In his commentary on Exodus, William H.C. Propp offered the following translation of Exo 2:11-15a (emphasis in bold added):
And it happened in those days, and Moses grew. And he went out to his brothers and looked upon their tasks and saw an Egyptian man striking a Hebrew man from his brothers. And he turned like this and like this, and he saw that there was no man. Then he struck the Egyptian and hid him in the sand. And he went out on the second day, and, see: two Hebrew men fighting. And he said to the evil one, “Why do you strike your fellow?” But he said, “Who set you as a man, ruler and judge over us? To kill me, do you say, as you killed the Egyptian?” And Moses feared and said, “The affair has become known after all.” And Pharaoh heard this affair and sought to kill Moses. So Moses fled from Pharaoh’s face and settled in the land of Midian.
In the textual note to Exo 2:12, wherein Moses kills the Egyptian taskmaster, Propp writes:
struck. Hebrew hikkâ may imply lethal force, but often does not (e.g., vv.11, 13). Later the Hebrew combatant truly names Moses’ deed: hāragtā ‘you killed’ (v. 14). (William H.C. Propp, Exodus 1-18: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary [AB 2; New York: Doubleday, 1999], 164)
Elsewhere, in his discussion of this event, Propp notes:
In the first episode, Moses sees an Egyptian striking a Hebrew. The severity of the beating is uncertain, as hikkâ ‘hit’ can also mean “kill.” But the intent and effect are probably not lethal (see NOTE 2:12 [quoted above]). Since Moses has gone out to behold Israel’s tasks, Rashi infers that the culprit is one of the corvée masters (1:11). This may be so, but the aggressor is called simply “an Egyptian man.” The author is not primarily depicting the relationship between slaves and their bosses, but between Israel and Egypt.
Moses gazes around, either in hopes of finding someone else to save the Hebrew or failing that, to ascertain the absence of witnesses (NOTE to 2:12). Then he kills (hikkâ) the Egyptian. Lexically, we might say, the Egyptian gets his just deserts, blow for blow (Cassuto 1967:22). But the beating he receives differs from the beating he was dispensing, and Moses’ act is morally wrong. Lamech once boasted he would “kill a man for wounding me, and a child for hitting me” (Gen 4:23 [J]). If this is unacceptable, how much less entitled is Moses to kill for the wounding of a stranger! By biblical law, moderately drubbing a slave is permissible (21:20-21). Thus, for all Moses or we know, the Hebrew deserves his punishment.
It is not killing per se that disturbs the author; the Torah is not pacifist tract. There are military victories and bloody executions; the Levites (32:26-29) and Phinehas (Numbers 25) are even rewarded for (justifiable) homicide with sacred offices. There is, however, a world of difference between killing in obedience to Yahweh and killing to avenge a beating. And Moses does not even sin boldly. The Levites and Phineas do not peer this way and that before striking.
Thus, Moses’ violence is not that of the macho solider. Were he the typical hero, his youthful deed would start him on a life of conquests (for midrashim on Moses’ military prowess, see Ginzberg 1928:2:283-89). He would eventually challenge the armies of Egypt and personally defeat Pharaoh. Then he would lead his people in triumph to the promised land, which he would conquer and rule in splendor. Instead, the hero who accomplishes all this is “Yahweh Man of War” (15:3).
At any rate, despite the lack of witnesses, the news gets around, presumably spread by the rescue Hebrew (O’Connell n.d.). When Moses subsequently sees two Hebrews fighting, he can no more forebear from this conflict than from the first. By styling one of the adversaries “the evil one,” the author emphasizes the parallel with the first incident. Here is another act of oppression, the more heinous because victim and aggressor are compatriots.
Whether he has learned a lesson about rashness, or whether he is more patient with Hebrews than with Egyptians, this time Moses does not shoot first and ask questions later. He makes the inquiry he should have made the first time: has the apparent aggressor good cause? But Moses is rebuffed with rude words that implicitly admit guilt. The malfeasant saves himself from a beating or worse by shocking Moses with the revelation that his own crime is known. Instantly, he ceases to worry about the beaten slave and begins to think of his own safety. By breaking off, the text implies that Moses quits the scene at once leaving matters unresolved. (Ibid., 166-67, comment in square bracket added for clarification)
This is interesting as Latter-day Saints have (correctly) noted that Moses was not guilty of premeditated murder, but (excusable, to some degree) homicide. For more, see Malin L. Jacobs and Stanley D. Barker, Question 10 Murder an unpardonable sin and Moses
A somewhat related topic is that of D&C 132:26:
