Actus Purus Is Oblivious and
Unconcerned
Like the God of the Bible, Aristotle’s
god is an immaterially simple being—without body or parts. Yet unlike the
simple God of the Bible, Aristotle’s god is both immobile and undifferentiated
(non-Trinitarian) in its simplicity. For Aristotle, an immobile and
undifferentiated simple God cannot contemplate anything other than that which
is also immobile and undifferentiated. Actus purus can only think of himself in
a single and eternal act of undifferentiated thought. Aristotle gives three reasons
for this:
1. Actus purus is undifferentiated
in its simplicity. This means that actus purus is identical to his thoughts.
Everything that is in God, even the concepts and thoughts in the mind of God,
is God. As Aristotle stated, “Thought and the object of thought are the same”
in God (Metaph., 12.7.8). Again, he said “Since thought and the object
of thought are not different in the case of things which contain no matter,
they will be the same, and the act of thinking will be one with the object of
thought” (Metaph., 12.9.5). For Aristotle, there is no distinction
between the pure and simple essence of God and the knowledge of God. And if God
could think about something other than himself, then those additional thoughts
would become essential to the very essence of God. Of course, this would
undermine God’s pure actuality, as it would make his essence dependent on
thoughts of things outside himself.
2. Because actus purus is
undifferentiated in his simplicity, he cannot make any distinctions within
himself. He is his thought, and thus his thought must be indivisible and
undifferentiated for him to remain indivisible and undifferentiated (Metaph.,
12.9.6). This not only rules out any thoughts about anything outside himself,
but it also rules out any differentiated thoughts about himself For God to
think about anything other than his simple, undifferentiated self, he would
cease to be undifferentiated in his simplicity. Thus, actus purus is pure
self-contemplation. Anything less would lead to a distinction within the mind
and essence of God.
3. Because actus purus is immobile
in his simplicity, he cannot process any divisible thought without there being
a movement within the act of thinking. Composite ideas, according to Aristotle,
include movement or “change in passing from one part of the whole to another” (Metaph.,
12.9.6). Therefore, claimed Aristotle, “surely it would be absurd of [God] to
think about some subjects” (Metaph., 12.9.3) because divine thought must
be “indivisible” (Metaph., 12.9.6)
Hence, the god of Aristotle,
according to B. A. G. Fuller, “knows only himself with a knowledge in which
there is a distinction neither of self from not-self, nor of the activity of
thought as such from its content” (B. A. G. Fuller, “The Theory of God in Book
A of Aristotle’s Metaphysics,” The Philosophical Review 16, no. 2 [March
1907], 173). “All God’s life and thought,” Fuller went on to explain, “are
locked up. He knows nothing about it, nothing but himself” (Fuller, 175). With
such a god as this, Aristotle turns things backward. The cosmos somehow can aspire
after God, but God knows nothing of the cosmos. Aristotle’s god is oblivious
and unconcerned about the affairs of men. Though this deistic god may be
simple, it is not the personal and relatable God of the Bible.
Actus Purus Cannot Create
According to the logic, actus
purus can’t be the efficient cause of the universe because an efficient cause
requires movement, which is impossible for the unmoved mover. The biblical account
of creation requires free and unnecessary acts of power in God. But if Aristotle’s
god cannot move, how will he actively move anything inside or outside himself?
Actus Purus Does Not Have a Free
Will
Actus purus can neither have any
unnecessary nor free acts of the will. Not only would this require movement in
the mind and the will of God, but it would also require a division within the
mind of God between what is essential and nonessential to his thinking.
According to Brian Davies, “The God of Aristotle is like a great, transcendent
magnet. There is a sense in which he causes or explains motion or change. But
he does not preside over it as doing what he wants to do. He does not act
voluntarily to get things done. He does not exercise will” (Brian Davies, The
Thought of Thomas Aquinas [Cambridge: Clarendon, 1993], 140).
Actus Purus Is Impersonal
In all this, actus purus is not
the personal and relatable God of the Bible. IT is impossible to have a
personal relationship with a god who is not even aware of us. Because actus
purus does not love us, it is hard to imagine any rational creature being motivated
to love this type of god in return. Is actus purus, who is cold, static, apathetic,
indifferent, unaware, and impersonal, the perfect being? Aristotle may have thought
so, but I am glad that divine revelation gives us a different definition of
God. (Jeffrey D. Johnson, The Failure of Natural Theology: A Critical
Appraisal of the Philosophical Theology of Thomas Aquinas [New Studies in
Theology; Conway, Ark.: Free Grace Press Academic, 2021], 67-69)
The following note is also apropos, at least from a Trinitarian framework:
The Trinity can interact with
creation in a personal and immanent way because he is inherently able to
differentiate between things within himself and things outside himself. Because
diversity is essential to the Godhead, God can distinguish between his
thoughts, emotions, acts, and time-related events. Yet he remains transcendent
and separate from creation because his unity is also equally essential to his
nature. Because he can differentiate between his will of decree and his will of
command, he is able to providently and emotionally interact with creation in a
personal way. But God also knows and sees all things at once. And ultimately nothing
can cause God to suffer because he knows and controls all things without there
being any change within himself. In sum, without the diversity of the three
persons, God’s simplicity would lead to pantheism. Conversely, without the oneness
of God’s essence, the relational properties inherent within the Trinity would
lead to open theism. Though from different directions, both pantheism and open
theism makes God dependent on creation. The equal ultimacy of the oneness and
diversity of the Trinity is the only safeguard to keep us from falling on
either side of the ditch. (Ibid., 162 n. 25)
