Jewish/Rabbinical Teachings Concerning the Sabbath and Animals (cf. Matt 12:11/Luke 13:15)

  

12:11: What person is there among you who has a sheep and, if it were to fall into a pit on the Sabbath, will not grab it and pull it up?

 

The relevant stipulations here are the following:

 

Babylonian Talmud Šabbat 128B: Rab Judah († 299) said that Rab († 247) said, “If a piece of livestock has fallen into a water ditch (on the Sabbath), one brings blankets and cushions and lays them under it. If it comes up, it comes up (there is no need to worry about any desecration of the Sabbath).” It was objected, “If a piece of livestock has fallen into a water ditch, one cares for it with food in its place (exactly where it is), lest it die. With food, yes; with blankets and cushions, no!” There is no contradiction here: in the one case it is possible to take care of the animal with food, in the other case it is not possible. If it is possible, yes (one does it); but if it is not possible, one brings blankets and cushions and lays them under it. Yet this means a destruction of items from their finished state (which as a סתר, “tearing down,” is forbidden on the Sabbath)! It was thought that the destruction of items from their finished state was a rabbinic prohibition, but the pain of a living being (= cruelty to animals) was a biblical prohibition; here the biblical prohibition should come and supersede the rabbinic prohibition.—In this passage two orientations come to expression: a stricter one that allowed feeding the animal in its endangered situation, but not its being saved from this situation; and a looser one, which to avoid cruelty to animals by invoking the Torah—we must think of Exod 23:5—allows facilitating rescuing the animal. From the circumstance that Jesus deals with in our verse with his opponents e concessis, it may be concluded that at his time the more lenient practice was common. ‖ The two following passages do not relate to the Sabbath, but rather to a festival. Since the stipulations about keeping the Sabbath holy and keeping a festival holy did not overlap—on a festival, for example, the preparation of food, and if necessary even the slaughtering of an animal was indulged, see m. Beṣah 5.2 and 3.3—an inference cannot automatically be drawn from festival practice to practice on the Sabbath. Nevertheless, the two passages are also instructive for Matt 12:11. Mishnah Beṣah 3.4: If a first born bit of livestock falls into a pit (on a festival), one skilled in the matter should, as R. Judah (ca. 150) said, climb down and inspect it. If a bodily blemish is found on it (which was present on it already before it fell into the pit), one brings it up יעלה and slaughters; but if not, one may not slaughter it. (On the use of a first born animal afflicted with a bodily blemish in the household of the owner, see Deut 15:21f.) ‖ Tosefta Beṣah 3.2 (205): If a bit of livestock together with its young (who may not be slaughtered on one and the same day) falls into a pit (on a festival), according to R. Eliezer (ca. 90), the first is brought up on the condition of slaughtering it, and then one slaughters it; the other, though, one cares for it with food in its place lest it die. (R. Eliezer, in accordance with the strict observance, allows bringing the animal out of the pit even on a festival day only for the purpose of slaughtering; if the latter does not follow, the animal remains in the pit.) R. Joshua said, “The first is brought up on the condition of slaughtering it, and then one does not slaughter it (perhaps with reason that it is too lean). Then one deals cleverly and brings up the second animal on the condition of slaughtering it. If he was not willing to slaughter one of them (earlier, before the animals had fallen into the pit), he (now) has the justification for this in his hand.”—This is found as a baraita in b. Beṣah 37A; b. Šabb. 117B; y. Pesaḥ. 3.30A.59; y. Beṣah 3.62A.38. (Hermann L. Strack and Paul Billerbeck, A Commentary on the New Testament from the Talmud and Midrash, ed. Jacob N. Cerone, 4 vols. [trans. Andrew Bowden and Joseph Longarino; Bellingham, Wash.: Lexham Press, 2022], 1:711-12)

 

 

13:15: Does not each one of you untie his ox or his donkey from its trough and bring it away and bring it to drink?

