For what hinders me, I assume the same
minor premise, namely, “the Father is greater by nature,” and then add that “by
nature He is not absolutely greater, nor Father,” and then conclude that “the
greater is not absolutely greater,” or that “being the Father” does not “absolutely”
entail “being the Father.” (Maximus the Confessor, Ambigua to John: Ambiguum 25,
in On Difficulties in the Church Fathers: The Ambigua, 2 vols. [trans.
Nicholas Constas; Dumbarton Oaks Medieval Library; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 2014], 2:15)
Gregory the Theologian, Or. 29.15 (SC
250:208, II. 7-11). Gregory’s point turns on a principle of Aristotelian logic
(Cat 1a), i.e., whether or not an individual can belong to a species or
class only if it shares all the characteristics of every member of that species
or class. Aristotle found this to be a false conclusion, and Gregory agreed.
Thus, conceding some differences in particulars (e.g., that in some ways the
Father is superior to the Son) does not demand that the individual is the
species to be reclassified. As Gregory states later in this section of his
oration, the Arian fallacy lies in arguing from the particular to the general,
from a conditioned to an unconditioned term, which Gregory says “is like saying
‘X’ is a dead man,’ and then drawing the conclusion: ‘mankind without
qualification is dead’”; see Norris, Faith Gives Fullness to Reasoning,
150-151. (Ibid., 354 n. 1)
