First Clement
The author of First
Clement (ca. 95 CE) believed humanity’s creation in God’s image
provided current opportunity for moral behavior (1 Clem. 33.4-8). The imago
Dei allows the Corinthian rebels to utilize their own desires to conform to
God’s desires. This rhetorical strategy could only be effective if the author
and reader shared a commonality of God’s ειωονα and/or ομοιωσιν retained within humans as free choice. This appears
in numerous passages (e.g., 1 Clem. 8.2, 11.1, 23.1), as the author
appeals to scripture.
Θεὸς γάρ,
φησίν, ὑπερηφάνοις ἀντιτάσσεται, ταπεινοῖς δὲ δίδωσιν χάριν. Κολληθῶμεν οὖν ἐκείνοις
οἷς ἡ χάρις ἀπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ δέδοται· ἐνδυσώμεθα τὴν ὁμόνοιαν, ταπεινοφρονοῦντες, ἐγκρατευόμενοι,
ἀπὸ παντὸς ψιθυρισμοῦ καὶ καταλαλιᾶς πόρρω ἑαυτοὺς ποιοῦντες, ἔργοις
δικαιούμενοι καὶ μὴ λόγοις (1 Clem. 30.2-3) [Lightfoot
translation: For God, He saith, resisteth the proud, but giveth grace to the
lowly. Let us therefore cleave unto those to whom grace is given from God. Let
us clothe ourselves in concord, being lowly-minded and temperate, holding
ourselves aloof from all backbiting and evil speaking, being justified by works
and not by words.]
In Clement’s
interpretation of Jas 4.6, God’s grace does not choose its recipients
unconditionally; it only comes to those who humble themselves and fear God. He
simultaneously emphasizes God’s sovereignty (1 Clem. 27). (Kenneth
M. Wilson, Augustine’s Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to “Non-free
Free Will” [Studien und Texte zu Antike und Christentum 111; Tübingen: Mohr
Siebeck, 2018], 41)
For Ignatius (ca. 110 CE), each
person bears either a stamp of God or the world (Ing. Magn. 5). The χαρακτηρα could possibly be interpreted as God’s
unilateral mark upon the faithful elect versus unbelievers, but his emphasis
upon voluntary martyrdom suggests otherwise. Ignatius implies we possess a free
choice that enables us to choose to suffer death with Christ resulting in life,
or alternatively clinging to life with death resulting. Persons decide between
the two ways.
ist weniger der Weg des Lebens und des
Todes ins Auge gefasst (so Did 1,1) als das Ziel, dem der Mensch auf seinem
Lebensweg, durch sein Handeln zusteuert, Jeder muss schliesslich, an seinem
Ort. (Paulson [1985], 49) [Eng: the path of life and death is
less in mind (so Did 1,1) than the goal that man is heading towards on his life
path, through his actions. Ultimately, everyone has to be in their place.]
Furthermore, Corwin analyzes Ignatius’
theology as supporting a view of sin resulting from ignorance rather than the
consequence of a devastating fall. The grace of God enables humans to utilize
their own desires in pursuing truth instead of false teachings.
Grace is thus essentially a
soteriological word, for it means the divine help extended to men for their
salvation. Sometimes it is loosely used as the equivalent for the whole saving
event (Phld. 11.1), but usually it carries more specific meaning. It is
by the grace of Jesus Christ that men can be loosed from the bonds of ignorance
that make them susceptible to the false teachings (Phld. 8.1). (Corwin
[1960], 164)
Each human freely chooses whether or
not to respond to God’s invitation of grace, particularly in martyrdom, since
God’s grace releases us from our ignorance, thereby allowing each person to
choose his or her eternal destiny. (Kenneth M. Wilson, Augustine’s
Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to “Non-free Free Will” [Studien
und Texte zu Antike und Christentum 111; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2018], 42-43)
Epistle of
Barnabas
The author (ca. 100-120 CE)
highlights human nature as having been corrupted (Barn. 16.7). "ἐποίησεν
γὰρ Κύριος πάντα ὄφιν δάκνειν αὐτούς, καὶ ἀπέθνησκον (ἐπειδὴ ἡ παράβασις διὰ τοῦ
ὄφεως ἐν Εὔᾳ ἐγένετο), ἵνα ἐλέγξῃ αὐτοὺς ὅτι διὰ τὴν παράβασιν αὐτῶν εἰς θλῖψιν
θανάτου παραδοθήσονται" (Barn. 12.5). [Lightfoot:
For the Lord caused all manner of serpents to bite them, and they died
(forasmuch as the transgression was wrought in Eve through the serpent), that
He might convince them that by reason of their transgression they should be
delivered over to the affliction of death.] Physical death results from
Adam’s fall while only personal sins cause a wicked heart.
