For Those Who Wish to Support my Medical Bill and Other Expenses

 (Do note: Even if you cannot donate at this moment, if you have an "in" with a large youtube channel or some other organization, do share with them and ask them to "plug" it. Alt. if you have a twitter/x account, youtube channel of your own, facebook page, on a discord channel, etc., do also share if you feel inclined to do such e.g., if you can convince those with the following like Ward Radio or Dan Peterson or someone "big" to share it on their discord, youtube channel, blog, etc)

I have been, and continue to be busy this week (including some doctor appointments for my chronic migraines, not just serious liver issues . . . ) and speaking at a YSA event in Dublin. As I have shared previously about the serious liver issues (some personal friends know how serious it is), while it looks positive so far, the biggest fear I have will be paying for the (private, not public) medical bills and other losses due to being out of work during (1) this six-month treatment period and (2) the recovery period beginning around December until ~April 2027. The “goal” figure reflects that.

https://www.gofundme.com/medical-expenses-liverrelated-and-other-issues

For those who are wary of GFM (it is safe, but I 'get' it), my paypal is

https://www.paypal.me/irishlds/

Prayers that the talk (and also Q&A session) I have scheduled this Saturday will go well.

Photius (810-891) on Romans 5:12

  

Question 84

What does the word of the Apostle mean, “in this all sinned”?

 

The saying, “in this all sinned,” which the divine Paul said and you asked to know its meaning, some interpret as “in the person of Adam,” and others “with respect to death itself.” But I accept neither the one nor the other. We must not understand anything else, since the phrase has in itself its own completeness. That is, the phrase “in this all sinned” here does not point to a person, nor indicate a person in any way, but rather signifies a cause; that is “εφ’ ω παντες ημαρτον” means “because all sinned.” This usage occurs countless times even in non-Chrisitan writers, but the divine Paul is sufficient, who interprets his own words. For he says elsewhere, “as long as we are still in the body, we groan under its weight”; and then, “Not that we wish to put it off, but to put on over it.” From this it becomes entirely clear that “εφ’ ω” was used to signify cause. That is, “for this we groan, not because we wish to be unclothed, but because we wish to be clothed upon.” To speak more freely, the sense of the phrase is as follows: “We groan while we are in this tabernacle, feeling the burden of our body.” What then? Do you wish to put off the body which the hands of God formed and joined with the soul by divine breath? “no,” he says, “far be such a thought. For surely I do not groan because I am stripped of it, but because I have not put on the clothing over it.” And by clothing he means being clothed with incorruption, and making it as it had been formed in the beginning. For this reason he immediately adds, “so that mortality may be swallowed up by life.” I do not groan therefore because I lay aside the body, but because I have not clothed it with incorruption and eternal life.

 

And it is not only here evident that “εφ’ ω” (“in this”) signifies cause, but also from the very sense of the saying under consideration. For he says, since Adam sinned and was afterwards condemned to death, therefore also the race that sprang from him received death. And not simply, he says, and without judgment, but “because all sinned,” that is, “because all sinned as the one who begot them.” For this made them also sharers of the punishment. That is, participation in the act led them also to participation in the condemnation. (Photius, The Collected Amphilochia, 3 vols. [trans. Nun Christina; 2025], 2:273)

 

Photius (810-891) Favoring γενομενον vs. γεννωμενον in the Amphilochia

  

Question 227

Should we say “God sent His Son being begotten” (γεννωμενον) or “having become”(γενομενον)—with one n or with two?

 

We must say γενομενον (“having become”) of a woman, just as we say γενομενον (“being made subject”) under the law—with one immutable n. First, because of the continuous sequence of meanings and words. Second, because Christ was indeed born of the Virgin with the unchangeable spelling of the double n in the second syllable (γεννηθεντα), yet He is not being born. For he was born once of the Virgin. Let no one, therefore, be led astray by the saying of Gregory the Theologian. For when he said, “Christ is born,” he did not mean that He is forever being born of the Virgin, but that the feast then being celebrated concerned the day of the Lord’s birth. For this reason, we must take every care neither to write nor to pronounce “γενομενον απο γυναικα” with the double n. (Photius, The Collected Amphilochia, 3 vols. [trans. Nun Christina; 2025], 3:517)