 

On the rescue of an animal in need on the Sabbath, see § Matt 12:11. ‖ The cattle are driven out on the Sabbath. Mishnah Šabbat 5.1: With what are the cattle permitted to go out (on the Sabbath)? The camel may go out with the halter, the female camel with the nose ring, the Libyan donkey with the halter, the horse with the chain; all chain-wearing animals may go out with the chain and be guided (literally: pulled) on the chain; they may also be sprinkled (the objects mentioned on the animals if they have become unclean) and immersed in their place (where they are on the animal in question). ‖ Mishnah Šabbat 5.2: The donkey may go out with a blanket if it is attached to it (and the attachment had already taken place before the Sabbath); the rams may go out with the leather (לבובין?) tied in front of them in the area of the heart, the ewes with their tails tied upwards or downwards (which aids in mating or prevents it) and with a sheath (for keeping the wool clean); the goats may go out with the udders bound. R. Yose (ca. 150) declared all this illegal, except for the ewes being wrapped. R. Judah (ca. 150) said, “The goats may go out with the udder bound to dry out the milk, but not if it is for the benefit of the milk (to prevent the milk from leaking out).” ‖ See further at m. Šabb. 5.3, 4.

 

Watering the animals on the Sabbath. A baraita in b. ʿErub. 20B: Do not fill a vessel with water and place it before the beast on the Sabbath. Instead, fill it and pour it out, so that the beast drinks by itself.—The same is said in b. ʿErub. 20B; 21A. ‖ If a well was in a public area and it formed by itself in a single area (private area), such that it was ten hand widths deep, then it was unusable on the Sabbath because its water could not be carried away from its own area into the public area around it. In order to make it nevertheless usable for watering cattle on the Sabbath, m. ʿErub. 2.1f. makes the following determination: “You are to put stakes (boards) around the wells, namely four double stakes (double boards) that appear as eight.” These are the words of R. Judah (ca. 150). R. Meir (ca. 150) said, “Eight that appear as twelve, four double stakes (double boards) and four simple ones.” [The words mean: the fountain is fenced off at some distance in a rectangular way by always making an angle of the rectangle from two stakes or boards. The sides of the rectangle remain open, according to R. Judah, who only requires eight stakes or boards. On the other hand, according to R. Meir, one post or board is to be placed on each of the four sides in the space left open. He therefore requires that the fence consists of twelve posts (boards). Through this fencing, the enclosed space is made into the private district of the well, so that now, even on the Sabbath, water may be scooped up and presented to the animals within the enclosed space.] “The height of the double stakes is to be ten hand widths, their width (toward the four sides) is six hand widths, and their thickness can be as much as it is. Their space (on the sides) must be sufficient for two teams of three cattle each.” These are the words of R. Meir. R. Judah said, “Of four cattle each, when they are tied together, but not when they are released. One team must be able to go in and the other (next to him) out. One can erect the fence close to the well, but the cow with its head and the larger part of its body must be within the fence when drinking. But one can also erect it at any distance, only then must use more posts (boards).”—The same is said with some deviations in t. ʿErub. 2.1f. (139).

 

According to m. Šabb. 7.2, tying (knotting) and untying were among the 39 activities prohibited on the Sabbath.—More precisely, m. Šabb. 15.1f. says: These are the knots for which one is liable (on the Sabbath): The knot of the camel drivers (on the nose ring of the animals) and the knot of the sailor (according to Rashi on the front part of the ship). Just as one is liable for tying them, so also is he liable for untying it. R. Meir (ca. 150) said, “You are not liable for a knot that you can undo with one hand. There are knots for which one is not liable, as in the case with the knots of the camel driver and the sailor. A woman may tie (on the Sabbath) the (neck) opening of her shirt, as well as the bands of the hair net and the belt, the straps of the shoes and sandals, tubes with wine and oil, and cover a pot of meat.” R. Eliezer b. Jacob (probably the II [ca. 150]) said, “You are permitted (on the Sabbath) to tie ropes in front of the cattle so that it does not break out. You are permitted to tie a scoop (over a well) with a belt, but not with a rope.” R. Judah (ca. 150) permitted it. As a general rule, R. Judah pronounced, “You are not liable on account of a knot that does not remain permanently.” ‖ Babylonian Talmud Šabbat 113A: R. Abba (ca. 290) said that R. Hiyya (b. Abba, ca. 280) said that R. Yohanan († 279) said, “You may take a rope (on the Sabbath) from the house and tie it to the cow and to the trough.” R. Aha the Tall One, that is R. Aha b. Papa (ca. 300) responded to R. Abba, “You may tie a rope on the trough to the cow and a rope on the cow to the trough, but you may not take the rope from the house and tie it to the cow and to the trough. (To balance the two sentences, it is then noted,) There it is an ordinary rope; here it is a weaver’s rope.” (Hermann L. Strack and Paul Billerbeck, A Commentary on the New Testament from the Talmud and Midrash, ed. Jacob N. Cerone, 4 vols. [trans. Andrew Bowden and Joseph Longarino; Bellingham, Wash.: Lexham Press, 2022], 2:232-33)

