Saturday, January 15, 2022

Logical Argument Against (especially "Edwardsian" [Jonathan Edwards' style of]) Compatibilism

  

G1 If compatibilism is true, then determinism is true.

 

G2 If determinism is true, then no human possesses the libertarian freedom to ever think otherwise.

 

G3 If one does not ever possess the libertarian freedom to think otherwise then he cannot rationally affirm knowledge claims.

 

G4 Some Calvinists have rationally affirmed that compatibilism is true.

 

G5 Therefore, it is possible to rationally affirm knowledge claims.

 

G6 Therefore, some Calvinists possess the libertarian freedom to think otherwise.

 

G7 Therefore, determinism and compatibilism are false.

 

This logical argument provides good reason for a rational thinker to reject compatibilism. Yet compatibilists continue to claim that a person can still be free and/or responsible even though everything about him is ultimately always causally determined by God, and he never could have actually chosen to think, believe, or behave otherwise. . . . the compatibilist cannot rationally affirm or justify any of his beliefs as objectively better or worse than a competing belief—for even the evaluations of his own thoughts and beliefs will also be determined by his greatest desires! Therefore, the Edwardsian compatibility cannot ever possess knowledge that a specific belief is good, bad, better, or worse (let alone true) than a competing belief. His belief (even if true) is not justified and thus, does not count as a knowledge claim. It follows that if the compatibilist really has rationally inferred that compatibilism is a better explanation than libertarianism, then his view of Edwardsian compatibilism must be false. As a result, the compatibilist has inadvertently defeated his project by way of his project. Ultimately, according to the Edwardsian compatibilist, the only reason he has chosen to reject libertarian freedom is because he has a “greater desire” for exhaustive divine determinism (EDD) to be true. That is not a good (rational) reason to believe anything. Subjective personal preference is vastly different than selecting a view based on objective truth. (Timothy A. Stratton, Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism: A Biblical, Historical, Theological, and Philosophical Analysis [Eugene, Oreg.: Wipf and Stock, 2020], 182-83, 184)