 

Johannes Crell (1590-1633) (Socinian) On Jesus Being Ignorant of the Second Coming

  

Ninth Argument: that Christ Was Once Ignorant of the Day of the Last Judgement

 

Up to this point we have brought forward testimonies from John in which something is denied of Christ that could not be denied of him if he were that supreme God. It remains that we bring forward similar testimonies from the other sacred writers as well, and indeed such as attribute a prerogative to the Father above Christ. The first of these we shall make that saying of Christ which we touched on above when treating of the Father (Mark 13:32): “But of that day or hour” (namely, of the last judgement) “no one knows, not the angels in heaven, nor the Son, but the Father”, or, as Matthew puts it (Matt 24:36), “but the Father alone”. How it is proved from this that the Father alone is the supreme God, we have shown earlier. Now we must see how it is proved from it that the Son is not that supreme God: although, once the former is proved, this latter necessarily follows. But here we proceed the opposite way, and do not demonstrate from the fact that the Father alone is the supreme God that Christ is not the supreme God, but from this latter the former. The matter, however, is easy and plain to anyone: for that supreme God is ignorant of nothing and never was. But the Son of God was once ignorant of the day and hour of the last judgement. Therefore the Son of God is not that supreme God.

 

Defence of the Argument

 

How greatly the opponents have tormented themselves in untying this knot, and what diverse interpretations different men, indeed even the same men, have devised, may be seen both in others and especially in Maldonatus. He reports that Jerome and Augustine, hard pressed by the difficulty of the testimony, took refuge in declaring the passage corrupt and saying that one should not read “nor the Son” but “the Father”: against the witness of all the manuscripts. If it is permitted to call this into doubt, nothing in Holy Scripture will be certain, nothing firm, nothing that one may not deny; and one will have to strike out not only the words of Mark but also the corresponding words of Matthew. The same interpreter says further that the greater part of the ancient authors held that Christ was ignorant of the day of judgement, not because he was really ignorant of it, but because he did not wish to reveal it to us, because his body, that is, the Church, was ignorant of it, or because he concealed that he knew it; and for this opinion he cites Origen, Chrysostom, Gregory, Jerome, Bede and Theophylact. This interpretation (if indeed it deserves the name) the same writer rightly refutes with the argument that in this way the Father too would be ignorant of the day of judgement, since he has not revealed it to us. But then, what sort of reply would this have been from Christ? The disciples wished to learn the day of judgement from him. Christ answers, on the view of those men: “The Son causes you to be ignorant of the day of judgement; he does not wish to reveal it; he conceals that he knows it.” Yet this was the very thing the disciples asked, that he should make it known to them. A reason should have been given why he would not make it known, why, as they say, he concealed it. And finally, what sort of interpretation is this: “I do not know”, that is, “I conceal that I know”? Did Christ deal thus with his disciples, and deceive those with whom it was both permitted and fitting for him to deal openly? Such speech would not be worthy even of a sensible man, much less of Christ. Others again, he says, such as Origen, Epiphanius and Chrysostom, interpreted it to mean that Christ was ignorant of the day of judgement, that is, had not yet experienced it. This opinion he refutes on the same ground as the previous one: because in this way the Father too would be ignorant of it, since he has not experienced it either. Others, he says, gave the sense as: “Nor does the Son of Man know, unless the Father knows”; but because the Father knows, the Son of Man knows too; so Euthymius. This interpretation is quite frivolous. First, because in this way he would have given no reason why he did not make the day of judgement known to the disciples, and would not have lessened but increased their desire to know it and to inquire of him about it: for in this way he would have indicated that the Son of Man knows that day. Secondly, the word “Son”, used of Christ absolutely, denotes not the Son of Man but the Son of God as such; especially since the word “Father”, by which God is understood, is at once set over against it. And the little word “but” in the words “but the Father” is in truth connected not with the immediately preceding words “nor the Son”, but with the words “no one knows”; or at least it stands for the adversative “but rather”. Finally, this interpretation contradicts the words of Matthew, who says that “the Father alone” knows. For how ridiculous would it be to say that the Son of Man does not know the day of judgement unless the Father alone knows it? For that is a contradiction in the adjunct, and the condition added overturns the very thing to which it is added. The same interpreter says further that many ancient and weighty authors, whose names he lists in order, interpreted it thus: that Christ was ignorant of the day of judgement in so far as he is man. This he holds to be true only to the extent that it is understood that Christ knew the day of judgement not under this title, or not for this reason, that he was man, but because he was God. Otherwise he holds it false, indeed dreadful to hear, that the human nature of Christ was ignorant of anything. For the Papists, and some others as well, think that the human nature of Christ knew all things straight from the beginning of his conception or birth. But he refutes that interpretation too, because Christ not only denies that the Son of Man (he ought rather to have said “the Son of God” here) knows the day of judgement, but also affirms that the Father alone knows it: by which word he seems to exclude not only the Son but also the holy spirit.

