How shall we define magic? We may not deem it sufficient
to describe it as a utilization of a formula, rite, or ceremony in order to
produce phenomena utterly incommensurate with, or and surpassing the power of,
the cause. The heart of the matter lies still deeper, for it concerns the aim
and purpose of the use of the formula we should call “magical.” For example,
the story of Aladdin and the jinns is a tale of pure magic. What is the
essential factor in the case? Is it not the power possessed and exercised by
Aladdin of coercing forces, ordinarily outside the range of his control, by
means of the technique called “magical,” to do his will? In each instance of
what may be alleged to be magic this fundamental characteristic maintains: the
person in possession of the magical secret can impose his will on others,
without reference to their desires. The broadly-defined type of primitive
religion that can be called magical presents the same characteristic: the
person employing the proper method can disarm the hostility or opposition of a
supernatural power, even of the Deity, and coerce it do to his will. As to the
salient quality of magic we may then say that it consists in the imposition of the
will of the person possessing the secret on that of another, whether human or
other-than-human, by the use of some formula or tie having this coercive power.
How, then, do the rites of Judaism or the sacraments of
Christianity fare when measured by this definition? To take the more extreme
case: does not the scholastic definition of the operation of the sacramental
principle, in terms of the doctrine of ex opere operato, fall under this
indictment? At first glace it would surely seem so: the proper person, with due
intention, the proper form and matter, and lo, the bread and tine are
transubstantiated into the Body and Blood of Christ! Yet as one looks under the
surface, two profound facts emerge in the consideration of what might be termed
extreme sacramental doctrine: (1) the sacraments have their sole excuse for
being in what is deemed to be explicit divine injunctions for their institution
and continuance. So there is certainly no advantage taken of Deity, nor any imposition
of human will on His—but the precise reverse: all that is done is done because
it is believed to be His Will that is being carried out. (2) What of the
worshipper? If the sacraments are consummated ex opere operato, do they
not function irrespective of the will of the human persons concerned? The
distinction between res sacramenti and virtus sacramenti may, in
respect to this phase of the discussion, be reduced to the simple statement: sacramental
efficacy so far as concerns the individual subject is precluded if there be constructive
will on his part. So upon examination the accusation that matured and extreme sacramental
views are essentially magic, falls to the ground completely.
What saves both Christian sacramentalism and the ceremonial
and ritual practices of Judaism from any tinge or taint of the magical is the
strong conviction of the divine authorization of these rites. God is being
obeyed by man’s fulfilment of His terms, and in obedience to the divine
injunction His will is being carried out. As a matter of fact, before the
destruction of the Temple Rabbinic thought had explored the other side of the
question as well, and had come essentially to the same conclusion as is
represented, caeteris paribus, by the scholastic distinction mentioned
above: the efficacious operation, as far as concerns the individual of the
prescribed Day of Atonement ceremonial, was conditioned by the subjective
attitude of the worshipper. In the light of this approach to the difficulty the
Rabbis and the Schoolmen seem to have some to the same type of solution. In the
larger issue it must be remembered that for both religions the sole essential
justification of the rites lay in the conviction that in performing them the
expressed will of God was being scrupulously obeyed. (Frank Gavin, The Jewish
Antecedents of the Christian Sacraments [London: Society for Promoting
Christian Knowledge, 1928], 19-21)
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