Various of
the Reformed indicate that the supralapsarian view rests on an apex logicus (q.v.), or point of logic,
viz., that the goal or final cause of any process, although temporally
subsequent to the means used to reach it (including formal and material
causality), must be logically prior. If the final cause or goal of God’s
predestination is the manifestation of his mercy in the elect and his justice
in the reprobate, then creation and fall are understood as means to that end,
and the eternal decree of electing and reprobating must be prior. In one
typical form of the supralapsarian definition, in the divine mind, the human
subject of election and reprobation is thus conceived as creabilis et labilis, creatable and fallible, i.e., as a
possibility for creation and as capable of falling. As early as the late
sixteenth century, in the work of Francis Junius, the supralapsarian model
indicated that, given the modes of divine knowledge (see scientia Dei), God eternally knows his human creatures as creatable
(creabilis), to be created or made (condendus), created or made (conditus), and fallen (lapsus, q.v.). Some supralapsarian
definitions identify the human objects of divine willing in all of these modes;
others focus on election and reprobation as referring foundationally to human
beings as creabilis or condendus or conditus, logically prior to referencing them in their fallen
state. In all of the supralapsarian definitions, the prior purpose of God is
the manifestation of his glory in the mercy of election and the justice of
reprobation, while the creation itself and the decree to permit the fall are
secondary purposes, or means to the end, of election and reprobation. The
breadth of the supralapsarian definitions serves to explain how theologians
holding this view were consistently viewed as in conformity to the various
Reformed confessions, notably the Belgic Confession and the Canons of Dort,
which include infralapsarian definitions: as defined by Junius and others, the
supralapsarian model includes the infralapsarian and accepts it as God’s
knowledge of the objects of his willing according to the scientia voluntaria sive libera (q.v.).
The infralapsarian view, which is the confessional position of the
Reformed churches, places the divine will to create human beings with free will
and the decree to permit the fall prior to the election of some to salvation.
Thus, in the divine mind, the human object of election is viewed in eternity as
creatus et lapsus, created and
fallen. In this view, the prior purpose of God is the creation of human beings
for fellowship with himself, and the decree to elect some to salvation appears
as a means to the end of that fellowship, while reprobation stands as a just
divine willing not to elect some of the fallen descendants of Adam. The
infralapsarian perspective is frequently called single predestination because
some of its formulations represent God as electing some for salvation out of
the fallen mass of humanity and then not positively decreeing reprobation but
passing over the rest, leaving them in their sin to their own damnation. It
more typically, however, takes the form of a double predestination, with
election and reprobation as coordinate decrees. The infralapsarian doctrine of
predestination arises out of the problem of the fall and salvation by grace,
whereas the supralapsarian teaching arises out of a more abstract consideration
of the eternity and omnipotence of God, of the fullness of divine knowledge,
and of the priority of God’s ends over the means employed to achieve them. (Ibid., 348-50)
imputatio: imputation, an act of attribution; specifically, either (1) imputatio peccati, the imputation of
sin, or (2) imputatio satisfactionis
Christi, the imputation of the satisfaction of Christ, which are parallel
imputations following a pattern reminiscent of the patristic conception of recapitulatio (q.v.).
Imputatio peccati is distinguished
into imputatio mediata and imputatio immediata, mediate and
immediate imputation. Mediate imputation refers to the divine attribution of
sinfulness to all human beings because of their corruptio haereditaria, or hereditary corruption. The imputation is
mediate, since it is contingent upon the natural corruption of individual human
beings. Immediate imputation, by contrast, refers to the divine attribution of
sinfulness to human beings because of the fall; i.e., it is the immediate
attribution of the fall itself to all the progeny of Adam and Eve, apart from
their hereditary corruption. The imputation is immediate because it is not
contingent upon the corruption of individual human beings. Scholastic
Lutheranism tended to recognize both an imputatio
mediata and an imputatio immediata;
the Reformed, however, in accordance with the principles of covenant theology
and their view of Adam as federal head, tended toward imputatio immediata to the exclusion of a theory of mediate
imputation. Only the renegade school of Saumur tended in the opposite
direction, teaching an imputatio mediata
only. This view was rejected by the orthodox Reformed as standing in conflict
with and prejudicial to the imputatio
satisfactionis Christi. In the era of orthodoxy both the Socinians and the
Arminians denied any imputatio peccati.
Imputatio
satisfactionis Christi is the objective basis of justification by
grace through faith. Christ’s payment for sin is imputed to the faithful, who
could not of themselves make payment; the unrighteous are accounted righteous
on the grounds of their faith. The orthodox Reformed argued that, since
Christ’s righteous satisfaction was imputed immediately to believers without
any righteousness being present in or satisfaction made by them before the
imputation, the imputation of sin must also be immediate; if not, injustice
would be done to Christ’s work. (Ibid., 164-65)