 

But since today the very interpretation which that interpreter rejects, namely that Christ is said to have been truly ignorant of the day of judgement not according to the divine but according to the human nature, is very widely and commonly received, even among those who otherwise maintain that at the very moment of conception the properties of the divine nature were communicated to the human, or that the knowledge of all things was infused into his soul, we must briefly refute it here; and once it has been disposed of, that man’s own interpretation is also to be refuted in a few words.

 

This interpretation, then, and this reply to our argument, which is commonly offered, is not to be admitted, chiefly for three reasons. First, because Christ simply and without any limitation denies that the Son knows the day and hour of judgement. From this it follows that he spoke of himself as a whole, in his whole person, as we showed in examining the second reply on the passage John 5:19. Secondly, to pass over other things said in the same place: both from the simple word “Son”, set over against God the Father, and from the gradation Christ uses, ascending from the angels to the Son and from the Son to the Father, it is evident that he spoke precisely of that nature according to which he is the Son of God. Thirdly, because in Matthew it is expressly said that “the Father alone” knows the day or hour of judgement. And this is also the sense of the words of Mark when he says: “No one knows”, etc., “but the Father”, thereby setting the Father against the Son, too. But if Christ had known the day of judgement according to the divine nature, then not the Father alone would have known it, but the Son as well, and besides, if we believe the opponents, the holy spirit.

 

As for that saying of Paul which they press so hard here (Col 2:3): “In whom are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge”, they do not notice, first, that those words can be referred no less, indeed even more correctly, to the term “mystery of God and of Christ”, which had been mentioned immediately before, than to the name of Christ; for it is chiefly the knowledge of that mystery which is treated there, so that the sense is: in the mystery of God and of Christ all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge are hidden. That mystery, however, is the doctrine of the Gospel (cf. Col 1:25–27). Secondly, the words “knowledge” and “wisdom” are to be understood of the knowledge of things pertaining to human salvation, which have also been revealed to us through Christ and are to be diligently learned by us. But that the day of judgement is not among these things is evident from the very words of Christ about which we are disputing. Not to mention that, even if the same kind of things were otherwise in question, this special saying about the day of judgement would nevertheless have to restrict the general one, and the special would have to be interpreted not from the general, but the general from the special.

 

It remains to say something about the interpretation and reply which that interpreter of the Papists devised after refuting the opinions of all the others; though he puts it forward in such a way that he himself seems not quite to trust it. For he says: But, unless I am mistaken, Christ speaks in the same way as he said above: “But to sit at my right hand and at my left is not mine to give to you, but to those for whom it has been prepared by my Father” (Matt 20:23). He therefore indicates, which is saying more, that not only as man but also as God he is in a certain way ignorant of the day of judgement: not that he is ignorant of it, but that it is not his office to know it; just as he did not say “for whom it has been prepared by me”, but “by my Father”, not because it had not also been prepared by him, but because to prepare the kingdom, that is, to predestine, is not his office but the Father’s.