 

Delayed Ensoulment in the Catechism of the Council of Trent (1566)

 From “Chapter IV: Of the Third Article”:

 

Question IV

Not all matters touching the Conception of Christ are supernatural, but most of them are

 

In this mystery we perceive that some things were done, which transcend the order of nature, some by the power of nature. Thus, in believing that the body of Christ was formed from the most pure blood of the Virgin Mother, we therein acknowledge human nature, seeing that this is a law common to all human bodies. But what transcends the order of nature and human understanding is, that, as soon as the Blessed Virgin, assenting to the words of the angel, said: Behold the handmaid of the Lord, be it unto me according to thy word, the most sacred body of Christ was immediately formed, and to it was united a soul actually enjoying the use of reason; and thus, in the same instant of time, he was perfect God and perfect man. That this was the new and admirable work of the Holy Ghost, no one can doubt, whereas, according to the order of nature, no body, unless within the prescribed period of time, can be endued with a human soul. (The Catechism of the Council of Trent [trans. Theodore Alois Buckley [London: George Routledge and Co., 1852], 42, emphasis in bold added)

 

Delayed Ensoulment in Pope Sixtus V, "Effraenatam" (November 19, 1588)

  

§ 1. Therefore, we, after having repressed the audacity of those who dare to violate the rights of marriage and presume to dissolve the indissoluble bond as far as they can, and who do not hesitate to defile themselves with certain more shameful acts of incest, desiring also to eradicate this evil as much as we can with the strength entrusted to us by the Lord, especially in our own times; And we decree and ordain, by this constitution of ours, which shall endure perpetually, that all and any persons, whether men or women, of whatever status, degree, order, or condition, even clerics, seculars, or members of any religious order, shining with any ecclesiastical or worldly dignity and pre-eminence, who henceforth, either by themselves or through intermediaries, procure the ejection of an abortus or an immature fetus, whether animated or even inanimate, formed or unformed, by means of blows, poisons, drugs, potions, burdens imposed on the pregnant woman, and even by other unknown or most intricate means, such that abortion indeed follows, and also the pregnant women themselves, who knowingly commit the aforementioned acts, incur, by the very fact, the penalties prescribed and inflicted by both divine and human law, as well as by canonical sanctions and apostolic constitutions, and by civil laws against true murderers who have committed voluntary homicide by act and deed (the texts of all of which we have expressly and word for word inserted in these our letters), and by this our constitution, which shall endure perpetually, we establish and ordain that they incur these penalties, laws, and constitutions extended to the aforementioned cases. (Pope Sixtus V, Effraenatam, November 19, 1588)

 

The Latin for “animated or even inanimate” is “tam animati quam etiam inanimate.”

