20. Still, the utterance of the
Apostle will seem to force us to the conclusion that we are not free agents.
Putting an objection, he says, "Thou wilt say then unto me, Why doth he
still find fault? For who withstandeth his will? Nay but, O man, who art thou
that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it,
Why hadst thou made me thus? Or hath not the potter a right over the clay, from
the same lump to make one part a vessel unto honour, and another unto
dishonour?" A reader may well say, "If, as the potter from the same
lump makes some vessels unto honour and some unto dishonour, so also God makes
some unto salvation and some to perdition, it follows that we have nothing to
do with our salvation or perdition: nor are we free agents." Let me ask a
reader who makes this use of the words, if he can imagine the Apostle
contradicting himself. I do not think any one will dare say this. Well, then,
if the Apostle does not contradict himself, how does the reader who thus understands
him mean to show that the Apostle reasonably finds fault when he blames the
Corinthian fornicator, or those who fell into sin and did not repent of the
lasciviousness and incontinence which they committed? And how is it that he
blesses for their well-doing those whom he praises, as, for instance, the house
of Onesiphorus, saying, "The Lord grant mercy unto the house of
Onesiphorus: for he oft refreshed me, and was not ashamed of my chain: but,
when he was in Rome, he sought me diligently, and found me. The Lord grant unto
him to find mercy of the Lord in that day." Surely it is not consistent
for the same Apostle to censure the sinner because he deserves blame, and
congratulate the well-doer because he deserves praise; and, contrariwise, as if
nothing depended on ourselves, maintain that the Creator of the world is
responsible for one vessel being unto honour, and another unto dishonour. How
can it be sound doctrine that, "We must all stand before the judgment-seat
of Christ, that each one may receive the things done in the body, according to
what he hath done, whether it be good or bad," if they who have done evil
have so conducted themselves because they were created vessels of dishonour,
and they who have lived virtuous lives have done that which is right, because
originally they were fashioned thereto and were vessels of honour? And again,
is not what is said elsewhere inconsistent with the view that it is the fault
of the Creator if "one vessel is in honour and another in dishonour,"
as the critics infer from what we have quoted? "In a great house," we
read, "there are not only vessels of gold and silver, but also of wood and
of earth; and some unto honour and some unto dishonour. If a man therefore
purge himself from these, he shall be a vessel unto honour, sanctified, meet
for the master's use, prepared unto every good work." For if he who purges
himself becomes a vessel unto honour, while he who carelessly leaves himself
unpurged becomes a vessel unto dishonour, the Creator cannot, so far as these
words go, be held responsible. For the Creator makes vessels of honour and
vessels of dishonour, not originally according to His foreknowledge, since He
does not, according to it, condemn or justify beforehand, but He makes them
vessels of honour who purge themselves, and them vessels of dishonour who
carelessly leave themselves unpurged. So that from antecedent causes for making
the vessels to honour and dishonour it arises that one man is to honour and
another to dishonour.
21. But if we once admit that there
are certain antecedent causes for one vessel being a vessel of honour, and
another a vessel of dishonour, what absurdity is there in going back to the
mystery of the soul, and understanding that there were antecedent causes for
Jacob's being loved and Esau's being hated; as regards Jacob, before his
assumption of a body, and as regards Esau, before he was conceived in the womb?
At the same time it clearly appears that, so far as the subject nature is
concerned, as there is one and the same lump of clay subject to the potter, out
of which vessels are made to honour and dishonour: so, though there is one
common soul nature subject to God, and, if I may so speak, one lump of rational
subsistences, certain antecedent causes have made some men to be unto honour
and others to dishonour. And if the Apostle's question conveys a rebuke,
"Nay, O man, who art thou that repliest against God? it perhaps teaches
that he who has confidence towards God, as a man of faith and good life, would
not have the question addressed to him, "Who art thou that repliest
against God?" Such an one was Moses; for Moses spake, and God answered him
by a Voice, and as God answers Moses, so also the holy man answers God. But he
who has not this confidence, manifestly, either because he has lost it, or
because he investigates these topics not from a love of learning but in a
contentious spirit, and therefore says, "Why doth he still find fault? For
who withstandeth his will?" this man would deserve the rebuke, "Nay,
O man, who art thou that repliest against God?"
22. But to those who introduce
different natures, and use the present passage in support, I have this to say:
If they make good their contention that from one lump are made both those who
are perishing and those who are being saved, and that the Creator of those who
are being saved is the Creator also of those who are perishing, and if He is
good Who maketh not only men who are spiritual, but also those who are earthy
(for this is a consequence of their doctrine), it is nevertheless possible that
a man who in the present time has through certain previous deeds of
righteousness become a vessel of honour, may, if he do not the like things, nor
such as befits the vessel of honour, become in a different age a vessel of
dishonour; as, on the contrary, it is possible that although through causes
prior to this life a man has here become a vessel of dishonour, when his faults
have been corrected, he may become a vessel of honour in the new creation,
sanctified and meet for the Master's use, prepared unto every good work. And
perhaps the Israelites of our day, if they live unworthily of their high
descent, will degenerate, and change as it were from vessels of honour to
vessels of dishonour; and many of the Egyptians and Edomites of the present
time, whenever they shall bring forth fruit abundantly, will enter the Church
of the Lord, being no longer accounted Egyptians and Edomites, but future
Israelites; so that, according to this, some through their deliberate choice
advance from bad to good, while others fall away from good to bad; and others
are kept in goodness, or rise step by step from good to better, and others,
again, abide in evil, or, because their wickedness abounds, grow worse and
worse.
23. And since the Apostle in one place
does not pretend that it rests with God whether a man becomes a vessel unto
honour or unto dishonour, but puts the whole responsibility upon us, saying,
"If then a man purge himself, he shall be a vessel unto honour, sanctified
and meet for the master's use, prepared unto every good work"; and
elsewhere he does not pretend that it depends upon us but lays the whole
responsibility upon God, when he asserts that "the potter hath a right
over the clay, to make one vessel unto honour and another unto
dishonour",and his statements are not contradictory; we must bring them
both together, and from the two draw one sound conclusion. The power we have
does not compel us to advance in goodness apart from the knowledge of God, nor
does the knowledge of God compel us to advance unless we also contribute to the
good result; for neither does our power apart from the knowledge of God, and
the full use of what is in a worthy sense our "power," make a man to
be unto honour or unto dishonour; nor does God's power alone fashion a man unto
honour or dishonour unless He have our choice, inclining to the better or the
worse, as a sort of raw material out of which to make the difference. This may
suffice for our treatment of Free Will. (The Philocalia of Origen, chapter 21)