 

So too it is the Father’s part to determine when the world is to be dissolved and when the day of judgement is to be. This is what he says to the Apostles: “It is not yours to know times or seasons which the Father has put in his own power” (Acts 1:7). Therefore he alone is signified to know it. And this, unless I am mistaken, is the true sense. He rightly added that “unless I am mistaken” twice; for he was afraid of being mistaken, and the ingenious man did not satisfy himself while he wished to satisfy others. But he has neither explained the passage correctly, indeed he has perverted it, nor removed the difficulty, but in part even increased it. For, first, without any example and without any just reason he departs from the proper and customary meaning of the words “he does not know”, and interprets them as “it is not someone’s office to know”; unless perhaps he offers as his reason the very thing that is in dispute, namely that it cannot be said that the Son does not know the day of judgement, because, as he has always known everything else, so he has always known that day too. Secondly, however he interprets the words “it is not the Son’s office to know that day”, he still does not escape the difficulty. For either it is not Christ’s office because he is not bound to know that day, or is under no obligation to know that day; or because he is bound not to know that day, or because he is not even permitted to know it; and the passages he cites seem to require this latter. If he means the latter, he increases the difficulty rather than lessening it, and even says more than is needed. For he says not only that the Son did not then know the day of judgement, but that he was not even permitted to know it. But how can he be that supreme God who not only is ignorant of something, but cannot even know it; or who is not even permitted to know something, and that in so far as he is God? And yet the passages he cites, duly compared with this sense, seem altogether to require this sense. For when Christ says, “To sit at my right hand and at my left is not mine to give”, he signifies that this does not lie within his power and discretion, or that it is not permitted to him. The passage in Acts, moreover, makes express mention of power, and signifies that the Father has reserved to his own (for in the Greek it is ἰδίᾳ, that is, “own”) power and discretion the determination of the times and seasons, and, further, the knowledge of them as well. But if he means the former, I ask, first, what does this contribute to the matter? For the sense will be that no one is obliged to know the day of judgement, neither the angels nor the Son, but the Father alone. What follows from that? Even if neither men nor angels nor the Son are obliged to know it, yet both the former and the latter will be able to know it; “and we”, the disciples could have said, “though we are not bound to, nevertheless desire to know it, since we can know it without prejudice to the truth of that saying”. For the man against whom we are disputing believes that Christ did know the day of judgement, even though it was not his office to know it. In this way, then, Christ would not have checked the Apostles’ desire and their eagerness to learn that day, and would have left room for the thought that it might come about that both men and angels know that day. Secondly, how can it be said that it is the Father’s office, or that the Father is obliged, to know the day of judgement, but not the Son, if the Son too is supreme and thus one God with the Father? For neither of them can be obliged to know anything without the other being obliged as well, since both have numerically the same intellect and altogether the same knowledge. And moreover, whatever reason you may adduce why the Father is obliged to know the day of judgement, it will be common to the Son, if he is the supreme God together with the Father. Indeed, if it could come about that one of them were obliged to it and the other not, or less so, one would have to hold that Christ is the more obliged; for he holds the office of judge, and in it, if he is the supreme God, depends on no one, so that he both fixes and determines the day of judgement at his own discretion. I say nothing of the fact that it is not correctly said that it is the Father’s office, or that he is bound, to know the day of judgement, since he cannot fail to know it; or, if you say it is his office because he is bound to define and fix that day, one must consider how correctly it is said that he is bound to do what lies within his own discretion. But enough of this. (Johannes Crell, On the One God, the Father: Two Books, in Which Much is Also Discussed Concerning the Nature of the Son of God and of the Holy Spirit [trans. Marcin Poholski; 2026], 87-93)

 

Photius (810-891) on the Obscurity of Scripture

  

Question 152

What is the obscurity of Scripture.

 

The obscurity of the divine Scriptures has many causes. First, because every language that is translated into another loses its flow. Second, because the similar words of the Hebrews caused confusion for the interpreters. For example, the word “kalos” can mean different things depending in accent: one way it means beautiful, proper, noble, and fitting for virtue; another way it means the rope of a ship. Likewise, the word “oros” can mean the definition of a thing, or a hill and high place; another way it means the watery residue of milk.

 

Third, there are Hebrew words which cannot be explained in Greek with the meaning they carry, and so they were left as they are, such as in Jeremiah, “the prison Sinōch.” Fourth, often punctuation itself produces obscurity, as in “the good shall be the inhabitants of the earth,” if a punctuation mark is not placed after “good.” Fifth, also the difference of accent, as in “Beginning of wisdom, seek wisdom,” if we do not read “beginning” as a noun but instead as a verb.

