Writing in 1936, philosopher A.J. Ayer addressed the “problem” of induction:
It is time,
therefore, to abandon the superstition that natural science cannot be regarded
as logically respectable until philosophers have solved the problem of
induction. The problem of induction is, roughly speaking, the problem of
finding a way to prove that certain empirical generalizations which are derived
from past experience will hold good also in the future. There are only two ways
of approaching this problem on the assumption that it is a genuine problem, and
it is easy to see that neither of them can lead to its solution. One may
attempt to deduce the proposition which one is required to prove either from a
purely formal principle or from an empirical principle. In the former case one
commits the error of supposing that from a tautology it is possible to deduce a
proposition about a matter of fact; in the latter case one simply assumes what
one is setting out to prove. For example, it is often said that we can justify induction
by invoking the uniformity of nature, or by postulating a ‘principle of limited
independent variety’ (cf. J.M. Keynes, A Treatise on Probability, Part
III). But, in fact, the principle of the uniformity of nature merely states, in
a misleading fashion, the assumption that past experience is a reliable guide
to the future; while the principle of limited independent variety presupposes
it. And it is plain that any other
empirical principle which was put forward as a justification of induction would
beg the question in the same way. For the only grounds which one could have for
believing such a principle would be inductive grounds.
Thus it appears that there is no possible way of solving the problem of induction, as it is
ordinarily conceived. And this means that it is a fictitious problem, since all
genuine problems are at least theoretically capable of being solved: and the credit
of natural science is not impaired by the fact that some philosophers continue
to be puzzled by it. Actually, we shall see that the only test to which a form
of scientific procedure which satisfies the necessary condition of
self-consistency is subject, is the test of its success in practice. We are
entitled to have faith in our procedure just so long as it does the work which
it is designed to do – that is, enables us to predict future experience, and so
to control our environment. Of course, the fact that a certain form of
procedure has always been successful in practice affords no logical guarantee
that it will continue to be so. But then it is a mistake to demand a guarantee
where it is logically impossible to obtain one. This does not mean that it is
irrational to expect future experience to conform to the past. For when we come
to define ‘rationality’ we shall find that for us ‘being rational’ entails
being guided in a particular fashion by past experience. (A.J. Ayer, Language,
Truth and Logic [London: Penguin Books, 1971], 34-35)
While reading this book during the
weekend, it reminded me of a favourite tactic presuppositionalists use to “prove”
(1) their apologetic system and (2) their concept of God (absolute
divine simplicity and the like) as opposed to, among other belief systems, the "Mormon" concept of God, as they argue that only in such a worldview
does induction make sense. (and, as a result, "Mormonism" cannot explain such). Of course, such is absurd. To see a good article on
this, including interactions with the arguments of Greg Bahnsen (protégé of Van
Til), see
Michael Martin, Does
Induction Presume the Existence of the Christian God? (1997)
On the idea that John 4:24 and other-like
texts support traditional Christian concepts of God, see, for e.g.:
Lynn Wilder vs. Latter-day Saint (and Biblical) Theology on Divine Embodiment
There are many problems with ADS. As one Eastern Orthodox apologist (himself an advocate of divine simplicity [not the same as absolute divine simplicity] and also an EO presuppositionalist, so no friend of "Mormonism"), see:
Jay Dyer, ROMAN CATHOLIC ABSOLUTE DIVINE SIMPLICITY REFUTED – JAY DYER
