Responding
to the “Epicurean Paradox,” Christadelphian apologist Jonathan Burke wrote:
1. Is God willing to prevent evil, but not
able? Then he is not omnipotent.
This premise fails because it assumes only
one sense of God being ‘not able’ to prevent evil; that He lacks the power to
do so. It therefore draws the invalid conclusion that God cannot be omnipotent if
He has the will to prevent evil but is unable to do so.
However, it is possible to assert God has
both the will and the power to prevent evil, but is ‘not able’ to do so for
reasons which have nothing to do with insufficient power. Two ways of asserting
this are the free will defense (addressing human evil), and the cost of
creation dense (addressing the evil of natural disasters).
The free will defense states that God, in
order to provide humans with the free will necessary for His purpose, must
necessarily permit them to commit acts of evil. God is therefore ‘not able’ to
prevent some forms of evil, not because He lacks omnipotence but because He is
restrained by His own purpose for creating humans . . .The cost of creation
defense states that the physical laws which will occasionally result in natural
disasters, are the very same physical laws required to create and sustain the
kind of life God needs for His purpose.
Removal of these physical laws would prevent
the evil of natural disasters, but would also prevent God creating and sustaining
the kind of life God requires for His purpose. Consequently, God is ‘not able’
to prevent such evil . . .
2. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent.
This premise fails because it assumes only
one sense of God being ‘not willing’ to prevent evil; that He lacks empathy
with His creation. It therefore draws the invalid conclusion that God is
malevolent if He has the ability to prevent evil and yet fails to do so because
He is in some sense ‘not willing’.
However, it is possible to assert God is ‘not
willing’ to prevent certain forms of evil for reasons which have nothing to do
with malevolence. On the contrary, it is possible to assert that one reason why
God is ‘not willing’ to prevent certain forms of evil, it is His benevolence; He
understands that those forms of evil result in positive outcomes which
ultimately provide greater benefit than the evil which is endured. This is an argument
found in the Bible itself. The writer of Hebrews draws an analogy between the
suffering we experience, and the discipline received by children from their
parents.
Hebrews 12:7 Endure your suffering as
discipline; God is treating you as sons. For what sons is there that a father does not discipline?
The analogy is highly appropriate, since
parents are both willing that their children’s suffering be minimized, and able
to reduce certain forms of suffering (by withholding disciple), yet they choose
not to, for the reason that the suffering has positive outcomes for the child’s
character and behavior. Yet no one would accuse parents being malevolent for
applying such disciple.
Hebrews 12:9 Besides, we have experienced
discipline from our earthly fathers and we respected them; shall we not submit ourselves all the more to the Father of spirits and
receive life? 10 or they disciplined us for a little while as seemed good
to them, but he does so for our benefit,
that we may share his holiness. 11 Now all discipline seems painful at the
time, not joyful. But later it produces
the fruit o peace and righteousness for those trained by it.
3. Is he both able and willing? Then whence
evil?
Since the major premises of the paradox have
been addressed with the free will defense and the cost of creation defense, the
answer to the question has already been supplied. The Epicurean Paradox is
therefore an ineffectual argument against either the existence of God or the
characteristics of the God of the Bible. (Jonathan Burke, Living on the Edge: Challenges to Faith [Reference Work Series vol.
1; Lulu Book, 2013], 371-73)