Sunday, April 24, 2016

Critique of Alister McGrath on the nature of Justification

[I]f Protestants insist that NT Justification is based on the juridical system of the Roman law court, this becomes a problem since there is no known Roman law (or Jewish law) that allows an innocent victim to take the legal punishment of an accused criminal so that the accused can go free. Dr. Horton’s colleague, Alister McGrath, tried to find such a connection in Roman private law, but the only thing he found was a concept called acceptiliation, which, according to McGrath, refers to the dissolution of an obligation by a verbal decree on the part of the one to whom the debt was due, without any form of payment having been exchanged (Iustitia Dei, II, p. 45). But this does not fit the Protestant concept of Atonement and Imputation, since the theory claims that Christ actually paid the debt, not merely let the culprit go free without anyone making a payment to the one owed. Thus, as it stands, there is no legal precedent for the forensic atonement used in Protestant soteriology . . . More importantly, McGrath also asserts that Greeks and Latins had decisively different ideas of the concept of merit, and that this was the main cause for the Latin church’s emphasis on merit and the prevalence of merit in medieval theology. According to McGrath, in Greek culture merit was only a matter of “estimation” which is not inherent in its object, i.e., considering an entity to be something that it is not in itself. McGrath asserts that merit, in the Latin culture, refers to the quality inherent in the object or person. 

Representative of these two meanings, according to McGrath, is the Greek passive axiousthai (“to deem worthy”) and the Latin equivalent, mereri. The Greek word that would have denoted “inherent merit” is meroma, from which the Latinmeritum is derived. McGrath’s conclusion: the disjunction between axiousthai and mereri is similar to the disjunction between dikaiosune and iustificare. Hence the Greek word has the primary sense of being considered righteous, whereas the Latin word denotes being righteous or the reason one is considered righteous. 

All in all, McGrath concludes that the initial transference of a Hebrew concept, to a Greek concept, to a Latin concept, led to a fundamental alteration in the concepts of justification and righteousness as the gospel spread from Palestine to the Western world (p. 15). Unfortunately, McGrath’s linguistic analysis and conclusion appear to read into history what his theology dictates. 

Despite the anomalies that always occur in translating a word from one language to another, it is a matter of certain faith that inspired Scripture, which translates Hebrew text into Greek text, cannot err, and does not envision the problem McGrath proposes. First, without reservation, the New Testament authors use the dikaioo cognates to translate the Hebrew and Septuagint cognates. These translations occur in many non-justification contexts (i.e., “non-imputation” contexts). 

For example, in 2 Cor. 9:9 Paul cites a quotation from Psalm 112:9 and uses the Greek dikaiosune to translate the Hebrew feminine noun tsadaqah (which the LXX also translates as dikaiosune). The context of 2 Cor. 9:9-10 concerns liberal giving, both of God and men, to those in need. 

Thus, contrary to McGrath’s thesis, dikaiosune is understood as that which is inherent within both God and man due to the good they have done. Similarly, Hebrews 1:9 uses dikaiosune to translate the Hebrew male noun tsadaq in Psalm 45:7 (of which the LXX uses dikaiosune) and speaks of the inherent righteousness of Christ. (The relevance of the LXX may be even more significant here since Hebrews 1:6 is quoted by Paul directly from the LXX). 

In addition, 1 Peter 3:12 uses dikaioo to translate the Hebrew adjective tsadeek of Psalm 34:15 (of which the LXX usesdikaious). The context of 1 Peter 3:12 regards righteous individuals as inherently righteous, for it is they who “turn from evil to do good” and “seek peace and pursue it.” Similarly, Hebrews 11:7 uses dikaiosune to describe the righteousness of Noah, translating the Hebrew adjective tsadeek in Genesis 7:1 which refers to God seeing Noah as inherently righteous for his goodness in the midst of the wicked people of his day. 

We should also add that Scripture does not support McGrath’s assessment of the Greek word axioo to refer only to the estimation of an individual rather than his merit (which he distinguishes from the Latin notion of merit that gives the individual the “right” of the third party estimation, i.e., because he is deserving of it). The New Testament uses axioo not only in considering someone worthy but also in recognizing someone worthy because he is actually worthy. For example, Hebrews 3:3 uses axioo in reference to Christ’s worthiness: “Jesus has been counted worthy of greater honor than Moses…” This is a common usage of axioo and its cognates in the New Testament (cf., 1 Thess. 1:11; 1 Tim. 5:17; Col 1:10; et al).  (Robert A. Sungenis, “Is justification by Faith Alone? Response to Michael S Horton”)

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