Looking for a Roman Catholic Apologist to Debate (1) Mariology and (2) the Book of Abraham

 Cross-posting from youtube

I reached out to Ethan Muse to see if he would debate (1) the Immaculate Conception and personal sinlessness of Mary and (2) whether the Book of Abraham is a 19th-century translation of an ancient text. He wanted me to affirm a negative for no. 1 (it was my burden to disprove her sinlessness [not joking]) and did not want to debate the Book of Abraham. So I am looking for an intellectually honest Roman Catholic apologist who would be willing to debate no. 1 (and if they want, also no. 2). I have a debate against a Baptist (June 9), so I am hoping to have something arranged for either July or August. Robert Boylan ScripturalMormonism@gmail.com

Steven Bigham (EO) on Canon 36 of the Synod of Elvira

  

Canon 36 has its place in a list of 80 other disciplinary, not theological, canons. Should we, therefore, identify the motive behind it as merely disciplinary, without any theological base? Those of an iconophobic bent tend to see behind the canon an iconophobic theology based on the 2nd commandment, while iconodules are inclined to restrict the canon’s scope to the realm of discipline. Two factors nonetheless seem to tip the scales in favor of a limited, disciplinary motive: 1) positively, the canon is part of a series of disciplinary canons, and 2) negatively, we have no indications that the bishops wanted to condemn all kinds of images on the basis of the 2nd commandment or anything else. If canon 36 is, in fact, a disciplinary canon attempting to regulate but not condemn a well-established practice, then the Council of Elvira does not deal with the basic theological question: the legitimacy of Christian images. Another 400 years will have to go by before that question is clearly and directly ask and answered.

 

We must recognize, however, that for whatever reasons—reasons that we will never really knew—it seemed good to a group of bishops in Spain around the year 300 to prohibit the painting of certain picturas on church walls. It is fairly obvious that this decision, and the reasons that motivated it, did not affect the Spanish Christians of subsequent history because they continued to paint images on the walls of Spanish churches. As far as we know, there has never been an iconoclastic controversy in the Spanish Church. Canon 36 itself had no subsequent history either, except in the collections of the council’s canons preserved here and there. We also know that canon 36 was completely ignored in all other Churches until the Reformation of the 16th century. Even during the Byzantine iconoclastic crisis, the iconoclasts did not quote it in their argumentation. It is quite possible that they did not know about it since few iconoclasts spoke Latin or had many contacts with the West. Due to the great geographic distance between Spain and Byzantium as well as the language barrier, it is not surprising that the iconoclasts never heard about canon 36 of the Council of Elvira.

 

On the other hand, we cannot really say that the canon was hidden or lost. Several councils of the 4th century adopted certain of Elvira’s canons verbatim, but not canon 36. Various canonical collections, however, reproduced it; the iconodules did not, therefore, try to hide it. The canon slept peacefully in these collections, having no great importance, like many other ancient canons that have lost their importance due to a change in the historical setting that gave them birth. It really only came onto the stage of history at the Protestant Reformation. Even though it had existed since the beginning of the 4th century, the canon had no historical importance until the 16th century. Since that time, iconoclasts and iconophobes have used it as a weapon against iconodules both Catholic and Orthodox.

 

The scope of canon 36 remains very limited in time and space, and very few Protestants of an iconophobic outlook would feel themselves bound by the decision of the synod of Elvira. If we understand that decision as an absolute interdiction of all images on church walls. Only the most radical reformers of the 16th century, and their successors, would advocate a total ban.

 

To conclude, then, we can say that the Council of Elvira really did forbid picturas to be painted on the wall of some Spanish churches, but for reasons that we will probably never know. This interdiction, however, is evidence for a tradition of wall-paintings in Spanish churches, going back we do not know how long. The vast majority of Christians, however, both iconoclasts and iconodules, have not given this council, or its canon 36, very much importance of authority. Nor have these Christians felt themselves bound to banish all picturas from the walls of their churches. As for the attitude of Spanish Christians toward non-idolatrous images at the beginning of the 4th century, canon 36 is so embroiled in ambiguity that it is practically impossible to arrive at any clear and definitive conclusions. That it is an expression of a generalized iconophobia in the Spanish Church, a repudiation of all figurative art, and a blueprint for an imageless Christianity seems to be a very heavy load indeed to put on the back of such a frail, little donkey. (Steven Bigham, The Image of God the Father in Orthodox Theology and Iconography and Other Studies [Torrance, Calif.: Oakwood Publications, 1995], 114-17)

