859. Having considered Omnipotent,
here Dionysius considers Ancient of Days. And regarding this he does
three things: first, he shows why God is called Ancient of Days; second, he
explains the reason given (at [389] “And indeed . . . “); third, he manifests
what he had said by the authority of Scripture (at [391] “On account of which .
. .”).
860. Now we must realize that
among us something is called ancient for two reasons: first, because it has
[endured for] much time; and second, because it precedes in time those things
that are younger. And that is called ancient which is in the past, remote from
the present; and this is prior in time. Thus God is called the Ancient of Days
for two reasons: first, because “he” pre-possesses the duration “of all things”
and of aeviternity and of time (by aeviternity is meant the duration
which measures being itself, but by time the duration which measures
becoming or moving). Second, because he is “before” all “days and before
aeviternity and” before “times.”
861. Next, when he says [389]
“And indeed . . .” he explains the reasons given, and first the first one;
second, the second one (at [390] “And as . . .”).
862. So he says first [389] that
when we say that God is “time” or some part of time, such as a “day” or
“reasons,” and when we say he is “aeviternity,” one must understand this in a
way which “befits” God, not of course in such a way that God is anything whose
being is something successive and divisible or adjacent to another [time or
day, etc.]. But rather he is called aeviternity, which is the measure of the
permanent, inasmuch as he is unchangeable “by any motion,” because he is not
moved by any motion.
And he is called time, which is
the number of motion, from the fact that God himself is always moving in the
manner which was mentioned earlier in Chapter 9 on motion [379-380 Dionysius;
840-842 St. Thomas]. Yet he does not move in such a way that there is any
succession in his motion, as there is in the motion which is numbered by time,
but God himself is “always” remaining “in himself.”
863. Next, when he says [390]
“And as . . .” he explains the second reason: for he is said to be, before days
and aeviternity and times, not in the manner of the past, as things which are
called ancient among us, but in the manner in which the cause is prior to its
effects: for he is the cause “of aeviternity and of time and of days.”
864. Next, when he says [391] “On
account of which . . .,” to manifest the foregoing things, he introduces some
authorities of Scripture. And he says that, on account of the foregoing, “in
the” appearances” of the hidden “visions-of-God,” God is described both as
“new” and as “old”: new, according to Isaiah 62:2, “And to you shall be called
a new name,” and old, according to psalm 70:18, “and unto old age and frailty,
God, may you not abandon me,” and Isaiah 46:4, “all the way to [your] old age I
[remain] myself and unto [your] gray hairs I will carry [you].”
Now through his being called aged
or old is signified by ancientness: namely that he always exists “from the
beginning” of eternity; and through his being called new or young is signified
that he is ancient “without old age,” that is, without any faltering or being
past, because, as was said earlier [379 Dionysius; 840 St. Thomas], he moves
while remaining immobile in himself.
Or: since old age and ancientness
seem to pertain to the beginning on account of their priority, and youth to the
end on account of its posteriority, through both being attributed to God we are
taught that he proceeds “through all things from the beginning all the way to
the end.”
He gives the third explanation
according to the thought of Hierotheus, whom he calls his perfector, that is,
mater in divine matters, who said that through both of the foregoing is shown
the priority of God himself and the fact that he is the principle: for through
his being called old is shown his priority “in time,” for we call old those
things which are prior in time. But through his being called young is indicated
a priority or principality is “in respect of” the idea of number: for he is
called younger who has advanced less in time. But among numbers, to the extent
that [a number] advances less, to the extent it is prior: for “the unit” and
the numbers close to the unit are prior to those “more advanced.” (Thomas
Aquinas, An Exposition of The Divine Names, The Book of Blessed Dionysius,
Chapter 10, Reading 2 [trans. Michael Augros; Scholastic Tradition in English
Translation; Merrimack, N.H.: Thomas More College Press, 2021], 409, 411)
