Commenting on Philo of Alexandria's theology of divine embodiment and his belief that souls are not created, Deborah Forger of the University of Michigan noted the following which is rather interesting:
In Leg. 1.33 in particular, which again is based on his exegesis of Gen 2:7, Philo works out the precise manner by which God’s spirit becomes united with human materiality precisely through the souls, and specifically that part of the human soul, namely the mind, of created humans. Here he raises the following hypothetical question: “Someone may ask … what is the meaning of [the expression] ‘breathed into’?” He responds to his own inquiry by explaining,
Now [the expression] “he breathed into (ἐνεφύσησεν)” is equal to “he inspired (ἐνέπνευσεν),” or “he gave life to (ἐψύχωσε)” things lifeless (τὰ ἄψυχα) … For there is need of three things, that which breathes in, that which receives [what is breathed in], and that which is breathed in. Now that which breathes in is God, that which receives [what is breathed in] is the mind, and that which is breathed in is the spirit. What then is inferred from these three things? A union of the three occurs, with God extending the power from himself through the mediant of the spirit as far as the subject. And why?—on account of, or in order that we may obtain a proper notion of him.
Leg. 1.36a, 37
This excerpt underscores how, through his hermeneutical reappropriation of Gen 2:7, Philo effectively articulates how he envisions a part, or an aspect Israel’s God intermingling with human corporeality through the souls of created humans: their souls contain a spark—or the very breath—of God within them. Philo describes the process as involving three primary characters. The first is God, the second is God’s spirit, and the third is the human mind. He then goes on to describe how God, the primary actor, takes God’s spirit, the secondary actor, and breathes it directly into the human mind, the third actor. In other words, God plants God’s spirit directly into the human mind, causing the very spirit of God to animate the souls of humanity. To further clarify this point, in Opif. 135, Philo asserts that the human soul is “nothing other than the divine spirit” and through the souls of humanity, God is “sent to settle here” from that “happy and blessed existence, for the advantage of our race.” Like the earthly human before them, the progenitor of their race, they receive their souls by God breathing the breath of life directly into their faces (QG 1.4). As a composite of material bodies and divinely inspired souls, humans stand apart from the rest of God’s creation. Their souls are neither created in the image of something else, nor are they the product or work of God’s divine intermediaries. Rather, coming directly from Israel’s uncreated God, they are also not-created.
This statement in Philo about the not-created nature of humanity’s soul is surprising for two primary reasons. First, if God were to create the human soul, this act would necessarily cause God to change. Yet because Philo’s God is immutable, his God cannot change. Consequently, the human soul cannot be created. Second, if the human soul is not-created, then it is not a part of the created world. This is significant because it underscores how Philo envisions that a part of Israel’s God can become embodied in humans through their souls. Since the souls of humans are constituted by a spark of the uncreated God, they also—like Israel’s highest divinity—must be not-created because they partake directly in God’s nature. The souls of humans embody a part of God within them, since—according to Philo’s anthropology—human souls are themselves “in a dynamic, mutually dependent relationship” with material, human bodies. (Deborah Forger, "Divine Embodiment in Philo of Alexandria," Journal for the Study of Judaism 49 [2018]:223-62, here, pp. 233-35, emphasis in bold added)