  

 

Further Reading:

 

Answering Fundamentalist Protestants and Roman Catholic/Eastern Orthodox on Images/Icons

Samuel Laeuchli on Canon 36 of the Synod of Elvira

  

They Must Not Do This—d²

 

The canons of Elvira contain four different patterns by means of which a certain deed or behavior is rejected. Pattern d² represents a canon or part of a canon in which a straightforward prohibition is stated: “They must not do this.” While many other canons threaten the transgressor either with a sentence of exclusion or of penance, the d² sentences stop at the prohibition, not reckoning with the chance that it may not be heeded. Why not? Is the difference between canons that merely say No and canons that carefully spell out what happens when Christians disregard the No a matter of chance? Is it that some of the men who formulated particular sentences happened to reckon with disobedience while others did not? It can be shown that the difference is not merely coincidental, and results from the bishops’ ambivalence. In some canons the simple prohibition sufficed because the synod did not fear noncompliance. In others, however, the synod failed to spell out penalty, exclusion, or mercy because the clerics were uncertain about their own convictions.

 

The famous can. 36 illustrates this first of Elvira’s four negative patterns: “There shall be no pictures in churches, lest what is worshipped and adored be depicted on walls.” The text has been controversial in historical analysis, in respect to Christian art and ancient Christian iconoclasm, because it does not make clear what the problem of iconoclasm was in Spain at the time. Were all images summarily banned or only those with liturgical connotations? Did the canon attack abuses or did it presuppose the total absence of art in churches? I believe that the ambiguity of the decision is revealing: it was in such a d² pattern that the synod operated when it did not want to commit itself.

 

There are three kinds of ambiguity in can. 36. In the first place, the canon has no addressee; it is one of the few canons which deal merely with the issue, without an s¹ segment. The canon, however, should have an s¹ segment, for those walls on which pictures were not to be painted were surely not decorated by angels. Bishops and presbyters, the same kinds of people who made decisions at Elvira, decided on such matters. When the synod meant to stop either a cleric or a layman from committing some objectionable deed, it certainly named him, or her, or them: “Bishops and presbyters who . . . .” Yet in the canon under discussion, the synod did not come to terms with persons. In the second place, the canon has no sanction. When the synod was afraid that its decision would not be heeded, it certainly was not reluctant to outline penalty or anathema, as the forty-nine cases of penance and irrevocable exclusion show. It does not spell out what would happen if images were put into churches. Moreover, in leaving out the s¹ unit, the synod did not even hold anyone responsible for such a misdeed. In the third place, the canon has a rather puzzling s³ segment: “ne quid colitur et adoratur in parietibus depingatur.” This segment could be interpreted as meaning that only what might be worshipped and adored was prohibited; but the main part of the canon does not prohibit images in such a restricted way. The synod’s ambivalence is unmistakable.

 

These three evidences, compared to the other decision patterns, make it quite clear that in the decision in can. 36 the synod was unwilling to commit itself. Why? There are two possibilities: either it did not regard the issues as very important, and did not expect much resistance, or it felt that the issue was too hot and it did not dare to make stringent sanctions against disobedience. One has to reckon, in all of the d² decisions, with both of these possibilities. They are not as unlike each other as one assumes at first sight. Whether the synod regarded the case under scrutiny as too unimportant to make an issue of or only halfheartedly supported its own ruling does not matter. What matters is that sanctions, anathema, and penance were left out of the d² decisions. They were left out to avert a confrontation.

 

Such evasion is especially clear in can. 36. The decision is ambiguous because the synod did not want to use the iconoclastic issue as a test case of its control of the churches. For some reasons that can no longer be recovered the issue came up in the council. It found a majority vote, perhaps a unanimous one. Who knows? The verdict, however, was vague: no one was threatened, no one was to be punished. The decision, like the preceding s³ segment, was inconclusive, and this canon was the only one passed concerning the matter of iconoclasm. The clerics who came to Elvira did not want to make a major issue out of iconoclasm. Perhaps they themselves loved images, their aesthetic character, their symbolic beauty. Perhaps there were pictures in their own churches which they felt were harmless. Yet they could imagine abuses, and so a stance had to be taken. The fourth-century church profited from their tentativeness: images became acceptable.