 

Sixth, there are many words which have one form in both singular and plural, such as “god” and “gods.” Seventh, many verbs change person, as in the word to Abraham, “Now I know that you fear God,” which was spoken instead of “you have known.” Eighth, they also use genders in the opposite way; the moon and the sea for them are the masculine gender.

 

Ninth, many times certain words are missing, as in “Mountains are lifted up and plains are lowered”; the word “like” is missing, so that it would be “They are lifted up like mountains” (for the meaning is of the waves), and “they are lowered like plains.” Tenth, during the captivity the sacred books had been burned, and afterwards, as those who dwelt in Jerusalem sent them to those who had been carried off to Babylon, some lay in wait and stole the books, and others again wrote with symbols with foreigners could not understand, and for these reasons obscurity arose, until Ezra was inspired, and after recalling all the books, recorded them.

 

Question 153

On the same subject, more clearly.

 

One cause of the obscurity of the Old Testament is the rough and beastlike character of its hearers, a fact confirmed by Paul when he says, “The same veil remains during the reading of the Old Testament, and it is not taken away, because it is done away in Christ.”

 

A second cause: Since Moses the lawgiver wore a veil on his face, in a similar way he expressed his legislation as through with a veil, by obscurity—not that any of this was worthy of blame, but the reason was the spiritual weakness of the hearers. Moses wore the veil because they could not endure the brightness of his face unless it was covered, and the law, in place of that veil, for this reason was clothed with obscurity. For he entrusted to them, as though they were treasuries, the most perfect and lofty doctrines, which foreshadowed Christ and His Covenant. But to them, their incomplete and diseased understanding stood as a barrier to their benefit from it. Yet it was kept as a hidden treasure for us, so that, when Christ should come, with the return to Him, the treasure might be revealed.

 

And consider to that a high dignity the presence of the Lord has raised us: He has established us in the place of Moses. Moreover, the prophecy of future things, even if it had no other cause of difficulty, is not as clear as the narration of present things. But when the things prophesied were fulfilled, their obscurity was changed into clarity. Indeed, what the Saviour foretold, “Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up,” not only did the disobedient and foolish among the Jews not understand, nor grasp its deeper meaning, btu even the more knowledge of them, who delighted in the Lord’s teaching—the company of disciples—even they did not understanding, but needed its fulfillment in order to comprehend the prophecy.

 

For this reason, the Jew is not guilty of blame who did not understand the prophecies concerning Christ before His coming. That is why the Saviour said: “If I had not come and spoken to them, they would not have sin.” That is, even though Scripture foretold these things about Christ, they remained dark on account of the absence of the One whom they proclaimed. But when He came, nothing else obscured them any longer, except the wickedness and malice of those who did not wish to acknowledge them.

 

Apart from these, another cause of obscurity is that the Old Testament was not written in the Greek language, but was translated into it from the Hebrew, and it is natural that every language, when carried into another, brings with it some difficulty of understanding. The Mosaic laws were first written in the Hebrew tongue, because only the Jews at that time were devoted to the knowledge of God, while the other nations had been brutalized, given over to idolatrous frenzy. But when the time drew near for Christ to come and to call the world to Himself, and the Greek language prevailed among the nations more than the others, then also the Hebrew tongue was translated into Greek, not more than one hundred years before the presence of the Savior, when Ptolemy reigned in Egypt. It was necessary, therefore, that with the language by which the nations would be guided into the knowledge of God, with that same language the prophecies should also be announced, which foretold the common Saviour.

 

Languages, however, were divided into many dialects because, although man had received one language in the beginning, through arrogance he reached into folly and godlessness. Since he used the one language to his harm, it was just that the multitude of tongues should take its place. Yet the gain and usefulness of the one language, after its division and scattering for so long a time, were restored when the disciples, proclaiming with tongues of fire in their mouths, then made known and fulfilled the mighty works of God. (Photius, The Collected Amphilochia, 3 vols. [trans. Nun Christina; 2025], 3:419-21)

 

Johannes Crell (1590-1633) (Socinian) on Jesus Being Tempted in the Wilderness and Belief in Personal, Supernatural Demons, Fallen Angels, and Satan

