Omniscience
At this stage, I wish to put to
work the points developed in the previous chapter concerning the analytic connection
between truth and the beliefs of an omniscient being. It is here, I
think, that it becomes most apparent that (as Hartshorne says) “truth is irrelevant
to a water”. (These connections will also prove crucial in responding to the
further problems to come.) Simply put: insofar as we are prepared to admit that
the current beliefs of an omniscient being are irrelevant to a wager—and I think
that we are—we should be prepared to admit that truth is similarly irrelevant.
Consider the following:
A: Let’s bet £5 on rain tomorrow.
If there’s rain, you owe me £5, and if now, I owe you £4. Deal?
B: Deal.
[A day passes, and there is rain
A: You owe me £5!
B: Not so.
A: And why is that?
B: Well, yesterday there was an
omniscient being—God—and yesterday that being didn’t anticipate rain today. Isn’t
that right, God?
GOD: Yes, that’s right. With
respect to rain, yesterday I had no anticipation concerning what would happen
today; I didn’t anticipate rain, although of course. I didn’t anticipate the
absence of rain.
B: And, God, yesterday, you were
omniscient, weren’t you?
GOD: Of course.
B: So yesterday, it wasn’t true
that there would be rain today.
GOD: Yes, that’s right.
B: So I’m not paying up; what A
bet was the case, and we have seen, wasn’t the case.
B’s posture in this dialogue if, of
course, absurd—but the trick is accurately to diagnose from whence the
absurdity comes. One option is to maintain that B’s posture is absurd on
grounds that B’s—and God’s—philosophical view of truth is absurd; they
are both mistakes not maintain that God could have been omniscient yesterday,
despite not anticipating today’s rain. B is not wrong about the nature and
content of A’s bet; B is simply wrong to allege that the proposition A was betting
was true wasn’t in fact true. But even if such an explanation were available,
such an explanation, in my view, is simply not needed. A should respond, n the
first instance, not by challenging God’s claim to having been omniscient
(although I grant that that may be done), but by challenging the relevance of
the supposition that God was omniscient to her winning the bet. On my
view, that is, A should respond as follows:
A: When yesterday I was betting on
rain, I plainly wasn’t betting something like this: “I hereby bet that any
omniscient being who might exist currently anticipates rain tomorrow.” Insofar as
I wasn’t, I was likewise not betting something like this: “I hereby bet that it
is currently true that there will be rain tomorrow.” So the fact that yesterday
God’s didn’t anticipate rain today is irrelevant, and so similarly is the fact
that yesterday it wasn’t true that there would be rain today.
A's posture is reasonable. B’s
conception of truth (and God’s claim that yesterday he was omniscient) are also
reasonable. But even if that is so, B’s refusal to pay isn’t.
The case of an omniscient being
further helps to dispel the sense that, on the open future, there is nothing to
place a bet on—after all, ex hypothesi, it is not true that it
will rain, and not true that it will rail to rain. And if this is so, and we
know it, where is the room for betting? But consider:
A: Let’s bet £5 on rain tomorrow.
IF there’s rain, you owe me £5, and if not, I owe you £5. Deal?
B: Well, unfortunately, there’s
nothing really to bet on here. For here is an omniscient being—God—and right
now, God does not anticipate rain tomorrow, and God does not anticipate an absence
of rain tomorrow. Isn’t that right, God?
GOD: That’s right.
B: So unfortunately, any betting
here makes no sense. If you were going to bet on rain tomorrow, you would have
to betting that God currently anticipates rain tomorrow. And fi I were going to
bet on no rain tomorrow, I would have to be betting that God currently anticipates
no rain tomorrow. But, as we have just seen, God has no anticipation either way
at this stage, and so it would be senseless for us to place bets on what God’s
anticipations are on this matter; God has no such anticipations.
A: Well, OK—that may be senseless,
given what God just said, but why do we have to place bets on God’s
anticipations? Why can’t we just place bets on rain tomorrow?
B: But, look, placing a bet “on
rain” tomorrow is equivalent to placing a bet on the claim that any omniscient
being anticipates rain tomorrow. So, again, there is no space to simply bet “on
rain” without betting that any omniscient being anticipates rain.
A: Let me try again. We don’t have
to place bets on God’s current anticipations regarding rain tomorrow. We can simply,
by saying some relevant words, agree that any scenario with rain
tomorrow shall therefore be a scenario in which you owe me £5, and any scenario
with no rain tomorrow shall therefore be a scenario in which I owe you £5—regardless
of whether, in the envisaged scenario, God had previously anticipated rain or
instead no rain. Shall we agree?
B: OK. We shall.
And all is well. A and B have bet
on rain tomorrow, but have no need for acts about whether it will rain
tomorrow. (Patrick Todd, The Open Future: Why Future Contingents are All
False [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021], 127-29)
