Saturday, January 15, 2022

Critique of Calvin's Attempting to Make a Distinction from People Sinning from "Necessity" while Saying Such Sinful Actions are still "Voluntarily"

  

 

[According to Calvin] One must make a distinction between saying that people sin from “necessity” and yet saying they sin “voluntarily.”

 

[Calvin] agrees with Bernard’s position: “Bernard says not improperly, that all of us have a will; but to will well is proficiency, to will ill is defect. Thus, simply to will is the part of man, to will ill the part of corrupt nature, to will well the part of grace” and thus, “I will say that the will, deprived of liberty, is led or dragged by necessity to evil” (Institutes, 2.3.5). He—with Aquinas—says that, while God is totally good and can only do good, he freely does good [1]. The Devil, on the other hand, is evil, but he freely does evil. To say it another way, Calvin quotes Augustine: “Man through liberty became a sinner, but corruption, ensuing as the penalty, has converted liberty into necessity” and then he adds, “Whenever mention is made of the subject, he hesitates not to speak in this way of the necessary bondage of sin” (Institutes, 2.3.5).

 

IT is hard for this writer not to conclude that by what he says he is evading the issue. One can readily agree that Adam freely chose—without compulsion—to disobey God. But how is it that a person does something “voluntarily” if the “will is deprived of liberty”? [2] Does not “necessity” refer to what a person must do because of his nature? True, prior to the fall (of the Devil and man), both had the freedom to choose among a range of options each compatible with their natures, but now, according to the Calvinistic views, they have only one option: evil. Only the grace of God can change this bondage in man by expanding his range of options, spiritually giving him the ability to respond to the good. Is not Calvin, then, assuming his conclusion, that is, that despite saying that people sin by necessity, they nevertheless have freedom? If the will responds to the person’s reasoning (Calvin affirms this) and is understanding is corrupted (with this Calvin also agrees), does it not follow that the will only wills (in agreement with the intellect) what is evil? [3] Is this not implied by Calvin in Bondage and Liberation? “We say that man’s mind is smitten with blindness, so that of itself it can in no way reach the knowledge of the truth; we say that his will is corrupted by wickedness, so that he can neither love God, nor obey his righteousness” (Calvin, Bondage and Liberation, 320). There can be no freedom for man—elect or non-elect—apart from the grace of God.

 

Remarkably, Calvin quotes Augustine to the same effect, though he would prefer that the word “free-will” be “abolished” from theological vocabulary:

 

Augustine hesitates not to call the will a slave. In another passage he is offered with those who deny free will; but his chief reason for this is explained when he says, “Only lest anyone should presume so to deny freedom of will, from a desire to excuse sin.” It is certain, he elsewhere admits, that without the Spirit the will of man is not free, inasmuch as it is subject to lusts which chain and master it. And again, that nature began to want liberty the moment the will was vanquished by the revolt into which it fell. Again, that man, by making a bad use of free will, lost both himself and his will. Again, that free will having been made a captive, can do nothing in the way of righteousness. Again, that no will is free which has been made so by divine grace. Again, that the righteousness of God is not fulfilled when the law orders, and man acts, as it were, by his own strength, but when the Spirit assists, and the will (not the free will of man, but the will freed by God) obeys. He briefly states the ground of all these observations, when he says, that man at his creation received a great degree of free will, but lost it by sinning. (Institutes, 2.3.8)

 

Perhaps it is fair to say that this particular discussion of “necessity” versus “voluntary” has led to a dead-end and is not fruitful. Augustine and Calvin are correct in concluding that, if the “will is not free,” it leads to a form of fatalism: a person cannot sin. (Timothy A. Stratton, Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism: A Biblical, Historical, Theological, and Philosophical Analysis [Eugene, Oreg.: Wipf and Stock, 2020], 118-20, italics in original, comments in square brackets added for clarification)

 

Notes for the above (renumbered):

 

[1] Aquinas, however, is not arguing like Calvin. The former speaks of divine freedom dealing with choices related to sitting or standing, sending rain or withholding rain, etc. God does not have freedom to do otherwise when it is opposed to his nature, and thus, theologians would argue God cannot choose to do evil. This does not necessarily mean that God does not possess a form of libertarian freedom known as “Source Incompatibilism.” Kevin Timpe writes: “Source Incompatibilism is the claim that what is most important for an agent’s free will is the agent being the [ultimate] source of her actions” (Timpe, Free Will, 12).

 

[2] Lane distinguishes the way “free choice” is used in Calvin. One he calls “psychological freedom”: “Human choice is free in the sense that it is not coerced by external forces but moves voluntarily, of its own accord” (lane, “Bondage and Liberations,” 19). This is the way Aquinas uses the term. [It is interesting that another Calvinist scholar—G.C. Berkouwer (1962)—rejects this sense of “free-will.” See Lane, “Did Calvin Believe?”, 80]. The other way Lane describes free choice he calls “ethical freedom” or “that a free will has the power to choose between good and evil by its own strength” (Lane, Bondage and Liberation,” 19)

 

[3] It is hard to understand Lane’s conclusion: “If Calvin appears to state that the will cannot but follow the intellect, this is because he is incautious in his use of language, not because he wished to affirm something that was patently false and which he was about to contradict” (Lane, “Bondage and Liberation,” 17). That God’s grace infuses the elect with “right reason” does not set aside that the will follows the reason, a reason enabled to see “light and truth” and, in the case of the non-elect—because of irremediable, dark reasoning—rejects the grace of God. The quotation above from Calvin’s later publication Bondage and Liberation supports this conclusion.