Self-determination in association with
divine foreknowledge is found regarding the Jews: “εἰς τοῦτο οὖν, ἀδελφοί, ὁ
μακρόθυμος προβλέψας ὡς ἐν ἀκεραιοσύνῃ πιστεύσει ὁ λαὸς ὃν ἡτοίμασεν ἐν τῷ ἠγαπημένῳ
αὐτοῦ, προεφανέρωσεν ἡμῖν περὶ πάντων, ἵνα μὴ προσρησσώμεθα ὡς ἐπήλυτοι τῷ ἐκείνων
νόμῳ” (Barn. 3.6). [Lightfoot: To this end
therefore, my brethren, He that is long-suffering, foreseeing that the people
whom He had prepared in His well-beloved would believe in simplicity,
manifested to us beforehand concerning all things, that we might not as novices
shipwreck ourselves upon their law.] God’s justice is connected with
human responsibility: “λέγει δὲ ἡ γραφή·
Οὐκ ἀδίκως ἐκτείνεται δίκτυα πτερωτοῖς. τοῦτο λέγει ὅτι δικαίως ἀπολεῖται
ἄνθρωπος, ὃς ἔχων ὁδοῦ δικαιοσύνης γνώσιν, ἑαυτὸν εἰς ὁδὸν σκότους ἀποσυνέχει”
(Barn. 5.4). [Now the scripture saith; Not
unjustly is the net spread for the birds. He meaneth this that a man shall
justly perish, who having the knowledge of the way of righteousness forceth
himself into the way of darkness] Thus, God’s foreknowledge of human
belief affects Gods’ actions in salvation. The human nature is fallen but
without evidence for inherited sin. (Kenneth M. Wilson, Augustine’s
Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to “Non-free Free Will” [Studien
und Texte zu Antike und Christentum 111; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2018], 43)
Epistle to
Diognetus
One paragraph in this epistle (Diogn.
9.5-6) could represent Divine Unilateral Predetermination of Individual’s
Eternal Destinies. However, other paragraphs do not allow this interpretation.
The Father sent Christ
ὡς πρὸς ἀνθρώπους ἔπεμψεν, ὡς σώζων ἔπεμψεν,
ὡς πείθων, οὐ βιαζόμενος· βία γὰρ οὐ πρόσεστι τῷ Θεῷ. ἔπεμψεν ὡς καλῶν, οὐ διώκων· ἔπεμψεν ὡς ἀγαπῶν,
οὐ κρίνων. πέμψει γὰρ αὐτὸν κρίνοντα, καὶ
τίς αὐτοῦ τὴν παρουσίαν ὑποστήσεται΄΄ (Diogn. 7.[4]-6) [Lightfoot: Not so. But in gentleness [and] meekness has He
sent Him, as a king might send his son who is a king. He sent Him, as sending
God; He sent Him, as [a man] unto men; He sent Him, as Saviour, as using
persuasion, not force: for force is no attribute of God. He sent Him, as
summoning, not as persecuting; He sent Him, as loving, not as judging. For He
will send Him in judgment, and who shall endure His presence?]
The author urgently desires to rescue
his readers from the Judge’s future coming.
ὅταν τὸν ὄντως θάνατον φοβηθῇς, ὃς
φυλάσσεται τοῖς κατακριθησομένοις εἰς τὸ πῦρ τὸ αἰώνιον, ὃ τοὺς παραδοθέντας αὐτῷ
μέχρι τέλους κολάσει (Diong. 10.7; cf. Jas 5.9) [Lightfoot:
when thou shalt despise the apparent death which is here on earth, when thou
shalt fear the real death, which is reserved for those that shall be condemned
to the eternal fire that shall punish those delivered over to it unto the end.]
This punishment from God upon humans
would result from exceeding wickedness in humankind—only God himself stood
capable of saving humankind through his Son (Diogn. 9.1-2). Semisch
notes human inability requiring God’s mercy
If they inherited eternal life, it
would not be owning to the worthiness of their disposition, but purely to the
divine mercy, and that universally would be capable of entering the kingdom of
heaven, not by their own indwelling power, but by the power of God. (Semisch
[1883], 205)
Meecham concurred: “’The inability of
our nature to obtain life . . . a Savior able to save’: We have here a demonstration
of the doctrine of salvation by grace.” (Meecham [1949], 298) Despite
wickedness and an inability to enter life independently, free choice allows
persons to desire God and respond in faith, while this freedom still remains
compatible with God’s sovereignty.
ᾧ πάντα διατέτακται καὶ διώρισται καὶ ὑποτέτακται,
οὐρανοὶ καὶ τὰ ἐν οὐρανοῖς, γῆ καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ γῇ, θάλασσα καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ θαλάσσῃ, πῦρ,
ἀήρ, ἄβυσσος, τὰ ἐν ὕψεσι, τὰ ἐν βάθεσι, τὰ ἐν τῷ μεταξύ. (Diogn. 7[.2]) [Lightfoot: by Whom all things are ordered and bounded and
placed in subjection, the heavens and the things that are in the heavens, the
earth and the things that are in the earth, the sea and the things that are in
the sea, fire, air, abyss, the things that are in the heights, the things that
are in the depths, the things that are between the two.]
Meecham writes of Diogn. 10.1-11.8, “Free-will is implied in his
capacity to become ‘a new man’ (ii,I) and in God’s attitude of appeal rather
than compulsion (vii, 4).” (Meecham [1949], 29-30) God does not compel anyone
but foreknows choices by which he correspondingly chooses. (Kenneth M. Wilson, Augustine’s Conversion
from Traditional Free Choice to “Non-free Free Will” [Studien und Texte zu
Antike und Christentum 111; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2018], 43-44)
