The following excerpts are from:
Peter
Martyr Vermigli, Predestination and Justification: Two Theological Loci (trans.
Frank A. James III; The Peter Martyr Library 8; Sixteenth Century Essays &
Studies 68; Moscow, Idaho: The Davenant Institute, 2018)
Certainly, if we speak correctly and
properly, God cannot be said to be the cause of sins, yet we cannot utterly
exclude him from the government and ordering of sins, for he is the cause of
those actions which to us are sins; although since they are from God, they are simple
justice, for God punishes sins by sins. Therefore, sins as punishments are laid
upon men by God, as by a just judge. (p. 23)
I am aware that some have tried to
reconcile statements of the fathers with this true doctrine we have now proved
by many reasons. They say that when the fathers write that predestination is
based on foreseen works, they do not understand by the name predestination the
work or action of God by which he elects or predestines any person. Rather,
they understand the purpose and certain means [of God’s works], and in that
regard, nothing can prevent works from being causes, for it is certain that the
final damnation comes from works as the cause and that good works spring from
faith as from their head or fountain.
I see that the intention of those who
labor to apply the statements of the fathers to the truth (as far as is possible),
is not to be denied. However, I cannot say that what the fathers assert is
true, for certain statements of theirs are so harsh that they cannot be drawn
to this meaning at all. To defend the freedom of our will they deny that everything
depends on God’s predestination. They intend to say that everything does not
depend on God, that something is also required of us. They say explicitly that
God elects some because he foresaw they would believe. Occasionally, they also say
many other such things, so that by no means can I see how their statements can
agree with our doctrine on this point. (p. 40)
JUSTIFICATION
Tsadac is a Hebrew verb that in the first conjugation
means “he was just”; if the word is translated according to the third conjugation,
it signifies that justice is transferred to another, for this is the force of
the form of those verbs which they call hiph’il. Just as ‘amad indicates “to stand,” so he’emid
means “to set up” so that it makes something stand. Therefore, in Hebrew hitsdiq
would be “to justify,” that is, to make someone just. (p. 87; Vermigli
writes this while attempting to [lamely] defend imputation/forensic justification)
In
a footnote to the material above in bold, the translator and editor, Frank A.
James III, wrote:
Vermigli points out that often in
Hebrew a verb is stative in the ql conjugation is transitive in the hiph’il; in
English, verbs undergo similar change; e.g., “I walked to the store,” “I walked
the dog.” Thus, in Hebrew, tsadeq, “to be just,” becomes hitsdiq,
“to make just”; ‘amad, “to stand,” becomes he’emid, “to stand
[something] up.” (p. 87 n. 2)
Moreover, if faith itself is
considered our work, we cannot be justified by it, since as a work it is
imperfect and flawed, far beneath what the law requires. But we are said to be
justified by it [faith] because through it we take hold (apprehendimus)
of the promises of God and the righteousness and merits of Christ, and apply them
to ourselves. Suppose there were a beggar with a loathsome and leprous hand by
which he received alms from one who offered them. Surely that beggar is not
helped by the loathsomeness or leprosy of his hand, but by the alms he receives
with it, whatever kind of hand he has. No one is so gifted with the true piety
that he does not need to mourn deeply and feel sorry when he sees that many who
are called Christians are ignorant as to whether works justify. This doctrine
is the head, fountain and mainstay of all religion. Therefore, we should be
more sure and certain of this above all. But nowadays it is not only called
into controversy, but any disagree among themselves and wander dangerously from
the true doctrine. (pp. 96-97)
Richard Smith, in his little book on justification,
which he wrote against me, contends that a dead faith is indeed faith. The
chief argument is this: that the body of a dead man, even though it is dead,
still is a body. This wise man greatly delights in his illustration, in which
he has proclaimed a sophistical argument not unworthy of his genius and wit.
Let us examine briefly this admirable illustration. I would want him to explain
to me whether a dead body is the body of a dead man or is it simply the body of
a man? I do not think he will reply that it is the body of a man, for there is
a great difference between the body of a man and a dead body. Certainly, they
are more different than two species of the same genus, because they are
contained in neighboring but different genera. [452] I grant that the body of a
dead man is a body in terms of substance, as are stones, stocks, and other such
things, but I flatly deny that it is still truly the body of a man, for dead
removes the proper form or species from the body of a man, which it had before,
[453] but it leaves the general classification, is that it can only be called a
body. Even so, when a true and justifying faith is lost or ceases to be a true
and proper faith, it may even be called, according to its classification, a
cold assent born of human persuasion, not something that originated from the
Holy Spirit and has the same strength and efficacy it had before. Therefore, if
the similarity of the illustration is preserved on both sides of the argument,
this marvelous subtlety (erophologia) will not count against us, for
just as we confess that a dead body is a body, so also we grant that a dead
faith is faith, provided that we understand by faith a classification of all
kinds of faith, but not the true and lively faith by which we are justified.
This argument is false, based on equivocation. (p. 181)
Notes
for the above:
[452] Possibly a reference to Aristotle,
An. pr. 1.31. Cf. idem, Categoriae 1b.16-24; idem, Topica 7.3,
parts of animals 642b.7-20.643a.
[453] Aristotle, De anima 2.1,
412a.17ff.: the soul is “the form of a natural body”; cf. Martyr, “Image of
God, PW, 39ff.