 

This tentativeness can be understood when set against the background of early Christianity’s relationship to art. Ever since the beginning of Christianity there had been polemic by Christian writers against the use of images, which was inherited in part from Judaism and in part from the philosophical criticism of popular religion. The critical statements of the early church against image worship were made by theologians, by the Christian leaders who rejected images as pagan, idolatrous, blasphemous, anthropomorphic, and crass. The archeological evidence, however, shows that Christianity in the third century, if not earlier, often produced pictures. The catacombs are full of them, and the baptistry and sanctuary at Duro Europos exhibit them. Can. 36 of Elvira would not have been necessary if pictures had not existed at all.

 

The conflict about images is related to the different attitudes toward them among clergy and laity. While the Christian elite regarded the icons for a long time with hostility, the Christian grass-roots community employed them without qualm. The conflict between traditional clerical anti-iconic positions and the popular demand for images was in evidence only a few years after Elvira when Constantine asked Eusebius of Caesarea for a picture of Christ, and Eusebius although one of the protagonists for Constantine’s imperial Christian ideals, rejected the emperor’s demand. For centuries, an anti-iconic and a pro-iconic stance continued side by side in the Christian church, one leading to the superb art of Ravenna and the other to the iconoclastic pogroms of the eighth century. The dilemma of can. 36 is the dilemma of a crucial moment involving that duality.

 

The ambiguity of can. 36, thus, directly reflects the mixed feelings of the clergy toward the matter. As members of the Christian elite, they had to speak against the images; as part of a church that acquiesced more and more in the popular demand for visual, concrete imagery, they were not so sure about the corrupting character of such art. The d² decision of can. 36 enables us to read that ambivalence between the elite’s traditional theological, as well as social, rejection of images and its personal emotional acceptance of them.

 

The d² pattern, therefore, was applied to cases that were easily resolvable because the persons named were essentially powerless to resist. It was also applied, however, to precisely opposite cases in which obedience would have been very hard to secure. Can. 29, for instance, prohibiting possessed Christians from participating in the liturgy of the church or from holding an office in the church did not need to say more. The mentally ill were easily dismissed in the ancient world. Such a ruling would hardly have evoked much dissent. Likewise, can. 80 barring freedmen from the episcopal rank contained no controversial move: freedmen were socially outclassed by the bishops and did not have much of a chance to break that barrier. (Samuel Laeuchli, Power and Sexuality: The Emergence of Canon Law at the Synod of Elvira [Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1972], 33-37)

 

 

Further Reading:

 

Answering Fundamentalist Protestants and Roman Catholic/Eastern Orthodox on Images/Icons

 

Mishnah Eduyot 8.7: Elijah, When He Returns, Will Solve Outstanding Halakhic Disputes

In Mishnah Eduyot 8.7, we read the following tradition concerning the then-future return of Elijah and how he will solve outstanding halakhic disputes:

 

Rabbi Joshua said: I have received a tradition from Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai, who heard it from his teacher, and his teacher [heard it] from his teacher, as a halakhah [given] to Moses from Sinai, that Elijah will not come to pronounce unclean or to pronounce clean, to put away or to bring near, but to put away those brought near by force and to bring near those put away by force. The family of Beth Tzriphah was on the other side of the Jordan and Ben Zion put it away by force; and yet another family was there, and Ben Zion brought it near by force. It is such as these that Elijah will come to pronounce unclean or to pronounce clean, to put away or to bring near. Rabbi Judah says: to bring near, but not to put away. Rabbi Shimon says: to conciliate disputes. And the Sages say: neither to put away nor to bring near, but to make peace in the world, for it is said, “Behold I send to you Elijah the prophet”, etc., “and he shall turn the heart of the fathers to the children and the heart of the children to their fathers” (Malachi 3:23-2. (source)