  

Thirty-fourth Argument: That Christ Was Tempted by the Devil

 

The fourth argument of this kind is that Christ, as the gospel history relates, was tempted by the devil and even solicited to worship him (Matt 4:1ff.; Luke 4:1ff.), and that for this very purpose, that he might be tempted, he was driven by the divine spirit into the wilderness. For this would by no means have happened if he were the supreme God. For, first, what would be more unworthy of God than to expose himself to an impious and wicked enemy, whom he had thrust out of heaven for contempt of his majesty, once most clearly beheld, to be tempted and solicited to worship that enemy himself, and of his own accord to offer himself so that his majesty might be mocked?

 

Secondly, to what end would this have been done? Was it so that it might be established that the supreme God can withstand and overcome the temptations of the devil? Could anyone have doubted that, so that a trial was needed? Furthermore, how would the devil have dared to undertake so great a thing? I will not now mention that the demons too tremble at the sight of the divine majesty, and indeed shudder at the very remembrance of him (Jas 2:19), since they have been cast down from heaven by him and thrust into Tartarus. For suppose now that in this malicious spirit, who is very well aware both of the wrath and of the invincible powers of God, and who well remembers the chains with which he is held bound by him, there dwells as much impudence and audacity as you please: yet you will at the same time admit that he is supremely cunning. Would that one did not have to admit it! But how can it come about that the most cunning spirit should tempt the supreme God, try to seduce him, and finally bring himself to solicit him to the most unworthy and detestable thing, namely to the worship of himself? Can it be that he either undertakes a thing which he well knows to be impossible, or does not perceive that this thing is most plainly impossible? Neither applies to anyone who has even a crumb of wit, let alone to a most subtle and cunning spirit. Add that when he says, “If you are the Son of God, command that these stones become bread”, and again, “If you are the Son of God, cast yourself down”, he shows clearly enough that he is working to make Christ in some way begin to doubt whether he is really the Son of God, as he had shortly before heard himself declared from heaven to be (cf. Matt 3:17), and further to seek fuller proofs, as of a matter in some way doubtful. But how could he in any way hope to achieve this with that Son of God who is supposed to have been begotten from the divine essence? Do we perhaps think that the enemy so practised in this kind of fighting, whom people commonly even call the architect of a thousand deceits, here used a kind of temptation which would be the most inept of all for deceiving, and brought out such futile and ridiculous weapons for attacking the bravest and wisest of commanders? What would Satan achieve if he tried by some reasonings to bring even an ordinary man, provided only he is of sound mind, to doubt about himself whether he was a man and not rather a substance inferior to man? Would this not be play rather than temptation? But it would have been far more laughable to try to persuade by reasonings the Son of God, who is supposed to have been begotten from the divine essence, to doubt whether he is the Son of God or not.

 

But you will see that the matter stands quite otherwise if you observe that Christ had been declared the Son of God by God in a manner that did not pertain to his essence, but in truth rested on divine love and consisted chiefly in this, that by designation he was already the Messiah, that is, the heavenly and eternal King of the people of God, which he afterwards actually became. For then you will easily see that the most crafty enemy did not fight so ineptly when he called this into doubt, and that the shield of faith was needed to catch his darts. I pass over now other things which occur in that history of the temptation of Christ: for instance, that Satan, having led him up onto a very high mountain, showed him all the kingdoms of this world and their splendour, as if this were not sufficiently known to him or not sufficiently before his eyes, in order to entice him the more easily to worship him; and that for the same purpose he dared to say in his presence: “To you I will give all this power and their glory; for it has been delivered to me, and I give it to whom I will” (Luke 4:6). For it is evident that Satan had well understood that he was dealing not with the supreme God, but with one who was a man in respect of substance, but by the singular love of God his Son. Because God had of his own accord offered him to Satan to be tempted, so that he might give proof of his virtue and piety, Satan did not think it wholly impossible to draw him away from God by his arts. But this and certain other things the discerning reader will notice for himself.

