A fourth expression requiring
explanation is the maxim that “outside the Church there is no salvation”. This
is quite misunderstood if it is taken at all to say that no one outside the
Church can go to Heaven. What is meant is that there is no “covenanted”
salvation outside the Church. And by “covenanted” salvation we mean salvation
attached (by a Divine pledge, promise, or covenant) to the fulfilling of
certain Divinely revealed condition. Granted only that the individual has failed
in his obligation of Church membership through invincible ignorance, and at
once his chances of being saved are, ceteris paribus, revived. But they
do not depend in such a case on a Divine promise, on a definite Divine pledge,
on a Divine covenant of which the terms are knowable and rather closely
definable. They depend in such a case entirely on conjecture and hope as to
what God will do in His infinite love and mercy for those who are fulfilling
His will to the best of their knowledge, and who fall in a major obligation
through no fault of their own. It does not seem doubtful in the present writer
that we may justly have the most optimistic hopes in such a case, and with the
greatest confidence. For the basis of our hope is the revealed infinite mercy
and love of God. And God is in no way bound to keep within the limits of His
covenant, though we men are.
But it is of the very essence of
such uncovenanted grace that it is lacking in the certitude and definiteness of
covenanted grace. Moreover, a still more vital attribute of it is that we may confidently
expect people to receive it only as long as their need of it not in any way
their own fault. Thus, if what begins by being invincible ignorance because at
any point vincible, the situation is altered entirely in its very heart and
essence. We cannot help having grace and manifold doubts about the individual’s
status in God’s sight in such a case. And we most remember that ignorance or
error is vincible—culpable, blameworthy—not only where it is in bad faith, but
also even where it is completely in good faith, provided only it could
reasonable have been overcome. That is the reason why it is so extremely
difficult to defend—or even to view with equanimity—the participation by
Catholics in schismatic worship, and especially in schematic sacraments, even
where the sacraments in question are valid. The matter becomes immeasurably
more serious where the sacraments are not only schismatic but invalid as well.
Such Churchmen may be in perfectly good faith. But can their ignorance be
invincible?
Schismatic corporate worship,
whether sacramental or not, must be held to be, objectively speaking, a
violation of God’s gracious covenant with mankind, and indeed an act of
rebellion against His will. This is not to say that is, granted its complete
good faith, either devoid of Divine grace to the sincere worshippers, or
displeasing (under the circumstances) to God. Undoubtedly Divine grace is most
bountifully dispensed outside God’s covenant with mankind. And equally undoubtedly
the objectively rebellious schismatic meetings are often motivated by such
glorious subjective loyalty to God that they cannot but be supremely pleasing
to Him. But all the same, it is the good faith and splendid loyalty which is so
pleasing to God, not its objective miscarriage in producing acts truly disobedient
in their nature. Hence for Catholics to participate in them is very wrong, not
only in itself, but also and especially because it gives those who are in error
encouragement to persevere in their error, secure in the conviction that
Catholics themselves are already beginning to admit that it is not really error
at all.
The obligation to loyal and
obedient membership in the Church, like all other obligations, even though
absolute (i.e., unconditional) cannot be the cause or the occasion of what
theologians call “formal” sin to those who are “invincibly ignorant” of its very
existence. If such fail to fulfill an obligation there is involved what is
called a “material” sin; i.e., a real wrong has been committed, even though it
be a wrong of omission rather than commission. But it is not a “formal” sin;
that is, it is not true sin at all. For sin, in the true and strict sense, is
possible only when one knows one is doing wrong, and freely goes
ahead despite such knowledge. Hence such people can beyond doubt be saved by
God’s uncovenanted grace and mercies, as expounded just above. (Felix L.
Cirlot, Apostolic Succession: Is it True? An Historical and Theological
Inquiry [El Paso, Tex., 1949], 15-16)
ON
INVINCIBLE IGNORANCE
Several times we have already had
occasion above to use the term “invincible ignorance.” It is of the utmost
importance to gain an accurate idea of what it means by “invincible ignorance.”
By it we mean excusable ignorance, ignorance which is not one’s own
fault, ignorance which could not reasonably have been avoided. It is important
to stress here that to ascribe invincible ignorance to a man is not in any way
to insult him. In fact it is not even in any manner or degree to disparage him;
except, indeed, in whatever sense one must be held to disparage everyone with
whom one is unable to agree. For “invincible ignorance” does not necessarily
imply a lack of knowledge, but only (for whatever reason) a blameless failure
to reach the truth, however great one’s knowledge. It may, and often does,
arise from total ignorance of the subject. But it may also spring from
indifference, from bias, from inadequately grounded presupposition, according
to some philosophies from the “type of mind” one possesses, or from any other
of the infinite variety of reasons which lead even the greatest of experts to
err occasionally despite the possession of monumental knowledge in their
respective fields. In fact, to ascribe to an opponent “invincible ignorance” is
usually the highest compliment one can possibly pay him, next to agreeing with
him. It is really what is always meant (whether or not he so expresses himself)
whenever one scholar disagrees with another, without calling in question
either his ability or his sincerity. If, e.g., one differs from Harnack on
the Lukan authorship of Acts, one has no alternative but to believe Harnack
mistaken. And in that case the most favourable view that can be passed on his
mistake is that it is due to “invincible ignorance.” That means simply that we
hold him to be quite sincere and to have neglected nothing that ought
reasonably to have been done to arrive at the truth. Yet we must hold, ex
hypothesi, that he failed to attain it.
If we hold that he has been
deficient in sincerity, or in seriousness, or in any other reasonably
remediable way, then we call his ignorance—his error, his i—no longer
“invincible” but “vincible.” That is a more serious charge. For “vincible”
ignorance means ignorance for which one is, at least in some way and in some
measure, responsible. Here one not only disagrees, but holds the opponent in
some manner responsible for what he must ex hypothesi hold to be
an error. Obviously such a judgment is much more unfavourable than the one
involved in ascribing to an opponent invincible ignorance. Obviously, also, if
one is really mistaken, and if his mistake is really due to vincible
ignorance, he is at least in some measure responsible for any wrong
committed because of such a mistake. Hence vincible ignorance of an
obligation does not excuse from its fulfillment, at least not fully. There is
involved in such a case at least what theologians call responsibility “in case”
(in causā). That is, one is directly responsible for the cause of
the objective wrong done, and hence is indirectly responsible for the objective
wrong itself. Thus there is involved, at least in a measure, sin as well
as wrong. (Ibid., 590-91)
