Saturday, August 5, 2023

Blake Ostler on the Problems of Petitionary Prayer in Classical Theism

[Classical Theists] argue that God in the timeless eternity of the “eternal now” or at En, engages in a logical sequence but not a chronological movement in dialogue. The timeless deity at En decides that Moses will hear him say, at a temporal time T1, that he intends to destroy Israel; and next, also at En, God hears Moses object at a time T2, and then God decides, also at EN, that Moses will hear him relent at temporal moment T3. However, the argument that there is merely a logical and not chronological sequence here is impossible, for at the very same moment En, God is in a state of not having yet formulated his response to Moses and of having already formulated his response—because if God is interacting with Moses, then his response is necessarily dependent on what Moses does and not vice versa. It follows that Moses’s actions are all logically prior to God’s responses, so that God’s response is logically dependent on what Moses does in the logical sequence. But this sequence entails that in the same moment of En God has both already (in a sense of logical priority) responded and also not yet formed the response because he is waiting (again in a sense of logical priority) on Moses to speak.

 

There are two distinct states of being attributed to an atemporal God in responsive prayer—a state of not yet having decided his response because Moses is speaking and he is listening to him, and a state of having already responded to the entire dialogue-sequence. Yet God cannot change form not-yet-having-decided to having-already-decided what he will response to Moses, for where there is no temporal sequence in time there cannot be any change of states of God’s intrinsic being. Thus, I cannot make any sense of God’s responding if God is timeless. The concept of responding entails that God has listened to the human prayer, and therefore the prayer is logically prior to God’s response. God’s decision about how to respond is logically dependent on the prayer and therefore logically a posteriori or logically after the prayer. Thus, if God responds, then his knowledge about what happens in the world is dependent on what in fact happens in the world. The problem is that God also sees his responses as a part of his knowledge about what happens in the world—for some of what happens in the world is supposedly dependent on God’s responses to prayer. But if God “sees” his responses to prayer as a basis for his responses and therefore sees his responses as logically prior to forming his responses, then God cannot respond at all, for the response is already (in a logical sense of priority) included in his knowledge of this world.

 

Blake T. Ostler, Exploring Mormon Thought: The Problems of Theism and the Love of God (Salt Lake City: Greg Kofford Books, 2006), 62-63