 

Defence of the Argument

 

But there is no ground for anyone to say that what we have deduced from that history does not follow, on the ground that Christ was tempted only according to the human nature, not according to the divine. For, not to repeat now other things said above more than once, the same absurdities follow none the less, even if you suppose that Satan tempted only the human nature, which was nevertheless personally united with the supreme God and joined to him by an indissoluble bond, and that God willed that it should be tempted. For it would have been unworthy of the supreme God to offer himself, in the nature personally united with him, to an impious and most foul enemy, to be held up to mockery and solicited to worship him. For the human nature could do nothing without the consent of the divine. Therefore Satan, in soliciting the human nature of Christ to worship him, would at the same time have solicited the divine nature to consent to so horrible a crime and to permit it to the human nature.

 

It would also have been superfluous to show that a nature personally united with the supreme God can withstand and overcome the temptations of Satan. For who could have doubted that? Hence it is also clear that Satan could not conceive even the slightest hope of overcoming it. For what? Could Satan believe it possible that the divine nature would so far forsake the human, personally united with it, that the latter would succumb to him, commit the most atrocious crime, and moreover become liable to eternal damnation? Did Satan not see that he would have to deal not with the human nature alone, but at the same time with the divine as well, and that this too would have to be seduced and persuaded to crime, if the former were to be overcome? What remains, then, but to say that Satan knew nothing of that union of the human nature with the divine? But what? Did Satan, who had taken as the very object of his attack this, that Jesus was the Son of God, not understand what those words signified? Yet, if the opponents’ view is true, they signify that that man Jesus is one person with that Son of God who is supposed to have been begotten from eternity out of the substance of God. Who would believe that Satan knew nothing of this matter, if, as the opponents hold, that incarnation of the Son begotten from eternity out of the essence of God was foretold in Holy Scripture, announced to the Virgin Mary, and afterwards actually accomplished, acknowledged both by Mary herself and by others, and declared at the baptism of Christ by a heavenly voice? Especially if he once in heaven beheld God, and in him all his decrees (for these are, for the opponents, in reality the same as God or his essence), and consequently understood that the second person of the Trinity would become incarnate in those times. But in a clear matter more words are not needed. We add only this: since Satan wished to bring Christ to doubt whether he was the Son of God — namely that Son which he had shortly before heard himself declared to be by the divine voice —, it would not be consistent that in tempting him he passed over that nature according to which he was the Son of God. This, however, the opponents hold to be the divine. Therefore they must renounce either this view or the limitation by which they restrict that temptation to the human nature.

 

We do not, however, think that any sensible man will say that this argument is derived from the testimony of the devil, who is a lying spirit. For we, on the contrary, against what the devil’s words aim at, insist that that very man whom the devil was tempting was and is the Son of God, who not long before had been commended at his baptism by a heavenly voice. The argument, therefore, is not derived from the testimony of the devil, as though he had said exactly what we maintain, but partly from the act of God, who willed that Christ should be tempted and exposed to the snares of Satan, partly from the mind, words and deeds of Satan, as effects which could not have come about unless our view were true. (Johannes Crell, On the One God, the Father: Two Books, in Which Much is Also Discussed Concerning the Nature of the Son of God and of the Holy Spirit [trans. Marcin Poholski; 2026], 202-5)

 

 

Photius (810-891) on the Obscurity of Prophecy

  

Question 204

Why was prophecy veiled with obscurity?

 

Since you ask and wish to know why, after all, prophecy has been veiled with obscurities. I will answer you briefly. It is because prophecy is not history. For more than anything else, the virtue of history is to speak clearly and without intricate expressions, since it teaches events that happened in the world and were known to all alike—great and common people—at the time they occurred, and even now can be readily known.

 

Prophecy, on the other hand, whose task is to reveal the unknown to the worthy and to make it inaccessible to the profane, is fittingly expressed in a veiled, enigmatic, and symbolic manner. From this, I think, your question is also resolved: for if we were not meant to learn certain things, they should not have been told to us at all; but if it was judged that we should learn them, prophecy should not be obscure—and perhaps they ought hardly to have been spoken.

 

For from what has been said it is clear that men both needed to learn them, and it was necessary that they not be expressed in a profane or common way, but that they be spoken clearly to the initiated, while to the uninitiated they should remain hidden and inaccessible. (Photius, The Collected Amphilochia, 3 vols. [trans. Nun Christina; 2025], 3:481)